As the Israeli government contemplates going into Gaza City, there are some rays of hope on the horizon.

The E3 Nations, (France, Germany and the United Nations) have decided to “snapback” the sanctions on Iran. This is all within the framework of the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA). Any nation can do this, and, as opposed to UN resolutions, this is not subject to a veto in the Security Council.

These three nations notified the UN Security Council on August 28, 2025. This indicates that United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 could be invoked, resulting in the reimposition of pre-existing sanctions on Iran.  This is because Iran has accumulated a very large stockpile of highly enriched uranium that is way beyond the 3 per cent required for energy consumption, perilously close to 90 per cent uranium, or “weapons grade.” They have also closed many sensitive sites off to the International Atomic Energy Administration, (IAEA), inspectors.

There is a 30 day period for the UN Security Council to either negotiate a new agreement, or the sanctions will be reimposed. Iran, of course, wants to conceal its inequities behind the cover of extended diplomacy.

 Iran has only admitted these inspectors to the Bushehr nuclear plant. In the 12-day June joint military operations against Iran by Israel and the United States against the Islamic Republic, Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan, underwent severe damage, and the IAEA inspectors have been blocked by the Islamic Republic.

Another piece of welcome news is that UN Security Council has finally  voted to dismantle the peacekeeping force UNIFIL, (The UN Interim Force in Lebanon),  which has been in place for nearly five decades. UNIFIL was created when Israeli forces withdrew from Southern Lebanon in 1978. However, it has served as a “tripwire”, preventing Israeli forces from protecting their own sovereignty, often serving to conceal Hezbollah’s activities

The unsettling news linked to this is that UNIFIL is not scheduled to withdraw until over the next two years. As Lieutenant Colonel Sarit Zehavi of IDF explains,  “The organization’s mandate allows it to patrol freely in open areas to search for weapons caches, but it has done nearly nothing to confiscate these weapons or eliminate Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. Nineteen years since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL has offered proof of confiscating a grand total of one Hezbollah rocket launcher.”

Lieutenant Colonel Zahavi continues, “The force also interfered with Israeli operations in the south during the 2023-24 war. Despite IDF warnings, UNIFIL did not evacuate from the war zone and continued patrols during some battles, allowing Hezbollah fighters to escape.”

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun had vowed to have only one militia in Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces, and has vowed to “place all weapons in Lebanon under state control.” He began this initiative with the Fatah faction at the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp in southern Beirut.

However, the main goal is to reduce Hezbollah’s influence within Lebanon. This may be challenging, as a significant portion of the Shiite population expresses stronger loyalty to Hezbollah than to the Lebanese government and views Hezbollah as operating in parallel to the state.

Despite Israel’s stunning ”pager operation” in Lebanon on September 17, 2024, and Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination ten days later in Dahieh, Hezbollah remains a major political, economic and military force inside certain segments of the Lebanese demographic mosaic.

Regional dynamics are further complicated by the delicate balance of power between state institutions and fealty to non-state actors. The upcoming withdrawal of UNIFIL, though gradual, marks a pivotal shift that could redefine security arrangements and political alliances along Lebanon’s southern border. As international actors recalibrate their involvement, both Israeli and Lebanese leaders face the arduous task of bolstering national security while navigating entrenched loyalties and longstanding rivalries.

Amid ongoing uncertainty, diplomatic channels remain active, yet the risk of escalation persists. The specter of renewed conflict hovers over the region, fueled by persistent arms smuggling, porous borders, and the ambiguous status of militant groups. International mediators, including the E3 nations and the UN, are pressed to forge consensus and encourage de-escalation, even as local realities threaten to undermine these efforts.

Looking ahead, the fate of Lebanon’s fragile sovereignty hinges on a complex interplay of internal reforms and external pressures. The promise of consolidating state control over all armed factions will require not only legislative resolve but also a sustained campaign to win the trust of diverse communities. As security guarantees shift and diplomatic efforts intensify, the region stands at a crossroads—its future shaped by both the weight of history and the resolve of its leaders to chart a more stable course.

Sarah N. Stern is Founder and President of EMET.

As the Israeli government contemplates going into Gaza City, there are some rays of hope on the horizon.

The E3 Nations, (France, Germany and the United Nations) have decided to “snapback” the sanctions on Iran. This is all within the framework of the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA). Any nation can do this, and, as opposed to UN resolutions, this is not subject to a veto in the Security Council.

These three nations notified the UN Security Council on August 28, 2025. This indicates that United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 could be invoked, resulting in the reimposition of pre-existing sanctions on Iran.  This is because Iran has accumulated a very large stockpile of highly enriched uranium that is way beyond the 3 per cent required for energy consumption, perilously close to 90 per cent uranium, or “weapons grade.” They have also closed many sensitive sites off to the International Atomic Energy Administration, (IAEA), inspectors.

There is a 30 day period for the UN Security Council to either negotiate a new agreement, or the sanctions will be reimposed. Iran, of course, wants to conceal its inequities behind the cover of extended diplomacy.

 Iran has only admitted these inspectors to the Bushehr nuclear plant. In the 12-day June joint military operations against Iran by Israel and the United States against the Islamic Republic, Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan, underwent severe damage, and the IAEA inspectors have been blocked by the Islamic Republic.

Another piece of welcome news is that UN Security Council has finally  voted to dismantle the peacekeeping force UNIFIL, (The UN Interim Force in Lebanon),  which has been in place for nearly five decades. UNIFIL was created when Israeli forces withdrew from Southern Lebanon in 1978. However, it has served as a “tripwire”, preventing Israeli forces from protecting their own sovereignty, often serving to conceal Hezbollah’s activities

The unsettling news linked to this is that UNIFIL is not scheduled to withdraw until over the next two years. As Lieutenant Colonel Sarit Zehavi of IDF explains,  “The organization’s mandate allows it to patrol freely in open areas to search for weapons caches, but it has done nearly nothing to confiscate these weapons or eliminate Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. Nineteen years since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL has offered proof of confiscating a grand total of one Hezbollah rocket launcher.”

Lieutenant Colonel Zahavi continues, “The force also interfered with Israeli operations in the south during the 2023-24 war. Despite IDF warnings, UNIFIL did not evacuate from the war zone and continued patrols during some battles, allowing Hezbollah fighters to escape.”

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun had vowed to have only one militia in Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces, and has vowed to “place all weapons in Lebanon under state control.” He began this initiative with the Fatah faction at the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp in southern Beirut.

However, the main goal is to reduce Hezbollah’s influence within Lebanon. This may be challenging, as a significant portion of the Shiite population expresses stronger loyalty to Hezbollah than to the Lebanese government and views Hezbollah as operating in parallel to the state.

Despite Israel’s stunning ”pager operation” in Lebanon on September 17, 2024, and Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination ten days later in Dahieh, Hezbollah remains a major political, economic and military force inside certain segments of the Lebanese demographic mosaic.

Regional dynamics are further complicated by the delicate balance of power between state institutions and fealty to non-state actors. The upcoming withdrawal of UNIFIL, though gradual, marks a pivotal shift that could redefine security arrangements and political alliances along Lebanon’s southern border. As international actors recalibrate their involvement, both Israeli and Lebanese leaders face the arduous task of bolstering national security while navigating entrenched loyalties and longstanding rivalries.

Amid ongoing uncertainty, diplomatic channels remain active, yet the risk of escalation persists. The specter of renewed conflict hovers over the region, fueled by persistent arms smuggling, porous borders, and the ambiguous status of militant groups. International mediators, including the E3 nations and the UN, are pressed to forge consensus and encourage de-escalation, even as local realities threaten to undermine these efforts.

Looking ahead, the fate of Lebanon’s fragile sovereignty hinges on a complex interplay of internal reforms and external pressures. The promise of consolidating state control over all armed factions will require not only legislative resolve but also a sustained campaign to win the trust of diverse communities. As security guarantees shift and diplomatic efforts intensify, the region stands at a crossroads—its future shaped by both the weight of history and the resolve of its leaders to chart a more stable course.

Sarah N. Stern is Founder and President of EMET.