Against Premature Celebrations of Victory

As Israel enters its 78^th year, we cannot overlook what it has accomplished in the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. These may mark crucial turning points, but not final victories.

Israel, in partnership with the United States, has maintained overwhelming air power and naval dominance, supported by superior military and strategic resources, funding, advanced technology and intelligence. Together, the US and Israel have destroyed up to 80 percent of Iran’s air-defense capabilities. Critically important nuclear sites, including Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, have been severely damaged.

Combined Israeli and US forces have eliminated key figures in the Iranian regime. On February 28, 2026, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in a targeted strike on his Tehran compound, along with 40 senior military officials, members of his family, and commanders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as intelligence and internal security personnel.

In Iran, the Supreme Leader is chosen by an Assembly of Experts. Apparently, Mojtaba Khameini was selected. However, there is no confirmed recent report of Mojtaba Khamenei’s public appearance or recorded live speeches.

The Supreme Leader’s role is apparently vacant.  This leaves the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as the most influential current actor in security and military concerns.

On March 1, 2026, Amad Vahidi, a former defense and interior minister, was appointed the Commander of the IRGC. Vahidi is under US sanctions for his role in the brutal suppression of the December through January protests, as well as the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom Protests”, where he employed lethal force.

The members of the IRGC are just as ruthless and repressive as the mullahs. The IRGC is not simply a military force; it is a domestic security, espionage, and ideological enforcement institution created to protect the Islamic Republic of Iran. IRGC forces have used lethal weapons, carried out mass arbitrary arrests, and engaged in torture and forced confessions— including of children. The IRGC also coordinates with the brutal Basij volunteer forces.

The IRGC is also an economic powerhouse within the Islamic Republic that is deeply embedded within the construction and infrastructure of Iran’s oil and gas projects, telecommunications, its roads, dams and pipelines and their smuggling networks. IRGC Commanders frequently become parliament members, ministers or even the president of the Islamic Republic.

The IRGC is therefore regarded as a hybrid military-economic and political force, rather than simply a military force.

Iran’s proxy to the Israel’s north is Hezbollah. Israel has attempted to relocate Hezbollah north of the Litani River, in pursuit of a stable buffer zone to protect the northern residents of Israel, who have had missiles raining down on them for decades.  This is also directly from the wording of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 which says that Hezbollah should withdraw to north of the Litani Reiver, and that the state of Lebanon should control its own population.   

Approximately one-third of Lebanon is Shiite, and their allegiances might very well align with Hezbollah’s.  The Lebanese Armed Forces have received 2.5 billion dollars from the U.S.  since 2006. The Lebanese Armed Forces is one of the largest recipients of US aid in the Middle East, outside those of major treaty US allies.

The state of Lebanon has not fully enforced Lebanese disarmament. However, under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter began talks with Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh Moawad. Although these talks were not with Hezbollah, Ambassador Yechiel Leiter described these talks as “excellent” and “in a very good atmosphere.” He emphasized the shared Lebanese and Israeli interest in reducing Hezbollah’s influence in southern Lebanon.

Israel is now in control of 50 percent of the area of Gaza. It has severely diminished Hamas’ tactical level of infrastructure. It has eliminated several of Hamas’ leaders, including Ismael Haniyah in Tehran, Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut, Yehya Sinwar in Gaza, and the Commander of Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Mohammad Deif in Gaza. Hamas now, although degraded severely, does not have one central figure, but is run by a fragmented, decentralized leadership, mostly outside of Gaza, in Qatar. Figures such as Khalil al-Hayya and Khaled Mashal are frequently singled out as being in control, both living in Qatar.

In conclusion, while many have called for a “ceasefire,” Sir Winston Churchill’s words after the Allied victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein on November 10, 1942, remain apt: “Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning.”