Behnam Ben Taleblu on the Iranian Nuclear Program and Its Return to a Policy of “Murder for Hire” Transcript

Disclaimer: This transcript is an edited version version of a transcript created using AI technology and may not reflect 100% accuracy.

The video can be found here.

Sarah: Good afternoon, and welcome to yet another compelling and informative EMET webinar. We are most fortunate to have Behnam Ben Taleblu with us today. Benham is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is one of the nation’s foremost experts on Iran. Benham has been quoted in every major publication. He has authored and co-authored articles in major international foreign policy publications. Benham appears on major networks such as C-SPAN, CNN, I-24 and BBC. He earned his MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago and his BA in International Affairs and Middle Eastern Studies from George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Since we last met, the already complex situation in the Middle East has become increasingly more complicated. On November 26^th, Lebanon and Israel signed a ceasefire deal. Then, on November 28, thousands of anti-Assad Islamic insurgents launched a massive attack on the Assad government and took control of Assad’s palace in Aleppo. They were mostly from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS is a group that was formerly affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s branch in the Levant. Until now, Assad has been propped up by Iran and Russia. The fact that the rebels have pushed into Hama, a core Assad stronghold, is very interesting.

We are very fortunate to have Benham with us today to answer our questions about the situation in Syria. Benham, why do you think HTS has decided to attack the Assad regime at this time?

Behnam Ben Taleblu: Sarah, it is an absolute pleasure to be with you and everyone at EMET once again. I know you have had to deal with me a few times as the Middle East crisis has widened and proliferated. There are many angles to what is happening in the Middle East right now. The situation is a combination of a Rubik’s cube and a kaleidoscope. Unfortunately, when things are left alone, they often get worse and not better. Change can often have negative repercussions. We have been living with the shocks of change since October 7^th. Our shock has been tempered by a few rays of hope here and there. This was especially true in late July-early August when we began witnessing Israel’s military victories against the Iran-backed network throughout the region. Israel may not have provided a full military solution to the region’s problems, but its successes showed there are viable military options. That should weigh heavily on the outgoing Biden administration and it should inform the incoming Trump administration.

With respect to the current situation in Syria, there has been a deconfliction agreement since 2020. There was a stalemate, ceasefire, or truce in the country’s northwest. This agreement was brokered by the likes of Turkey, and less so by Russia. Iran joined later to shape the political and military facts on the ground. Iran invested heavily in militia to save the Assad regime. This was particularly true after a constellation of pro-Assad forces conquered Aleppo in 2016.

The 2020 stalemate or truce I referred to, may have led the world to believe that northwest Syria was stable. The world may have been convinced that it was a matter of time until Assad went back to his Arab roots. They likely believed that members of the League of Arab States were actually trying to pull Assad away from Russia and away from Iran. We are seeing now that the assumption that stability would persist in northwest Syria, was fatally flawed. The assumption that peace in Syria was actually holding, was also completely false. This is because there was continued and considerable violence by the state against society in northwest Syria.

Some of the Salafist, Islamist armed opposition has received significant backing from Turkey, a major NATO member. The Turkish armed opposition groups have their own designs on northern Syria. They are trying to isolate the Kurdish-led or Kurdish-controlled cantons across the north. As such, Turkey has had its own agenda apart from trying to find an equitable solution for Syria vis-à-vis the Assad regime. This is one reason for the Turkish-backed or Turkish-supported series of militia and terror groups moving throughout northwest Syria. Erdogan was also frustrated with his diplomatic attempts to bring Assad in from the cold and rehabilitate him. As an aside, I believe many of our friends on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf were frustrated with attempts to cleave Assad away from the Iranians.

Some experts had anticipated an uprising against the Syrian regime before now for a number of reasons. One: the Turks sensed opportunities they could exploit. Two: the Turks were extremely frustrated with Assad. Three: despite an alleged truce or stalemate over the past four years, there was no real peace at the societal and state level in northwest Syria. Four: HTS, as well as some of its even more vigorously armed Islamist supporters, had been threatening an operation for many months.

Although some expected the rebellion to occur months ago, they did not anticipate the level of success achieved by the rebels. The shock came from the fact that the Syrian force lines melted away and the Syrians fled so quickly. The success of the rebel forces is similar to the way in which the Taliban moved into government-controlled territories in 2021. HTS and the constellation of rebel forces is moving further and further south and they are holding the territory they conquer.

The real question right now is around the future status of the minorities in Syria. This is subject to much disinformation from the Assad regime, but it is also something that we really do need to monitor. We should be cognizant of the fact that HTS was an al-Qaeda-linked group, and that past may be prologue when it comes to the plight of minorities. A past example is the horrific way Yazidi women in the region were treated. We also need to be very concerned about the Kurds in the region and about the vast majority of Syrian Arabs. They are stuck between the paradigm of mosque or military. They are facing a choice between Islamists who are authoritarian or secular Baathists who are authoritarian.

Sarah: What do you think will be the extent of foreign involvement in this war? Russia’s military resources have been depleted in Ukraine. Hezbollah’s infrastructure in Lebanon has been largely destroyed by Israel. Iran has proxies throughout the Middle East. Who is going to get involved? Will Assad be calling on Iran or Russia to back him up?

Benham: I think Assad has benefited significantly from state patronage. I agree with those who have framed these rebel advances as driven by changing geopolitics. The first driver is that Russia’s resources and attention have been diverted to Ukraine. The second driver is the fact that the Islamic Republic’s terror and proxy network has really been badly bruised and beaten by the Israelis throughout the Middle East. Unfortunately, the Americans have contributed little to this.

Although Russia and Iran’s changing statuses are important structural factors, I do not think they have the kind of local-level causality as the top four reasons I discussed earlier. The primary reasons I mentioned previously impact the situation in northwest Syria more organically. Nonetheless, they are not divorced from the big-picture issues involving state actors. The Syrian civil war reached the point it did because of significant foreign intervention. The issue has always been which actor is benefiting from which kind of foreign intervention.

The Islamic Republic said recently they would stand by Assad. They spoke about sending Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ground forces to support Assad. They have taken similar actions in other countries in the past. As an example, Persian-language social media applications called for taking up arms in support of the old Afghan Shia militia called the Fatemiyoun. There have been reports of Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq crossing the critical Bukamal-al-Qa’im border between western Iraq and eastern Syria. This has been an area of laissez-passer for Iran-controlled forces. It is also the place where the Americans have concentrated a lot of their firepower against these militias in the past.

One wonders the degree to which Assad will be able to pull a rabbit out of a hat here. The defense of Syria is a core strategic interest for both the Russian and Iranian regimes. This is in spite of the obstacles they are facing on the world stage. Russia’s presence in Syria is key to their staying power in the Mediterranean and Syria is critical to the Islamic Republic’s land bridge strategy. As such, I think we may see changes even in the areas which have seen significant Assad regime defeats. These changes may take place in the months, and not the weeks, ahead.

U.S. foreign policy will be critical in determining how the situation in Syria plays out. With respect to the Iran-Iraq war, Menachem Begin and Henry Kissinger allegedly suggested it was a shame that both sides could not lose the war. Those types of statements implied support for an approach of non-interference and for allowing the two sides fight it out by themselves. Many are recommending such an approach with respect to Syria. However, we should take our cues from the Syrian people and from the facts on the ground. Our policy should be dictated and adjusted by whichever actor tips the balance, be it an anti-Western dictator, or an Islamist, jihadist opposition militia group.

Sarah: It appears Syria is a very fragile country right now. Is there a chance Syria might be balkanized and disintegrate into bastions—a Turkish-held bastion, an Iranian-held bastion and a rebel-held bastion?

Benham: I have to admit that I am not a scholar of Syria. However, I can say that Syria has already balkanized to an extent considering the changes in control over territory since the beginning of the armed conflict there.

In answering your question, I want to be careful not to speak on behalf of any of my Syrian friends or the opposition forces. My anti-Assad friends in the Syrian diaspora have stood with the Iranian opposition. They understood that what is bad for Assad is bad for Khamenei and vice versa. I worry about them because they are squeezed between a rock and a hard place. I do not think they will have great options to choose from. Based on my very limited interaction with them, they have seemed comfortable with first defeating Assad and then focusing on territorial integrity. Of course, there are very different viewpoints amongst the different factions comprising the opposition. These include the Syrian opposition forces, the Kurds and others.

Sarah: Right. It is important to remember how this whole situation originated. In 2011, some adolescents scrawled, “Assad must go,” on a wall. They were tortured by the regime and many of them did not return home alive.

Benham: Let me just add a quick footnote to what you said. One may be justified in fearing a takeover from any Islamist rebel group. However, the Assad regime initiated this conflict. There is irony in the fact that it was the secular Western-educated autocrat who originated the conflict. For many years, Assad aligned himself with Russia and Iran, the axis of evil. His actions led to that famous statement, “Assad or we burn the country.” Unfortunately, Assad has been successful in having the West accept less and less palatable options in Syria. We often hear people asserting that Assad is the least bad option. That is terrifying because he is the worst bad option. In many ways, he caused the chain of crises in the Middle East. He has caused wave after wave of migration, displacement, death, and torture. As you said, the rebellion against him started with some brave young Syrians.

Sarah: What are your feelings about the Lebanese-Israeli ceasefire? How is it different from UN Security Council Resolution 1701?

Benham: There is no doubt that the thinking that went into 1701 is the same sort of de-conflicting thinking that went into the most recent ceasefire agreement. That said, on a tactical level, one may applaud the Israelis for successfully using military means to achieve political ends. I am referring to Israel’s wave of successes against Iran-backed forces from July, August and September. The world witnessed the Pager attacks and the series of decapitations of Hezbollah command and control, including Hassan Nasrallah. Many thought those successes would be impossible or that they would have triggered a more overt Iranian attempt to bail out its most successful proxy. The Israelis were able to land punishing blows against Hezbollah’s vast arsenal. This arsenal was bigger than some arsenals of European states and other world militaries. The Israelis used their military power extremely effectively.

My fear is not related to Israel’s ability to succeed using military power, at least in the short term. My fear is the medium- to long-term challenges of being able to maintain deterrence based on the threat of military power. That is why a resolution like 1701 is actually quite powerful, at least on paper.  The Lebanese constitution or the Taif Accords were quite powerful on paper although they failed to be enforced in real life. Fortunately, the Israelis were able to grandfather in the right to attack anything that would constitute a threat to its northern communities and still have the ceasefire hold. That said, I fear that this difference between people and paper will manifest in the longer term.

Iran’s longer-term objective is to exhaust the Israelis and make them reticent about upholding the architecture of peace in the region by themselves. I would bet that the Iranians pressured Hezbollah to accept this ceasefire because they believe it will fail to be enforced in the medium to long term. They think that the forces that led to the failure of enforcement of 1701 will once again manifest themselves to lead to the failure to enforce this recent agreement.

We should also consider the challenges that we have with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and with the beefed up Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). We are facing additional challenges from the West and from France in particular. They are viewing the issues in Lebanon tactically and not strategically. They are operating through the lens of crisis management without actually trying to solve the problems in Lebanon. The legality and politics of enforcement is a ball being kicked around by the UN, the UN Security Council, the US, the French, the Europeans and even the IDF. The definition of what is considered legal and politically feasible with respect to enforcement, oscillates constantly.

As such, the Iranians are counting on this entire house of cards collapsing. They likely believe the deal will no longer be enforced when it becomes too precocious and politically risky to deal with. The Iranians may be hoping for the world to look the other way in the medium to long term. Lebanon is easy to ignore and this may allow the Iranians to resupply Hezbollah in the longer term. Many of today’s politicians and policymakers do not have the time, resources, and political attention to invest in longer term enforcement. That is likely what Iran is counting on. That is where Israeli military deterrence will have to factor in. The linkage between the Syrian and Lebanese theaters may also play a role in this.

Sarah: Right. In the wake of this war, Congress has already appropriated hundreds of millions more dollars to the LAF. With all that money, do you think the LAF could serve as a buffer against Hezbollah?

Benham: I know the funding of the LAF is a hyper-political debate. Over the past two decades, Lebanese Hezbollah has proven itself to be less Lebanese and more an element of the axis of resistance. They have served as Iran’s security police. They have been involved in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen and have even been involved in narco-trafficking. They are not the defenders of the Lebanese state even though they styled themselves as such after the Israelis left Lebanon.

There really was the potential for the L in the LAF to stand up for itself. No one can fault America or Western Europe for not trying to stand up the LAF as an effective institution. However, the LAF is composed of the same societal fault lines that exist within Lebanon itself. This is inherently self-defeating. The LAF may be outgunned by Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a terrorist organization and therefore risk-tolerant while the LAF is an element of a state army in a highly fractured or failed state. This makes them risk-averse. The LAF has de-conflicted in negative ways in the past. As an example, they seem to have turned a blind eye to Lebanese Hezbollah crossing over the border into Syria.

Recently, the LAF has been focusing on emptying the rear of Hezbollah, following the military successes of the Israelis over the past few months. That is good but what about enforcement of previous peace agreements? So, the LAF provides a weak foundation for the additional money, interest, and attention it is receiving.

I am not suggesting we stop providing these resources to the LAF. The most vociferous anti-Hezbollah voices and forces seem to treat the LAF as their last and best hope This includes political and social voices both within Lebanon and in the diaspora. I cannot be more Lebanese than the Lebanese. That said, I would be dishonest if I did not point out the LAF’s track record. It would be remiss of me not to point out that Hezbollah may be able to regroup faster than the LAF may be able to train.

Sarah: Right. The administration provided Israel the right to attack Lebanon in the event they needed to defend themselves. However, Amos Hochstein seems to be blaming Israel for violating the ceasefire. Could you explain this?

Benham: With immense respect, I think Mr. Hochstein may be better positioned to explain why he is blaming Israel because it is an inherent contradiction. The Israelis were only able to square the circle regarding the ceasefire agreement because they were provided the right to defend themselves against attacks from Hezbollah. Neither Mr. Hochstein, nor anyone else should forget that the only reason Israel agreed to a ceasefire was because it retained the right to defend itself. It was clear Hezbollah would provoke Israel.

Hezbollah has the ability to emerge and retreat back into the Lebanese state and into Lebanese society. Some of the ways Hezbollah provokes Israel is with what is called raindrops of attacks. Hezbollah also moves forces and assets into areas that threaten the Israelis in the north. Obviously, when Mr. Hochstein makes such statements, it chills the spines of those people who want a return to normalcy in the north. The current ceasefire agreement basically guarantees another Lebanon war in time, one we hope will be much less devastating for both Israel’s north and Lebanon’s south.

So again, I cannot explain Mr. Hochstein’s statement. I was not in the room when the ceasefire was negotiated. However, it was popularly reported that the ceasefire only came about because of the exception that was carved out regarding Israel’s right to self-defense. With respect, critiquing the use of that exception immediately after the signing of the ceasefire, seems to me to be a politically dishonest move.

Sarah: Right. Let’s get back to Iran. Do you think the incoming Trump administration will renew its maximum pressure campaign? Will that be sufficient to arrest Iran’s hegemonic intentions in the Middle East? Will it impact the regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons?

Benham: It is clear that maximum pressure on Iran is making a comeback under the new Trump administration. We know that from what the president himself said both during the campaign and during the post-election period. We have also heard the same from the national security team that is coming together, as well as from those managing the transition.

Maximum pressure includes both political and economic components. There is a question as to how strong the impact of the sanctions will be over time. Recently, a major wave of sanctions was imposed on Iran’s ghost fleet. This fleet helps Iran sell illicit oil and petrochemicals. It generates just enough revenue and oxygen for the Iranian regime to continue funding the wave of instability across the region. It also funds the security apparatus that engages in massive domestic repression in Iran. Iran is continuing this activity in plain sight now. Iran is increasingly confident about dangling weapons of mass destruction in front of the world. This is similar to the way Mr. Putin dangles the threat of nuclear weapons over Ukraine and the world.

The ideological and political challenges that confounded the Trump administration in its first term, are likely to continue in its second term. Post-George W. Bush, no U.S. president has been elected on a ticket promising to do more in the Middle East. Every president since Bush has been elected to do less in the region. However, if maximum pressure is to be successful, it requires a more robust US regional posture. It requires that the US pay more attention to the arsonists behind many of the fires in the region.

I think the incoming Trump administration can circumvent the challenge posed by the mandate they received from the electorate. They can assert that if they do not resolve the conflicts in the Middle East, they will not be able to pivot and focus on the competition between the great powers. They can point to the successes of Cold War One. Some allege we are currently fighting a new Cold War or something similar. In the first Cold War, the great power competition was global. The war between the two major adversaries, the U.S. and the USSR, remained cold. One reason for this is because it was hot everywhere else.

We have to have a global perspective and view the region in the context of the different strategic competitors in play here. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the weakest element of the axis that includes both the Chinese and the Russians. The Trump administration has been strong against this axis. We can also consider North Korea to be part of the axis. Although it is the only non-nuclear power, North Korea is the strongest member in many ways. It is the first country in history to use ballistic missiles overtly, directly, and conventionally from its own territory against the territory of two nuclear-armed states. It did this three times in one year. These are history-making actions.

If the maximum pressure sanctions come back, the goal will be to reduce the oxygen and the revenue for an Islamic regime that punches back. Fortunately, our transatlantic partners have issued statements condemning the Islamic regime. They have increased diplomatic pressure, political posturing and have even applied economic sanctions against the regime. Europeans are taking action against the regime because of Iran-Russia ties and because of increasing Iranian nuclear escalation and the Mahsa Amini protests.

The Trump administration will be able to take advantage of this and prevent the Iranians from cleaving the transatlantic community apart as they did in the past. The Trump administration will need to have a real strategy and a roadmap. During the transition period, both sides of the Atlantic need to do their homework. They will need to understand how the Iranian regime is escalating, how to cut off its oxygen in the future, and what to do when it punches back. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the arsonist behind many of the region’s fires. Just as there was a line from losing to the Taliban to not being able to deter Putin, there will be a line from ceding the region to the Ayatollahs to not being able to deter the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Sarah: Right. So, on October 25^th, Israel responded to the regime’s attacks of April 13^th and October 1^st. What damage has Israel done to Iranian capabilities? How much time does that buy Israel?

Benham: October 25^th was actually the second direct retaliation by the Israelis. On October 13^th, the Iranians fired ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, and drones at Israel. On October 19^th, the Israelis responded by targeting a radar installation without taking credit for it. Israel then responded to Iran’s October 1^st attack by using air-launched ballistic missiles, mostly from outside Iranian territory. Some reporting and evidence suggest the Israelis potentially penetrated Iranian airspace. They dismantled and handicapped the regime’s strategic air defenses, the Russian-provided S-300s. This left the regime unable to protect its vast constellation of military and nuclear facilities, some of which are even below ground or subterranean.

Israel’s retaliatory strikes do not eliminate the danger posed by Iran’s other shorter and mid-tier air defenses. These would present a problem when conducting more direct attacks on Iranian territory, rather than standoff strikes from further away. That said, the strikes have created excellent opportunities. They penetrated the most advanced element of Iran’s layered air and missile defense architecture. They pave the way for Washington to be able to think more creatively. The Ayatollahs have been rendered bare and defenseless. This allows Washington to signal a credible military option. There is now more room for that coercive U.S. economic element than ever before. If President Trump is serious about a deal with Iran, he can now aim for one that achieves full denuclearization, as opposed to an arms control agreement. Israel’s strike provides the means to justify that goal even if it was not on the cards from a political perspective. That is the situation on the defense side.

On the offense side, we are learning that the strike was even more complex and layered than it originally appeared. There was a fair amount of criticism of the Israelis in the aftermath of the strike. The dissenting voices inside Iran had been hoping for a much larger strike, including potentially even against political leadership. At the time, I heard jokes from Iranians in Iran. The jokes asked what the difference is between Israelis and Iranians during wars in the Middle East. The answer was that when Israel is bombed, Israelis go to a shelter. When Iran is bombed, Iranians go to the rooftops to make sure the office of the supreme leader is hit first.

The Israelis targeted Iran’s ballistic missile manufacturing capacity. It did not go after the regime’s vast arsenal of ballistic missiles, many of which can carry a nuclear weapon and can strike Israeli territory when fired from Iran. That means the missiles can travel around a 1400-kilometer distance. The Israelis did not target that arsenal. Rather, they targeted the production lines for that arsenal.

Israel has advanced layered air and missile defenses, which are backstopped by the American military and by regional and European support. This means that if the regime chooses to escalate and respond again, it is going to have to fire more missiles at Israel to have an impact. Unfortunately for the regime, it no longer has the capacity to backfill its missiles as it did before Israel’s retaliatory strikes. So, if the regime fires more missiles, it loses more missiles and it cannot produce and backfill them as quickly as will be required. I think going after the underwriter of the tool and not the tool itself, was a display of really outstanding strategic thinking by the Israelis.

The most sophisticated element of the strike was the attack on part of Parchin. Parchin is a large military complex. It’s not just one site, it is a constellation of facilities. Parchin includes the Taleghan sites, sites that the International Atomic Energy Agency had not been able to visit. There were two Taleghan sites which were semi-secret nuclear facilities. My colleague, Andrea Stricker, did great work on analyzing this facility. There has also been a lot of good work on this done by the Institute for Science and International Security (the good ISIS). I would also recommend the work done by IAEA Deputy Director for safeguards, David Albright. Olli Heinonen from Stimson Center has also done a great analysis of this as have the experts from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

The Israelis were able to take advantage of the fact that some of the activity at the Parchin military complex was undeclared. Striking the facility indicated to the regime that they may lose more of their nuclear sites in the next round. As I mentioned, the regime did not declare the site so it cannot accuse Israel of attacking a nuclear site. In this way, Israel circumvented the Biden administration’s red lines. As you may recall, the Biden administration instructed Israel not to attack Iran’s nuclear sites. So, as time passes, we understand how sophisticated Israel’s attack on Iran was and how much of a deterrent effect it created.

Sarah: A couple of weeks ago, there was a fatal attack on the Chabad rabbi, Zvi Kogan, in the Emirates. Do you think Iran is likely to commission personal assassinations going forward? We know that they have attempted to assassinate former Secretary of State John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, Brian Hook and Masih Alinejad?

Benham: They even attempted to assassinate President Trump. There is a deterrence deficit that exists with this regime. This regime has plotted to assassinate, capture or kidnap dissidents and reporters like Masih Alinejad, a popular women’s rights activist. They have attempted to assassinate elected U.S. officials like President Trump, or members of a national security cabinet, like Brian Hook or Mike Pompeo. One would have thought that the regime would have been afraid to commission such actions, but they apparently believed they would be safer by eliminating their opposition. This illustrates the deterrence deficit that exists with the regime. This is something that the Trump administration will have to correct.

You mentioned the case of the Chabad rabbi in the UAE. The UAE is a problematic jurisdiction. In 2020, a German citizen and U.S. national was captured there by pro-regime forces. He was extradited from Oman to Iran. He was subsequently executed. His daughter and his son led a campaign to highlight his plight, to no avail. This regime killed a German citizen and a U.S. national, and people barely blinked. This was a case of hostage-taking. The regime literally kidnapped him from the UAE. So, while many do have great hopes that the UAE will continue to build on the legacy of the Abraham Accords, it is activities like this 2020 kidnapping that continue to raise alarm bells.

Again, this is a tough neighborhood. We recognize what the UAE has been able to do for the stability and security of everyone who lives there. That said, we also have to recognize that nefarious forces persist. As such, every day, we need to ensure that the policy is commitment and not hedging. The more we hedge, the more the loopholes in the system will be exploited and the more we will see the type of atrocities we witnessed with the attack on Zvi Kogan.

Sarah: Right. We are hearing very little about what is happening inside of Iran right now. What is the status of the women’s movement and the workers’ movement? Is there any chance the Trump administration could help precipitate a counter-revolution?

Benham: The good news is that the counter-revolution is already well underway. From 2017 to the present, Iranians have moved from reform to revolution. They are ready to revolt against broad swaths of the Iranian political spectrum and against regime elites. Rather than trying to reform the Iranian regime, they are now trying to overthrow it. The protests are growing in geographic and demographic scope. The period between them is shrinking and they are growing in intensity and duration. The regime understands this which is why they are meting out more and more violence and repression against the protestors. Their repression is not contained to the streets and cyberspace. They are taking actions like firing shotgun pellets at the eyes of protesting women and at the protesters’ crotches. There are also many stories of brutal rape and abuse by the security services in the regime’s prisons.

So, the regime is brutally repressing the forces acting against them while also benefiting from the 21st-century elements of what an authoritarian state can do. They can control cyberspace and they can control the population. An example is the hyper-controversial hijab law that just passed. This law is enforced via a series of street cameras. Women are fined if they are seen without a hijab while driving their cars. They are also fined for failing to wear their hijabs in other semi-private or in semi-public spaces. The regime is able to dock their pay. They are able to access their bank accounts, freeze their assets, put liens on their houses and confiscate their automobiles. So, the government uses 21st-century technology to box in their citizens rather than to serve them.

The regime is facing a poor economic situation at home. This is coupled with the unfinished business of the street against the state. As such, it really is a matter of when, not if, we witness the next major round of protests against the regime. I say major round because small-scale labor activity and protests are continuing all the time in the Islamic Republic. Hats off to the bravery of the protestors. We have a tracker based on open-source information. We have dug deeply into open-source public social media about protests and small-scale protest activity against the state in Iran. We have not seen the major protests similar to those of 2017, 2018, 2019, 2022. However, there is still a significant amount of small- to medium-scale protest activity throughout the country. This activity is conducted by brave Iranians. They are providing the connective tissue in the political and social memory of protesting Iranians. They have a vast array of grievances. The nature of Iranian society today makes the Iranian opposition one of the most pro-Western, pro-American, pro-Israeli forces in the entire region. They are not an armed group or a militia. They are not a terror entity. They are simply people who want a much better life. They have articulated a vision of what the region could look like that is drastically different from their current reality.

The Trump administration has raised their expectations. They did this by slaughtering the sacred cows that used to govern and politically handicap many people in Washington, D.C. Trump has helped to break a taboo surrounding support for the Iranian opposition. So, during the campaign period, when Trump spoke against regime change in Iran, the Iranian people saw this as a disappointment. They saw it as an impediment to their views, values, and interests because they do want regime change.

I think the West can help by engaging in a policy of maximum support. The term maximum support is one coined by those of us at FTD, and some of our friends at NFTY. Maximum support should complement Trump’s already excellent maximum pressure policy. Combining these two policies, would continue to box the regime in, and also provide support to the people in technical and pragmatic ways. Rather than have Elon Musk meet with an Iranian diplomatic official, he should meet with the U.S. intelligence community. He should find ways to get Starlink into Iran so that the Iranian people have a fighting chance against this repressive regime.

The first premise for the West should be to do no harm. The West needs to get out of the way and make sure that they are not empowering the aggressor. There should be no sanctions relief and no money provided to those engaging in foreign aggression and domestic suppression. This will remove the regime’s oxygen. The West should apply maximum pressure on the regime and also find ways to tip the playing field against them. Perhaps the next time the Israelis perform cyber-attacks on Iran, they could synchronize them with the Iranian street protests. Perhaps the Israelis and Iranian opposition can work together and learn from one another.

It is important to make sure the Iranian people know that no one has a problem with the Iranian state. No one has a problem with Iranian power. No one has a problem with Iranian defense policy or Iran’s regional interests. However, everyone has a problem with the way the Islamic Republic has used and abused the name of Iran to advance its narrow regime and ideological goals. They have ignored the public good and national interest of Iranians. If you look closely, the aspirations of the Iranian people overlap strongly with the aims of the Israelis and the Americans.

Sarah: Right. The IRGC and the Basij, have all the weapons in Iran. Is there a way to provide the people on the streets with some weapons to overthrow the regime?

Benham: That may not be the wisest move, considering the balance of power in Iran right now. The balance of force is drastically tipped against the population. The regime has batons, clubs, guns, chains and buckshot. The Islamic Republic’s entire apparatus is an injustice system and it controls cyberspace. The regime has the literal ability to shut off the internet. They can use and abuse every single law and regulation to marginalize and cower the average Iranian protester both economically and politically.

So, I think the U.S. doing even some basic things would be a game changer. The next time the regime tries to take the internet offline, the U.S. should get them back online and take credit for it. President Trump once mocked a failed Iranian satellite test on twitter. President Trump should realize he could mock the regime’s inability to shut down the internet in parts of its own country. This would provide the wind beneath the wings of Iranian protesters. We need to find safe ways to put the wind beneath the wings of the Iranian protesters.

We should not play the regime’s game. We should not perpetuate the regime’s claims that any major protest will necessarily lead to civil war or secession or separatism. If we do, most normal, average nationalist Iranians will sit out the protests against them. Rather, the goal should be to explain that the longer the Islamic Republic stays in power, the longer the threat of violence will remain. In summary, I think there are a lot of simple ways to begin to tip the balance that do not require us to have that conversation about providing weapons to people on the street right now.

Sarah: Beautifully stated. I am sure our audience now understands why we adore Ben Taleblu and our friends at https://www.fdd.org/ . Please support EMET at https://emetonline.org/ . We provide facts about the Middle East to our policymakers on Capitol Hill almost every single day. This enables them to make informed and critical policy decisions. Please also support the brilliant analysts and scholars at FDD.org.

Tomorrow we are going to host an emergency briefing on Syria from Hazem Alghabra, a Syrian-American diplomat who spent years at the State Department. I want to thank all of our listeners for your support. Thank you so much, Benham.

Benham: Thank you. My pleasure.

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