Biden’s too little, too late

American efforts to facilitate a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia are nothing new. Over the past year, the Biden administration has worked to achieve this historic deal, which would effectively end the Arab-Israeli conflict. The window of opportunity, it now seems, has shut and won’t reopen in time for America’s next presidential election. For President Joe Biden and his Saudi deal, it’s too little, too late.

A quest for legacy

Having given up on his bid for reelection, Biden has one thing on his mind: legacy. With his 50-year political career ending, Biden’s focus is on shaping our collective memory of him. Often, economic and social issues are what drive voters to the polls. However, events on the world stage often shape our perception of our former leaders. Biden, having been foreign-policy-oriented throughout the lion’s share of his political career, understands this better than anyone.

Little can be said for the Biden-Harris administration’s achievements in the global arena. Afghanistan, Ukraine, Russia, Israel, Hamas and Iran all bring up bitter memories of Biden’s handling of geopolitical matters. Biden flaunts bringing NATO together in Ukraine’s defense, as well as successful coordination against Iran’s unprecedented attack on Israel. However, it could be argued that under a different American president, these crises would never have happened in the first place.

Biden began to realize this before the breakout of the Middle East’s most recent conflict. Subconsciously, he may have realized that his presidency was entering its final year. Eager to cement his legacy, Biden looked for gold where his predecessor had found it: Israeli-Arab relations. President Donald Trump set the stage with the Abraham Accords, ushering in a new era of regional normalization for Israel. Biden, on the other hand, saw an opportunity to connect the biggest piece of the normalization puzzle: Saudi Arabia.

The too little

Saudi Arabia understands the value of a normalization deal with Israel. It would be a tremendous achievement not just for the two parties, but for the crowned broker of such a deal. This understanding stems from Israel’s deals with Saudi Arabia’s neighbors.

Riyadh looked on as their Emirati neighbors received the promise of a sought-after F-35 deal, free from Israeli objections; Bahrain received security guarantees ensuring their future sovereignty and stability; Morocco received historic recognition of its sovereignty in Western Sahara; and Sudan was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Saudi Arabia began to imagine the magnitude of the American concessions it could extract in exchange for normalization.

In the summer of 2023, the Saudi price tag became public and double-sided: On one side, a U.S.-Saudi defense treaty, cementing the bilateral security relationship in the face of American political trends; on the other, U.S. cooperation on a Saudi nuclear program, boosting Riyadh’s efforts to diversify its national economy and energy.

The Palestinian issue, it seems, was initially an afterthought for the Saudis. Riyadh seemed willing to accept general rhetorical statements from Israel on the matter. It was actually the Biden administration that saw an opportunity to demand concrete Israeli steps in exchange for the deal. These obstacles prolonged the parties’ negotiation efforts. However, they surely could have been overcome.

Unlike the Abraham Accords, American concessions needed for a Saudi-Israeli deal could not be delivered by the administration alone. A defense treaty, like any treaty, would require the support of 67 senators at the least. Generally, American nuclear cooperation with foreign nations requires House approval as well. In an almost evenly split Senate, passage of the necessary legislation would require broad bipartisan support. Normalization with Israel would likely bring on board almost all Republican senators. However, serious convincing by the administration would be needed to ensure the support of enough Democrats.

Some argue that only a Democratic administration could convince enough Democratic senators to support a U.S.-Saudi treaty. Even with this assumption, would this administration be willing to make such large concessions? Was the Biden administration ever capable of meeting all of Saudi Arabia’s demands? Or could it only deliver too little?

The too late

For years, the Biden-Saudi relationship has been defined by a lack of trust from Riyadh. Biden’s presidency is perceived as a revival of Obama-era attitudes towards the kingdom and the whole Middle East.

Saudis watched as Biden’s boss welcomed a wave of violent revolutions across the region’s republics. Gulf monarchies were left to fend for themselves against a rising Muslim Brotherhood, threatening national and regional stability.

Just when fears of political upheaval had subsided, President Barack Obama signed a nuclear deal with Riyadh’s greatest rival—Iran. Obama’s alienation of Saudi Arabia came to a head towards the end of his presidency. In several interviews, Obama referred to America’s Gulf allies as “free riders” who should “share” the Middle East with Iran.

The Trump era was a welcome change for the Saudis. The former president’s first trip abroad was to Riyadh. They felt Trump accepted the nature of the bilateral relationship—a transactional exchange of oil for security—and also understood the royal Saudi mindset itself. Not pressing Saudi leadership on social and political issues, Trump allowed the kingdom to progress at its own pace.

Biden was quick to revive Riyadh’s Obama trauma. While campaigning for the presidency, Biden pledged to make the Saudis “the pariah that they are.” The Saudis were quick to react, realigning their regional and global posture. Riyadh strengthened ties with Russia and China and refused to consider American demands on coordination of OPEC’s oil production. Simultaneously, it moved to forge a more positive relationship with the rival from across the Gulf. In March 2023, a Chinese-brokered détente agreement was signed that also served to bolster Beijing’s regional influence.

Only at this point did Biden’s “legacy bug” appear, and an Israeli-Saudi peace deal was added to the administration’s to-do list. Just over 18 months remained until Election Day. The task of steering the U.S.-Saudi ship away from the iceberg and towards the shores of peace seemed hard enough.

Then Oct. 7 happened.

The ensuing war in Israel and Gaza had a freezing effect on efforts to pursue regional normalization. Outrage in the Arab world forced Saudi Arabia to elevate its demands for progress on the Palestinian issue. Simultaneously, Israel’s emerging security needs prevent it from delivering on those demands in the near future. Neither side, it seems, will be changing course before the November presidential election.

Some blame the Israel-Hamas war on the failure of efforts to reach an Israeli-Saudi deal under this administration. Indeed, it may have forced negotiations into a setback too big to overcome in such a short time. However, the war is not the root cause of this administration’s inability to deliver on its mission. The problem was the Biden administration’s professed hostile policies and rhetoric towards Riyadh and its failure to embrace opportunities when conditions were ripe. Its actions turned Saudi-Israeli normalization into a mountain too high for the parties to climb.