Behnam Ben Taleblu on the Elections in Iran Transcript

Sarah: Good afternoon and welcome to another topical and timely EMET webinar. As you know, we meet with members of Congress or their staffers almost every day. Many of them have come to rely on us for our accurate analysis of current events in the Middle East. Each week, we host webinars with subject matter experts and we write and publish at least one article as well. Please look out for my article due to appear in this week’s edition of Newsweek. The article is titled, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing and it deals with the newly elected president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian.

The people of Iran went to the polls last Friday. They elected Masoud Pezeshkian as their president. Pezeshkian is a 69-year-old former cardiologist. He won 53.6% of the vote to defeat his ultra conservative opponent, Saeed Jalili. There has been a tremendous amount of media enthusiasm for Masoud Pezeshkian. As expected, top among the enthusiasts was the New York Times. Given the election results, the New York Times asserted that Iran may now see a softening of its absolutist foreign policy and there may now be an opportunity for a new diplomatic opening. Not to be outdone, the Washington Post declared that an Iranian reformist had won the presidency and is seeking to engage with the West. Reuters also led with a headline noting that Iranian voters replaced their prior hardline president with a moderate.

The Iranian Council of Guardians examines presidential candidates to determine their fitness and to approve their candidacy. This Council is a non-elected body of twelve, six of whom are selected by the Supreme Leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. The other six are recommended by the head of the judiciary. On Monday, Pezeshkian reaffirmed his commitment to destroy the state of Israel. He reportedly stated that Iran’s many terror proxies across the region will not allow Israel’s criminal policies to continue. He wrote to Chief Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah saying, “I am certain that the resistance movements in the region will not allow this regime to continue its war-mongering and criminal policies against the oppressed people of Palestine, and other nations of the region.”

Is President Pezeshkian actually a reformer? Our guest today is Behnam Ben Taleblu. Benham is eminently qualified to discuss the Islamic Republic of Iran and its new president. Behnam is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on Iranian security and political issues. Behnam previously served as a research fellow and senior Iran analyst. Prior to joining the FDD, Behnam worked on non-proliferation issues at a think tank in Washington DC. Benham is often quoted in publications like the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Fox News, and the Associated Press. He has written for the Hill, Fox News, US News, World Report and also for publications like the Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy and the National Interest. He appears regularly on BBC News, Fox News, CSPAN and other news outlets. Behnam earned his MA in international relations from the University of Chicago and his BA in international affairs from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International affairs. Behnam, we are honored to host you once again. Can you explain to us who Masoud Pezeshkian is?

Behnam Ben Taleblu: Sarah, thank you for the opportunity to address you and your audience again. We are talking at a critical time as regards current events in both the US and in the Middle-East. The other day, we heard what some called breaking news. Apparently, the Director of National Intelligence connected the dots between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the material support being provided to pro-Gaza protesters here in the US. If you will forgive me, useful idiots here in the states have been amplifying the regime’s messages and integrating them into the American body politic for a long time. For the first time ever, we heard about the connection between the Iranian regime and the pro-Gaza protesters. There were a lot more questions than answers.

As you mentioned, the Iranian regime will soon conduct an inauguration ceremony for the person they selected to serve as their 14th president. We see little change in the way in which they are conducting this process. With respect to the staff and editorial boards of the western media, there is an understandable confusion, conflation of events and projection. If I look tired or appear downtrodden and dispossessed, it is because I am. I have the scars from previous debates about previous candidates. In the past, many of the same outlets missed the story of continuity and sold us a similar story of change. In 2014, the regime approved a candidate who was styled as a moderate. However, the same candidate amplified and intensified the policies that made the Islamic Republic of Iran a pariah state. People like Hassan Rouhani from back then, helped the Islamic republic by putting lipstick on the pig. Masoud Pezeshkian is here to serve the same purpose.

Their moderate façade, allows them to engage more deeply, but still transactionally, with western interlocutors and counterparts. At the same time, they continue working to achieve the stated goals of the Islamic republic. Their moderate disguise, helps the regime to stay on course with the objectives of achieving death to America and to Israel.

I think it is high time we remove the stigma that has been attached to some of our policy options until now. We need to stop advancing the fallacy that any kind of dialogue with the Iranian regime is productive dialogue. The only voice of consequence in the Islamic republic is the Supreme Leader, and that title is meant to be taken literally. I also have a qualm with the way the right in America views the regime. Those on America’s right have looked too statically at the story of stasis. They have missed Khamenei’s ability to balance multiple objectives and to move different pots and pans around like a chef in a very large kitchen. Khamenei, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard accord, and the supreme National Security Council, have been able to continue moving forward with their ultimate objectives while dealing with other challenges to Iran at the same time.

Iran went from a reformist president in the nineties and early two-thousands, to a polyester clad Holocaust denier. Then they moved from a western, moderate styled cleric, to another cleric who was the polar opposite and now to a heart surgeon styled as a reformer. The regime sends these different personas onto the playing field as needed. They provide the appropriate facade allowing the editorial boards and pages to project onto Iran that which they wish, versus what actually exists. As such, if you sense frustration in my voice and my appearance, it is because I have seen this situation before. We have been through this before, and we ought not to continue to make the same mistakes over and over again.

Iran recently conducted what was termed an electoral contest. Iran announced snap elections after the helicopter crash that killed Iran’s former president, Ibrahim Raisi. Eighty individuals auditioned for a chance to run for president. The Guardian Council then whittled the candidates down to six. As you mentioned, the Guardian Council is loyal to the Supreme Leader of Iran. The six candidates put forward to run for the position of president were evaluated and considered kosher, or more aptly, halal. The criteria for the evaluation included style, as well as substance. Over the past decade, politics here in the US has taught us the difference between a political candidate’s style versus their substance.

Iran selected a president with a fundamentally different style to the prior one, but without an accompanying change in substance. I do not think Pezeshkian was put in place to transform Iran’s relationship with America. He certainly has not been selected to change the relationship between Israel and Iran. I think he is more of an agent of stasis than of change. He was brought to the helm for a purpose.

His purpose at home is to fracture the dissidents and the opposition. The diaspora communities have been more engaged in advocating for regime change more than ever before. The population has been boycotting electoral contests en masse. The regime asserted they achieved a participation rate of 49.6%. In late June, during the previous round, the participation rate was said to be in the high thirties. There is no way that number grew at that speed in ten days. The regime talks about elections because it bolsters their legitimacy. It bolsters their security and it bolsters their deterrence. Legitimacy, security and deterrence form an unholy trinity. This unholy trinity is why Iranian religious, military and political officials fib on a routine basis. They want to be seen as having a groundswell of massive popular support because they believe it will immunize them from internal dissent and from external criticism.

You do not have to take it from me. You do not have to take it from someone working for FDD and living and working in Washington. A few months back, the commander of the aerospace force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps articulated the same opinion. He said the presence of people at the ballot box fills the magazines of the weapons of the armed forces. This illustrates that the regime sees their own people as instruments to be used to further their agenda. So, Pezeshkian was brought to help the regime at home. In particular, they selected him to help them survive the Women, Life, Freedom movement. They know they have lost the support of vast swaths of Iranian society. They are now hoping that a stylistic change will translate to increased domestic support for the regime.

If Trump re-elected, Pezeshkian could be helpful in shielding Iran from transatlantic coordination. If Biden is elected again, Pezeshkian could tempt the US into discussions on nuclear diplomacy. These discussions would provide the regime with sanctions relief even if they accomplish nothing. So, that is my 50,000-foot assessment.

I wanted to put forward my high-level assessment before discussing the details of Pezeshkian’s background and before discussing what he did as health minister and his role in parliament. I want to ensure we are clear on what the regime is trying to do here. This is not a normal election. This was not a situation of a population going to the polls with faith in their political system. This is an engineered process to achieve a specific outcome. The regime selected a candidate with a change in style and not substance.

Sarah: You mentioned economic change. How much of this election was engineered to relieve sanctions against Iran? How much of it was designed as a path to them becoming part of the international community’s Economic Development Corporation?

Behnam: Even under the ultra-hardline Raisi government, Iran was winning an increasing number of friends abroad. For lack of a better word, Iran achieved détente with Saudi Arabia, its ideational, ethnic and sectarian rival. It integrated itself into BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It also benefited immensely from the wave of antisemitism that followed Hamas’ October 7^th terrorist attacks. Following these attacks, the pariah state used changing political winds to paint a different state as a pariah.

So, the Islamic republic has no problem being seen as being part of the international community. What they do not want to do is to pay the price of being a normal nation. Their reason for being, both as a regime and as a state, is fundamentally from other states. They have different interests and a different orientation. So, we must be careful. This regime will be willing to do oil deals and to engage in business deals. However, these should not be interpreted as an actual sign of moderation or genuine reform.

What we are seeing with the selection of Pezeshkian, is a continuation of the playbook followed by the technocrats at the helm in the 1990s, under the Rafsanjani government. They appeared competent and their actions seemed rational. It looked like they were trying to improve the economy after the Iran-Iraq war. However, they were still involved in nefarious activities like organizing the terrorist attack in Buenos Aires, Argentina. I think this is essentially the track that Pezeshkian will follow.

Yes, he has a mandate to improve Iran’s economy. However, he also has a more important mandate from the Supreme Leader. He is seeking sanctions relief, but he is also looking to introduce transaction costs and shocks into a growing transatlantic alliance. The Biden administration may have been shaky on Iran, but the European Union has toughened their stance. They were to the right of America at the last IEA Board of governors meeting. The Canadians recently designated the IRGC, in its entirety, as a terrorist organization. These are not small issues for the Iranian regime and someone like Pezeshkian may provide the stylistic change needed to help reverse these types of decisions.

Sarah: We did see videos of people celebrating on the street after Pezeshkian was selected. The videos were produced by the Islamic republic. How much of this type of coverage do you think is real? Do you think the people within the Islamic republic really believe the propaganda the republic is putting forward about Pezeshkian? Do they believe he is a moderate and a reformer? Will he change the hijab laws? Will there be freedom of dissent? Will there be freedom of the press?

Behnam: Whenever someone styled as a reformist comes to the helm in Iran, Iran-watching communities around the world engage in academic debates. The debates focus on whether the individuals themselves intend to institute meaningfully change. We also make the assumption that the individual actually wants to institute reform, and then discuss whether Iran’s byzantine political system allows for it. Whichever way you look at it, the conclusion is that the individual cannot institute meaningful reform. It is important to respect what the debates reveal and not to push away from the table.

To emphasize the importance of this, we should consider statistics from the regime from about two weeks ago, when Pezeshkian was still one of six candidates. Two of the thirty Iranian provinces saw an increase in voter participation from the 2021 election which brought Raisi to the helm. The first of these provinces was Tehran, the base and political headquarters of the reformists. The second was Qom, a major Shiite seminary city. Every other province in Iran saw a downturn in electoral turnout in the first round of the election. This is based on a comparison on voter turnout in the Iranian calendar year 1403, versus turnout in the Iranian calendar year 1400.

There is a reformist faction in Iran. However, their definition of reformist is very different from ours. More importantly, entry to that reformist faction is highly selective. These reformists are people with means, and with access to political and economic elites. They are mostly members of the upper middle class and the upper class of Iranian society and they lend legitimacy to the system. Although they may not buy-in to the system completely, they believe that capital is king. They live the luxurious lifestyle you see in the Instagrams of the rich kids of Tehran. Even though Iran is subject to sanctions, there is excess capital there just like there is in other places across the Persian Gulf. Black-market crony capitalism is flourishing in this hyper- Islamist and authoritarian regime. There is no doubt the individuals in the reformist faction look cooler than I do. However, just because someone looks fashionable and modern, does not mean their politics are moral and good. This describes the people inclined to support the reformist faction in Iran.

The vast majority of Iranians did not show up at the polling stations. They were the ones making memes and jokes and mocking the fact this presidential selection was even termed an election. These people come from different geographies, social classes, ages and demographic groups and do not necessarily dress fashionably. Generation Z is at the helm of this protest movement. Since 2017 or 2018, they have been telling the reformists that the game is over. The vast majority of the population boycotted the so-called election. They do not need to safeguard a Maserati or mansion in Tehran and they are not a member of an ideological Basij family. This population is done with the fiction that there are two sides to a political spectrum in Iran.

Sarah: Why is the West so willing to believe Iranian propaganda? Why are we so quick to apply our own interpretations to words like moderate and reformer?

Behnam: General McMaster coined the term strategic narcissism. General McMaster discussed strategic narcissism in terms of foreign policy and strategy in Washington. He discussed how we insist on placing Washington at the center of every foreign policy issue, when, in reality, our adversaries have their own views and their own agency. People inject a role for America into all sorts of debates and conversations. They do this even when discussing events in places as far away as South America or even South Asia. They fail to consider there are organic things happening in these parts of the world that have nothing to do with the US. In these instances, we should not insert ourselves into their affairs. There is irony in this. On the one hand, the academy in the US talks constantly about ethnocentrism and eurocentrism. On the other hand, the US continues to impose American and Western viewpoints into every discussion.

The West, and the US specifically, have a cultural issue as well. We swallow every counter American narrative hook line and sinker. Narratives with a counter American zeitgeist mainstream flavor, are particularly appealing to us. We insist things are as bad as they are because the causal chain points to something America did, rather than something that may have happened organically.

So, combining strategic narcissism with the cultural element, makes us culturally illiterate as scholars, experts and analysts. We use the terms they feed us and we fall for their arguments. In terms of the next generation of scholarship on Iran, what we really need is cultural literacy.

Sarah: Over the past several months, we have seen many nations running to Tehran. This includes those who signed Abraham Accords with the United States. Why do you think that is?

Behnam: I am incredibly worried about this. Rulers like Mohammed Bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, do not suddenly harbor different emotional views of Tehran. I am sure they still see the Islamic Republic as a malign force. However, the Arab states of the Gulf, live in a smaller universe than we do, given their location. Washington’s bipartisan foreign policy failures have severely impacted these Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states over the past decade and a half. Washington has failed to counter, contain or roll back the diverse threat posed by the Islamic republic. We have failed to counter Iranian threats regarding nuclear missiles, the military, proxy terrorism and illicit finance. These GCC countries literally live on the front lines. As such, they are forced to go between balancing and band-wagoning to continue creating the space for their political existence. They live in a changing world. This means they have had to extend their regional balancing and band-wagoning so they can contend with a more globalized and multipolar world than ever before.

We are seeing the Tehran-Riyadh normalization happening before the Riyadh-Jerusalem normalization. We are seeing a war criminal like Putin welcomed with open arms in the UAE. Bahrain has had its territorial integrity and sovereignty threatened by the Islamic Republic on a routine basis, yet they too are now being forced to hedge their bets. I think we should absolutely be constraining this unproductive behavior from our friends and key partners in the region. However, I understand why they are doing it. They are doing it because administrations over the past decade and a half have not always had their backs. They observed the secret, backdoor diplomacy conducted with Iran during the negotiation of the JPOA. They have taken note of the hostage diplomacy with Oman and the politics of the Yemen war. The Saudis also contended with reaction of the US to the Khashoggi crisis.

The three most recent presidents, Obama, Trump and Biden, talked very differently about many issues. However, whenever they talk about the Middle-East, they talk about leaving and then pivot to Asia. They almost mock our major partners in the region, despite their political and military integration into a US supported order there.

Iranians have taken note of this. They have been able to put a shiv in the side of the GCC states. The did this with the Houthis, with the Aramco attack and with drone attack and missile attacks. They start with the knife and then they follow up with the handshake. The Islamic Republic is not trying to erase these Arab states or to turn them into mini-Islamic Republics overnight. Rather, they are trying to create problems for them arising from their partnerships with Israel and the US. They are forcing the GCC states to hedge and to pay for their security. As an example, Riyadh may not have actively joined the Red Sea piracy and anti-shipping activity happening since November. However, since the Houthis entered the fight, they have not attacked Saudi Arabia once. So, Iran is working to box in these states in this way. I understand the moves they are making and they are setting a very dangerous precedent.

Sarah: You mentioned that the European Union has moved to the right of the United States. However, in the recent elections, the French and British parliaments have moved to the left. How do you think that will impact the region and how will it impact their relationships with Israel?

Behnam: I have not followed the French election very closely. The EU is about the economic and political Franco-German partnership. One hopes Germany can still help bring the French towards the center. With respect to Iran, we are seeing some helpful signs from the Labour Party in the UK.  I am not referring to the backbenchers, but to those who were part of the Labour Party’s shadow government. Some of these parliamentarians do not see the region through rose colored glasses. They have spoken about supporting the prescription of the IRGC as a terrorist organization in the UK. So now this new government has an opportunity to put their money where their mouth is with respect to Iran.

What we hear from Jeremy Corbyn and his affiliates about Israel is very much cause for concern. However, there might be room for optimism. The situation is like a kaleidoscope. The answer you receive on any issue, depends on how you spin it. You will get a drastically different answer with a slightly different constellation of players. So, I think we need to keep a careful watch on the impacts of the recent elections as regards their relationships with Israel.

Sarah: Pezeshkian comes from a Kurdish region. I am not sure if he is actually Kurdish, but he has some affiliations with minority groups. He does speak Arabic and Kurdish. Did he get any Kurdish support in the election?

Behnam: I have not yet completed a post runoff assessment. Pezeshkian is actually Azeri and Kurdish and he does speak Arabic. He also speaks Kurdish and Azeri. I believe he speaks English and French to some degree as well. Pezeshkian has Azeri Kurdish lineage patrilineally and matrilineally and one might think that is an interesting thing to examine further. However, I suspect this is not really the case. Iran’s Supreme Leader is also half Azeri so there is a bit kaleidoscope here as well.

If one does want to play the game of believing suspect regime statistics, there are two areas to consider. There are the two minority province areas that were highly active during the 2022 to 2023 Women, Life, Freedom uprising. These areas were Kurdistan in the west and Sistan and Baluchestan in the southeast. This may debunk what some outlets are saying about him being able to garner more of the minority vote because of his heritage.

Sarah: Interesting and to be continued. One of our viewers asked if we can make regime change our strategy?

Behnam: We could if we all shared similar goals. I think the vast majority of people in the US want a more representative government in Iran. However, they also have security concerns, including a non- nuclear Iran. That could be the goal. That could be a minimum requirement from which we could build a better Iran policy. You could have the objective of a non-nuclear Iran. The way to achieve this might be via regime change. To achieve this, we could apply maximum pressure on the regime and provide maximum support for the Iranian people. We have to tie in the thing that the regime fears the most, its population. The Iranian regime does not fear Israeli military pushback and US cyber or military attacks as much as it fears its own population. They have said it and they have shown it and we have to leverage it. We should make the argument that regime change is in the US national interest and also in our ideational interest. We need to demonstrate that this actually correlates and overlaps with the interests of the Iranian people. Washington has the luxury of making this argument in this case and Washington seldom gets to demonstrate an alignment between strategy and values in the region.

Sarah: Yeah. How much of Iran’s presidential selection was to placate the domestic Iranian population and how much of it was for international consumption?

Behnam: I think the reason for Pezeshkian’s selection was split evenly between those two objectives. However, their aim was shatter and not to placate. The regime aims to shatter two consensuses. They plan to shatter the consensus formed by the majority of Iranians in Iran. Iranians of all types agree that the government in Tehran is the major problem for people in their country. Irrespective of age, ethnic and social background and class, Iranians converge on one central truth, they do not support what their government has done over the past decade.

The regime wants to shatter this coalescence amongst its population. That is why they killed 1500 people in response to the November 2019 protests. It explains why we did not just witness a harsh response to the Women, Life, Freedom protests, but also to those that occurred a few months prior. It is also why we observed a heavy-handed response to the six-plus day nationwide protests in Iran. These protests were ignited by a combination of poor economic governance, the war in Ukraine, war induced supply chain shortages and pandemic and post pandemic induced shocks. All of these factors impacted the wheat trade across the Middle east and led to major protests in Iran. The regime understands that there is fertile ground for the next round of protests. They are now trying to subvert them using a stylistic approach.

The other reason for Iran’s presidential selection is the regime’s attempt to disrupt the warming transatlantic consensus. The Europeans are discussing the danger posed by Iranian drones. They are expanding their ballistic missile sanctions on the Islamic republic. These are game changing actions from our European friends. Of course we would love them to do more. We would love to see a snapback on sanctions as of yesterday. However, the Europeans are not resting on their laurels and they are taking some action. They have implemented over a dozen rounds of human rights sanctions since the beginning of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. Our allies in the transatlantic community deserve support, particularly since they are coming under fire from their own parliament for taking action. The regime does not want this to continue. They are afraid that if there is a Trump administration 2.0, the US would revert to the maximum pressure campaign and would bring its friends along with it. So, they are setting the stage to shatter that consensus.

We are seeing many reports speculating about potential candidates for the position of Pezeshkian’s foreign minister. Mohammad Jabad Zarif was the foreign minister under President Rouhani. Zarif’s deputy is Abbas Araghchi. There is a report saying Araghchi could become Pezeshkian’s foreign minister. He was on a member of Pezeshkian’s campaign staff and participated in the JCPOA talks. This guy is very likely to be about to play musical chairs and obtain a promotion to foreign minister.

Sarah: Speaking of the JCPOA and snapback sanctions, many clauses of the JCPOA have already expired, or about to expire. Most Americans are totally oblivious to this. Can you talk about the sanctions that are about to expire?

Behnam: Yeah, the topic of the JCPOA is really funny in some ways. The Iran related debate here in Washington is still tied to the JCPOA. We have reports discussing the prospect of a renewed nuclear deal with Iran. The JCPOA is an obsession in the transatlantic community. It is an obsession among our European friends and interlocutors who still believe in its non-proliferation value. There is also a flank of the Democratic Party that still considers the JCPOA central to our foreign policy and a political dogma. However, the JCPOA is not necessarily what is in the zeitgeist. Pezeshkian did bring it up during the “campaign” season. He discussed the JCPOA, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other initiatives the Rouhani government would have liked to have taken to the next level. However, these initiatives are not widely discussed in the Iranian press, nor do they carry the same weight as they do here. This is because the Iranians have moved on. Everyone else has moved on.

There was an arms embargo against Iran which expired in 2020. I remember the vigorous, vitriolic fights about it in late summer and early fall of 2020. At that time, our friends in Europe did not see the value of defending this international arms embargo. They viewed the Iranian weapon proliferation as an Israeli and an Arab problem. In retrospect, this was an extremely shortsighted approach. A mere two years later, we are observing Iranian drones targeting Europe’s critical infrastructure. They are killing European citizens and underwriting Putin’s war machine. This was a failure of imagination but it was also a failure to assess trend lines and objective realities. We are now paying the price for them seeing the world as they wished it to be, rather than as it was.

In 2023, there was a lapse in a major prohibition on Iran’s ballistic missile testing and transfers. Soon after, the Russians sent a note out saying that they would no longer be constrained legally or politically from purchasing any sort of arms from the Islamic Republic. This included missiles. They also make it clear there would be a two-way transfer of weapons between the two countries. The Islamic Republic has transgressed a host of nuclear related clauses. In November 2021, the Europeans were already discussing how Iran’s nuclear violations and advances were eroding the counter proliferation benefits of the JCPOA. As I mentioned, the Europeans were to America’s right at the IEA board of governors about a month ago. They were worried about previously undeclared nuclear sites, about Iran’s gaps in the monitoring of videos when it comes to their centrifuge production and about the advanced centrifuges they are bringing online. They were also concerned about tunneling at another site, potentially at Natanz.

So, there are many concerns here. We are focusing on Pezeshkian, the death of Raisi and a bit on events in the region. We are not talking about the crown jewel, the nuclear program and that is precisely what the regime wants.

Sarah: Behnam, do you believe that Iran has passed the nuclear threshold?

Behnam: In terms of the academic definition of a nuclear threshold nation, they are a borderline threshold nation right now. I am working on a paper with an Israeli scholar. She worked at the Israeli Atomic Energy Agency, but she is a think-tanker now and her views are her own. She and I are bouncing around a thesis about Iran’s political and technical strategy. We suspect Iran can achieve the equivalence of nuclear deterrence by using their current political and technical strategy with their drones, missiles and terrorist apparatus layered on top. We think they can obtain nuclear deterrence without any of the costs of weaponization. Free nuclear deterrence for Iran becomes a function of a technical strategy of latency and a political strategy of hedging. It also relies on long-range strike capabilities like ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones, anti-ship capabilities like cruise missiles and ballistic missiles and its terrorist apparatus. The combination of all of these, allows the regime to continue exporting its revolution and functioning like the terrorist state it is. This is not to say that the regime would not go all the way in developing nuclear weapons, but helps explain why the regime feels confident enough to keep doing what it is doing right now.

They routinely threaten to complete development of a nuclear weapon and they have weaponized these threats. Regime officials have compared development of a nuclear weapon to building a car, noting that all it requires is assembly of all the components which are already available. Iranian parliamentarians and IRGC nuclear security chiefs have threatened to go all the way in building a nuclear bomb if compelled to do so. These comments are happening more and more frequently and we should expect to see more of them in the Iranian press as well. They serve as a deterrent. The regime is warning us that they have amassed the capability to develop nuclear weapons and so we had better not antagonize them. Iran is sitting on the fence and that is the problem. It is not a huge technical leap for them to complete development of a nuclear weapon. Until then, they can exert tremendous influence simply by threatening to do it.

Axios published an interesting story about a month ago. They discussed the possibility that some computer modeling had been restarted in Tehran. The story illustrated that there is not a clear consensus on the definition of what constitutes weaponization. This is a huge intelligence problem because there is no glaring red flag for us to focus on. The regime has succeeded in going from zero to 60% and then to 84% enrichment and they have gotten away with it.

Sarah: The late Qasem Soleimani spoke about creating a ring of fire around the state of Israel. I think there are many people in the United States who believe that this is a problem for Israel only. What would it take to wake up the West, and the United States, in particular? What will it take for us to realize that this is not just Israel’s problem but a problem for the entire western world?

Behnam: Over the past four decades, Qasem Soleimani and the Quds force architected the Islamic republic’s proxy terror group and militia strategy. This strategy helps them to deny the reality of what they are doing. It allows them to choose to fight low intensity and asymmetric wars across a series of failed states across the region. They are not only targeting Israelis and Americans. In the past they have also targeted coalition members in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. They have been successful in harassing their neighbors and eroding at what is left of Middle East governments and alliances. The GCC states are in their sights and Jordan is now one of their targets as well. So, this is not just an Israeli problem at all.

The first secretary general of NATO was asked why NATO was created. I am going to paraphrase his response. He said it was to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in. The Islamic republic version of that is to keep the Americans out, the Arabs down, and the militias strong. Their objective is to bring death through 1000 cuts to both Israel and the US. You do not have to take this from me. After the October 7^th attack, the militias in Iraq, Syria and Jordan were firing at US positions. Since October, we have absorbed around 180 different strikes on our positions in those countries. We have returned fire about 17 to 20 times. The number of attacks on US positions, reveal that they are definitely targeting the US.

Sarah: Very frightening. Let me turn to one of my wonderful staffers, Joseph Epstein. Joseph, do you have any further questions?

Joseph Epstein Thank you, Sarah. And thank you, Behnam, for being with us today. You mentioned earlier that you believe Pezeshkian probably will not change much in terms of substance. How much power does he actually have to make changes? Ibrahim Raisi, was considered very conservative. What was he able to change while he was president?

Behnam: The Iranian space program expanded considerably under the Raisi government, particularly the IRGC’s space program. While president, Raisi increased the funding for this significantly. The Iranians made great technical strides and greatly increased their competency in this area during his presidency. They made progress in developing liquid and solid propellant space launch vehicles. Although this occurred under President Raisi, it does not imply he was working the phones day and night to get it done. What it does imply is that he had the people in place and the political will to make it happen. More importantly, he had the green light from institutions above him.

Pezeshkian might be able to impact policy in a minor stylistic way. You may recall I mentioned that someone like Abbas Araghchi may be promoted to foreign minister soon. The promotion of such an individual may be an indication that Pezeshkian is planning to tempt the West with some kind of nuclear diplomacy. It might also imply that he has a green light from the office of the Supreme Leader to play this game again. To succeed at these games, tone matters. From 2006 to 2010, the UN Security Council passed a series of substantial sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Then Iranian president, Ahmadinejad, openly mocked them. He labeled the UN Security Council as a body part constantly spitting things out. Iranian reformists criticized Ahmadinejad for his failure to understand the power of the UNSC and of their resolutions, So, some Iranian presidents bring a technical competency and others highlight gross technical non-competencies. Their differences are a function of Iran’s personalist policy.

Joseph: You touched on the issue of Pezeshkian coming from a minority community. You also mentioned that the regime fears its own people more than anything. Some people assert that some minority communities may have separatist intentions and Pezeshkian may serve to assuage these intentions. What would you say to that? Do you think that’s accurate?

Behnam: Not entirely, the regime uses brute military force to quell perceived separatist intentions. That is why they practice military drills in a lot of these provinces. If you follow the Iranian press, you see they report everything from real stories about busting drugs and smuggling rings, to made up stories about busting foreign intelligence rings. The minorities in these provinces live under the propaganda and the material fist of the Islamic republic.

The vast majority of individuals living on the geographic and social and political periphery of Iran, are actually not secessionists and separatists. These are just assertions used by the regime to justify their massive crackdowns. Pezeshkian has both the Azeri and Kurdish blood. As such, he might be able to try and assuage some of minority concerns stylistically. However, he will not really grant them equality before the law. They will also not obtain respect from the central government in Tehran.

Sarah: In 2023, the regime executed more people than any other nation, it was an astronomical number. Can you tell us more about why these people were executed?

Behnam: Most were charged and executed for political reasons. Iran charges people for “warring with God” or “spreading corruption on the earth”. I think the Islamic republic uses their justice (or injustice) system to adjudicate their political fights with society. A huge number of Iranian executions over the past two decades have also been tied to drugs. People have been executed for real and alleged drug violations. The Islamic republic even executes minors on drug related offenses.

Sarah: Based on your discussion today, I do not think Pezeshkian is going to change the regime’s behavior. It sounds like he will also not impact their nuclear program or their terror proxies. I doubt that he will change the regime’s attitude towards dissent, freedom to gather, freedom of the press, and freedom for women. Despite the buzz in the international press, I do not think the relationship between Iran and the rest of the world is really going to change. The same holds true for Iran’s internal domestic policies.

Behnam: I would like to add a quick footnote. The press should be reporting that Pezeshkian has already spoken with Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Together, they discussed their ideological alignment. He also spoke with America’s great competitor, Putin of Russia. While campaigning, Pezeshkian tried to gain popularity by quipping at some of the other hardliners at the stage. However, while in parliament, he wore the IRGC uniform, supported the downing of American drones by the IRGC, and commended the regime’s militarist and confrontational policy. During the Trump administration, he supported a bill that I believe was called the newer plan. This bill included a massive nuclear escalation. So, his track record illustrates he is here to change us and not to change Iran or the regime.

Sarah: Exactly. Thank you so much, Behnam, for your brilliance. Please, if you like what you hear, support the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies at https://www.fdd.org/. Please also support us at https://emetonline.org/. We depend on you, our listeners, to allow us to continue our important work. Thank you so much, Behnam. It is a pleasure.

Behnam: Thank you. Pleasure.

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