India, Israel, and the Middle East Transcript

Disclaimer: This transcript is an edited version version of a transcript created using AI technology and may not reflect 100% accuracy.

The video can be found here.

Interviewer: Hello all, and welcome to today’s Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET) webinar. Today’s discussion features Ratnadeep Chakraborty, author and expert on Indian-Israeli relations. Over the past few years, India has emerged as a leading global power. What does India’s rise mean for the Middle East, and for Israel in particular? How does India view the Middle East? Ratnadeep Chakraborty is here today to discuss the history, and current state, of Indian-Israeli relations.

Ratnadeep is the author of ‘The Evolution of Israel’s National Security Doctrine: A Journey from Ben-Gurion to Netanyahu’. He is co-founder of ‘The Honest Critique’, an independent media organization offering in-depth analysis on global affairs. He contributes regularly to prominent media platforms in India. Ratnadeep hosts the popular podcast ‘Indian Eye on Israel’, where he delves into Israeli politics, society, and its role on the global stage. He specializes in strategic affairs and terrorism in the Middle East. Ratnadeep is unique in that he decodes Israel’s complex political and security landscape through an Indian lens. He holds a master’s degree in International Relations and another in History. He also holds a bachelor’s degree in Journalism.

Before we start, I would like to mention that our work is only possible with your support. If you find what we do informative and helpful, please consider sponsoring a future webinar or contributing to EMET. It is your help and support that allows us to continue with our important work on Capitol Hill. There we advocate for a prosperous and peaceful Israel in the Middle East. We fight the influence of the Iranian regime, increase U.S. national security, and improve the welfare of Jewish Americans.

Today’s webinar will be recorded for future viewing. I encourage those of you who find the webinar informative, to share the link once it has been sent out. If you have any questions for our speaker, please feel free to write them in the Q&A function at the bottom of your screen. Without further ado, I would like to introduce Ratnadeep Chakraborty.

Ratnadeep Chakraborty: Thank you for the introduction. Shalom and namaste. I hope you can see my screen. Israel and India share two millennia of history. Together they have faced complex diplomatic challenges and have developed the flourishing partnership we see today. Before we delve into today’s topic, I want to give you a brief overview of the ancient connection shared by Israel and India. The ties between India and the Jewish people stretch back millennia. They go back to an era when both civilizations were in their formative stages. Our story begins during the reign of King Solomon between 970 and 931 BCE. Biblical accounts suggest that there were trade relations between the Kingdom of Israel and the Indian subcontinent during that period.

Exotic goods like peacocks and sandalwood were mentioned in the Bible and were likely brought from India. In 562 BCE, the Jews established their first settlements in India. This was in the wake of the destruction of the First Temple by the Babylonians, a very traumatic event in the history of Israel. During this calamity, a group of Jews made their way to the shore of Kerala, a southern part of India. Legend says they were welcomed by the local rulers and were allowed to continue their religious practices.

Over the centuries, three Jewish communities flourished in India. The first community was that of the Cochin Jews, known as the Malabar Jews. They settled in Kerala and developed their own religious tradition. They blended Jewish practices with local customs. One of the famous synagogues there is the Paradesi Synagogue. It was built in 1568 and stands as a testament to the presence of the Malabar Jews in India.

The second community is the Bene Israel community. Most of the Bene Israel community made their homes in Mumbai. They are descendants of Jews who experienced a shipwreck on the Konkan coast while fleeing persecution in the Galilee. The Bene Israel community arrived in India around the 2^nd century BCE and subsequently adopted the Marathi language and Indian customs.

The Baghdadi Jewish community is the third Jewish community in India. They came to India around the 18th and 19th century and settled mostly in the regions of Kolkata and Mumbai. They were merchants from Iraq, Syria, and other Middle Eastern countries who came to India for trade opportunities. They became integral parts of India’s rich tapestry and contributed significantly to the trade and commerce of the region. The interaction between them and the local Indian people was not just restricted to trade, they also shared their cultures. One example is the linguistic influence that Hebrew and the Indian languages had on each other.

I am often asked why Indians and Israelis get along so well. The Israelis who migrated from India do not have any hard feelings towards India. This is very different from the Jewish communities who migrated to Israel from Europe. I am often asked why this is so. The answer is very simple. There has not been a single case of anti-Semitism in Indian history. This is a testament to India’s longstanding tradition of pluralism and tolerance. This attitude continues to shape India’s diversity and international relations to this day.

Now, I want to delve a bit into the modern era. Post-World War II, we find both India and Israel at crucial junctures in their histories. They faced similar challenges of nation-building and of establishing their places in the global order. India achieved its independence on August 15, 1947, after a long and arduous struggle against British colonial rule. However, the joy of independence was tempered by the partition of India and Pakistan. This partition resulted in one of the largest mass migrations in human history.

A year later, in May 1948, the State of Israel was established as a homeland for the Jewish people. This followed the United Nations partition plan of 1947. The creation of the Jewish state was immediately followed by a bloody war with its Arab neighbors. The new state had to fight for its survival, while simultaneously absorbing hundreds of refugees coming from European and Arab countries. India took a very significant step in this context of newfound statehood and regional tension. On 17 September, 1950, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, recognized the State of Israel. India was one of the first countries in Asia to recognize the Jewish state. Soon after recognition, the Jewish Agency established an immigration office in Bombay, now Mumbai. It was later converted into a trade office.

Nehru chose to recognize Israel when many other Asian countries chose not to. His decision was influenced by several factors. He recognized the historical persecution faced by the Jewish people and the need for a Jewish homeland. He understood that India and Israel were similar in that they were both newly independent states facing hostile neighbors. He also wanted to maintain a balanced approach in the Middle East, even while supporting the Palestinian cause. However, India did not establish full diplomatic relations with Israel until decades later.

When Israel first gained independence, India chose not to recognize the Jewish homeland for several reasons. One of them was India’s prominent role in the Non-Aligned Movement, which stood in opposition to the Western-aligned bloc. India had a slant towards the Soviet bloc during the Cold War and saw Israel as being part of the Western camp. The domestic situation in India was another reason India failed to recognize Israel at that time. India had a large Muslim population and was reliant on its economic ties with the Arab states. It was particularly dependent on their imports. These reasons made it impossible for India to recognize Israel when it received independence.

Formal relations between the two states were established in 1992, when diplomatic missions were set up in both countries. The era before then was marked by significant covert operations. For example, Israel provided crucial support to India in their 1962 war with China. This assistance was not just in the form of intelligence. The Israelis also provided tangible military aid in the form of mortars and small arms. Israel’s foreign minister at that time was Golda Meir. She played a very important role in the back-channel talk that established this support for India. The cooperation between the two countries continued during the conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. During both conflicts, Israel stood by India. Israel provided equipment to India and the two countries shared intelligence as well. In 1968, India established its external intelligence ring, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The R&AW maintained relations with the Mossad and there was significant intelligence sharing between the two organizations. R.N. Kao, the founder of the R&AW, visited Israel and met with Mossad officials. This laid the foundation for future long-term intelligence sharing in the region.

There was limited economic cooperation between Israel and India prior to 1992. Trade was conducted through third parties only. For instance, Israeli drip irrigation technology, crucial for water conservation, made its way into India through countries like Cyprus. Similarly, Israeli diamond merchants conducted business in India through Belgian companies.

There were unofficial means of communication between the two countries prior to the establishment of formal channels. One of them was the Israel-Asia Center which was established in Jerusalem in 1968. This Center promoted an understanding between Israel and Asian countries, including India. Similarly, the World Jewish Congress played an important role in maintaining links between the Israeli and Indian governments at that time.

There was a gradual shift in India’s stance towards Israel. There were four primary reasons for this. First, in 1978, Israel and Egypt made peace at the Camp David Accords. This meant India could potentially consider improving relations with Israel without upsetting or alienating the Arab countries. Second, the threat of Islamic extremism grew significantly, particularly in Kashmir. That led India to seek Israeli expertise in counterterrorism. Third, the Soviet Union was in decline. The Soviet Union was India’s long-term ally, and its decline meant India had to recalibrate its foreign policy and look to other countries for military support. The fourth and most important reason was Israel’s technological advancements, particularly in agriculture and defense. Knowledge-sharing in these areas became increasingly attractive to India.

On January 29, 1992, Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit announced he had established full diplomatic relations between India and Israel. This was a watershed moment for both countries. Days later, on February 1st, the Israeli flag was proudly raised at the new embassy in New Delhi. This symbolized the dawn of a new era in bilateral ties between the two countries. This momentous decision was a result of several converging factors.

As I mentioned, India needed to realign its foreign policy following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. With its long-term ally gone, India needed to forge new partnerships to navigate the diplomatic global landscape. The bipolar world order had given way to a US dominated unipolar world. The United States was also Israel’s closest ally. As such, India viewed improved relations with Israel as a pathway to better relations with the U.S.

The Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 was another reason for the dawn of the new era of cooperation between the two countries. The Madrid Conference demonstrated Israel’s willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the Arab neighbors. Previously, India had been concerned that normalization with Israel would trigger a backlash from Arab states. The Madrid Conference helped ease India’s concerns in this regard.

Liberalization of the Indian economy was another major reason that India established formal relations with Israel. In the early 1990s, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh liberalized the Indian economy. This created a need for advanced technologies and investment in areas where Israel excelled. These areas included agriculture, water management, and the defense sectors. Israel’s success in developing a high-tech economy despite limited natural resources was seen as a model for India’s own aspirations.

The change in global dynamics played an important role in leading India to establish a formal diplomatic relationship with Israel. Between 1990 and 1991, the first Gulf War reshaped the power dynamics in the Middle East. Many Arab states joined the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. This led to a weakening of the United Arab Front against Israel and provided India with more room to maneuver in its Middle East policy. In spite of its concerns about antagonizing Arab states, India shared a strategic concern with Israel over the rise of Islamic extremism. The end of the Cold War shifted India’s focus to new security challenges, including terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Israel’s expertise in dealing with counter-terrorism and advanced military technology became very intensively attractive to India. More than that, the Jewish community in India played a very important role in advocating for closer ties between the two countries.

Once the two countries established full diplomatic relations, they built embassies and rapidly increased bilateral visits. In 1993, Israel’s foreign minister, Shimon Peres, visited India. This was Israel’s first high-level visit to India. In 2000, then the Home Minister, L.K. Advani paid an official visit to Israel. This cemented the diplomatic ties between the two countries. Ariel Sharon’s 2003 visit to India was a major breakthrough. It was the first visit to India by any Israeli Prime Minister. Sharon’s six-day visit to India included a delegation of Israeli business people. This emphasized the focus on the economic ties between the two countries.

2008, was one of the most difficult years for both countries. On November 26, 2008, Lashkar-e-Taiba conducted a series of coordinated terror attacks in Mumbai. The Jewish community was one of the targets of the attacks and a number of people were murdered at the Chabad House. Following this devastating attack, India and Israel shared intelligence and expertise in urban warfare. Israel offered India advanced security equipment, and proposed joint anti-terror exercises. 2015 was the first time an Indian President visited Israel. Pranab Mukherjee, then Indian president, even addressed the Israeli Parliament. In 2017, Benjamin Netanyahu received Narendra Modi, Indian prime-minister, at the airport. This move surprised a lot of people because Israel generally reserves that gesture for American presidents or the Pope. In 2018, Prime Minister Netanyahu visited India for six days. In 2022, we celebrated the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In the last picture I am showing, you can see the Masada Fortress in Israel and the Gateway of India. They are both lit up with the logo advertising the 30-year relationship between the two countries.

I want to touch on the evolution of Israeli-Indian relations since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. The period since 1992 has been characterized by rapid expansion and deepening of bilateral ties. Let’s examine some of the factors contributing to these growing ties. We can start by analyzing political and diplomatic relations. Regular high-level exchanges between the two countries have facilitated direct dialogue and cooperation in many critical areas.

In 2000, India and Israel established a Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism. After 1992, India established a policy of de-hyphenation. This policy separates Indian relations with Israel from their policies regarding Palestine. Since then, there has been significant economic growth in the Israel-India relationship. Trade between the two countries has been remarkable. It has grown from $200 million in 1992, to $7.86 billion in 2022. Indian exports to Israel include items like precious stones and metals, chemical products, and textiles. India imports transport equipment, machinery, and chemicals from Israel. Negotiations are currently ongoing to renew current agreements between the two states. There is the possibility of boosting trade to $20 billion annually.

Defense cooperation has been at the forefront of the relationship between India and Israel. By the early 2000s Israel had become one of India’s top defense suppliers. Key acquisitions included the Phalcon AWACS, the Barak 8 air defense system, and even drones. The Barak 8 missile system is an example of the joint development projects between the two countries and it showcases their successful collaboration. India and Israel have also cooperated in border security technologies and counterterrorism training.

Agriculture is another major driver of the growing relations between the two countries. The Indo-Israel agricultural project, launched in 2008, has been a flagship initiative. There are over 29 centers of excellence across India. These centers employ Israeli agricultural technology, and expertise with a focus on protected cultivation, drip irrigation, and post-harvest management.

Science and technology have also been key to the success of this relationship. The India-Israel Industrial R&D and Technology Innovation Fund was established in 2017. Through this fund, India and Israel partner to perform research in cutting-edge fields. The two countries cooperate in space technology, including the launch of an Israeli satellite by ISRO. They perform joint research in areas like nanotechnology, biotechnology, and water management.

I believe our cultural ties are the most important part of our relationship. Many Israelis go on backpacking trips to India once they complete their mandatory conscription service. Conversely, many Indian students enroll at Israeli universities. Since 1992, Israelis have celebrated Indian festivals in Israel and vice versa. This promotes a cultural understanding between the two countries. As we look toward the future of the India-Israel partnership, we see a tremendous potential for growth in multiple domains. I will briefly discuss four such sectors.

Defense and security have received a major boost. This is especially true with respect to the Make in India initiative. The technology transfer between India and Israel aligns with India’s vision in this regard. There has also been a focus on UAVs, missile defense systems, air applications in defense, and cybersecurity.

There has been enhanced military access and cooperation in space-based technologies between the two nations. There has been collaboration on next-generation weapons systems and defense AI. The technology and innovation collaboration has the potential to extend to blockchain, advanced AI, 6G communication, and the establishment of innovation hubs and accelerators. There can be a focus on digital infrastructure projects, including Swarovski’s Digital Identity System and Internet Solutions.

A free trade agreement can help boost trade between the two countries to the $20 billion I mentioned previously. Currently, some of the sectors of cooperation are stagnating and so we need increased diversification. We need to diversify into areas like renewable energy, digital health, and educational technology. We need to increase cross-investment in both start-ups and established companies. The bilateral and multilateral cooperation that both countries engage in is tremendously important. We should work to strengthen the India-Israel-UAE partnership in trade, technology, infrastructure, and food security.

We have seen enhanced cooperation in multilateral forums, including the I2U2, a partnership group between India, Israel, the UAE, and the U.S. After the Abraham Accords, India and Israel engaged with Arab partners more than ever before. At the last United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting, Prime Minister Netanyahu addressed enhanced cooperation through the India-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC). The IMEC is anticipated to significantly strengthen the relationship between India and Israel. It positions both countries as key players in a new global trade and infrastructure network. As Prime Minister Netanyahu said, the IMEC is a vital node connecting the Middle East and Europe with Asia. For India. IMEC offers a critical alternative route to the West. This aligns with its goal of counterbalancing China’s Belt and Road Initiative and expanding its trade networks westward.

Thus far, I have mainly addressed the strengths in the relationship between India and Israel. As part of a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis, I want to touch upon the weaknesses in the relationship as well. The geographical distance between the two nations is a major problem right now. This distance limits frequent in-person interaction. There have been no direct flights operating between the two countries since the war started. Even before the war, there were only a few flights operating between the two countries.

Cultural and social differences have also affected business practices. Language barriers impact effective business interactions. Additionally, the regulatory framework in both countries makes it a little difficult for trade to flourish. Complex bureaucracies in both India and Israel, slow down collaboration efforts. An asymmetry in economic size and market structures sometimes hinders progress in the expanding relations between the two nations.

I have covered the opportunities part of the SWOT analysis in the future in the last slide where I spoke about the future trajectories. I’m going to talk a little bit about threats before I conclude my presentation. India is currently working to balance relations with the Arab world and Iran. India is highly dependent on oil from the Middle Eastern region. As such, there is a domestic political sensitivity in India regarding the relationship with Israel. Currency fluctuation and non-tariff barriers have also had a huge impact on trade. The geopolitical instability in the Middle East obviously diverts Israel’s focus. Understanding these factors will be crucial for both countries to work further, strengthen their relationship, and expand the strategic partnership in coming years.

To conclude, I would say that the Indian-Israeli relationship is a testament to the power of shared values, mutual interest, and strategic vision. From ancient cultural connections to modern-day collaboration in cutting-edge technologies, this partnership has shown remarkable growth and resilience. This effective partnership stands as a model for bilateral cooperation, promising mutual benefits and contributing to regional and global stability. I rest my case and I am open for any questions that you have. Thank you.

Interviewer: Thank you so much, Ratnadeep. During the Cold War, India pursued a policy of non-alignment. Does this policy continue to affect the way that India views the Middle East today?

Ratnadeep: As I explained, India has significant geopolitical interests in the Middle East. India’s future is deeply intertwined with economic security and diplomatic priorities of the region. I would not say India still views the Middle East with a cold war lens but there are certain things India needs to keep in mind while engaging with Israel and the Middle East.

More than 60% of India’s crude oil imports are from countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE. This is a critical geopolitical interest for India. The Gulf region is very important for India’s energy security. Any instability and disruption in the region can have a direct impact on India’s economy.

The Middle East has served as a significant trading partner for India. It is also home to a large Indian diaspora. This Indian diaspora plays a vital role in enhancing bilateral trade. A huge part of India’s economic remittances comes from the Indian diaspora in the Middle East region. Remittances from the Middle East amount to billions of dollars each year. The economic benefits from the Indian diaspora in the Middle East, is something India needs to bear in mind as it expands relations with Israel.

India has to manage its relation with the Middle East and Iran in the interest of its own security. The International North-South Transport Corridor and the Java airport in Iran are important to India from a strategic perspective. India’s geographic location makes it vital for it to considers its economic and geopolitical goals broadly.

That said, India has successfully managed to de-hyphenate its relation with the Arab states and Israel to a large extent. I mentioned in my presentation that Prime Minister Modi was the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel. I have heard from Indian diplomats that whenever any diplomat visited Tel Aviv, they had to visit Ramallah as well. However, when Prime Minister Modi visited Israel in 2017, he did not visit Ramallah. He did visit Ramallah a year later. However, the fact that he did not visit in 2017, illustrates India’s policy of de-hyphenation.

Interviewer: Thank you. Has there been a change in relations between India and Israel after October 7^th? How have the wars in Gaza and Lebanon affected India’s relations with other countries in the region?

Ratnadeep: India’s reaction after October 7^th highlighted its strong alignment with Israel. Prime Minister Modi was one of the first world leaders to condemn the barbaric acts of October 7^th as acts of terrorism. However, the situation for India has been complicated since then.

We can read nuance into India’s approach to what has been unfolding at the United Nations. On October 18^th, Russia presented a bill calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. The bill failed to mention Hamas’ initial terror attack on Israel. India did not vote on that bill. India abstained on another resolution calling for a ceasefire for humanitarian reasons. The reason for the abstention was because it did not mention the October 7^th attacks.

So, since the war started, India has called for restraint on both sides. This is because India stands to lose a great deal from prolonged wars in the Middle East. This is not just about India’s level of energy dependence on the Arab states in the region. I mentioned the IMEC corridor. This corridor is a blessing for both India and Israel. However, protracted wars impact the viability and timing of this corridor.

In summary, India’s stance has always been to support Israel’s right to self-defense, but we also support the notion of a two-state solution. We advocate for long-term stability via division of the land. That has been India’s official stance ever since the war started.

Interviewer: Thank you. I want to ask a follow-up question. India has not yet recognized Hamas or Hezbollah as terrorist organizations. This is surprising especially since Israel recognized Lashkar-e-Taiba, as a terror organization. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a Pakistani organization. Do you know why India has not recognized Hamas and Hezbollah as terror organizations? What geopolitical conundrums are driving India’s decision in this regard?

Ratnadeep: This is a question I get asked whenever I speak about Israel. India maintains a measured stance on Hamas and Hezbollah. India did term Hamas’ actions on October 7^th, an act of terrorism. However, both Hamas and Hezbollah are Iranian proxies. India’s relationship with Iran is crucial for it to maintain access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. This is particularly true through projects like the Chabahar port which enables India to bypass Pakistan and establish a direct trade route to Afghanistan. Iran is a key partner in India’s fusion strategy and in solidifying its influence in the region. Adopting a very negative stance on Iranian proxies would jeopardize India’s investment in the Chabahar port and would limit its access to the region.

Also, designating an organization as a terror group in India is a little complex. This is because India’s counterterrorism designations are guided by the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). Under UAPA, India typically designates organizations as terror groups only if they pose a direct threat to zone authority or are involved in actions impacting India domestically.  This means India is selective about labeling foreign organizations as terrorist groups. India did label the Islamic State and Al Qaeda as terrorist groups. This is because they had affiliates in the subcontinent and carried out attacks there. It has, of course, labeled the Pakistani groups, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba as terror organizations. This is because they carried out attacks in India.

I want to mention that Israel recognized Lashkar-e-Taiba as a terrorist organization during the anniversary of the Mumbai attacks. Israelis were killed in the Mumbai attacks. They were a major target for Lashkar-e-Taiba when they carried out the 26/11 attacks. That is the reason Israel designated them as a terror organization.

I do not think India will reciprocate and declare Hamas and Hezbollah as terror organizations. As I mentioned, India did condemn Hamas’ actions on October 7^th as acts of terror. I also believe that there is a sense of Western bias inherent in this question. Choosing to label an organization as a terror organization, may imply something different when viewed through the Western lens from when it is viewed through the Indian lens.

I believe Indian foreign policy is built on strategic autonomy and pragmatism. This requires India to balance multiple relationships and regional considerations. So, the relationship with Israel has grown significantly. It has outgrown any organization, administration, leaders or labels for Hamas and Hezbollah.

Interviewer: Thanks. Before November 5^th, it seemed like the whole world was holding its breath in anticipation of the US election results. A Harris administration would have implemented a very different foreign policy from the Trump administration. Do you think Donald Trump’s incoming administration will affect India’s strategy in the Middle East? If so, how?

Ratnadeep: Well, I will start with the disclaimer that I am not an expert in the India-America relationship. That said, there are a few things I have observed since President Trump was re-elected. He has appointed Mike Waltz as a national security advisor. Mike Waltz is considered to be an Iran hawk. Waltz’ appointment is a strong indication that the administration will return to the maximum pressure policy on Iran. Previously, this policy impacted India adversely because India relies on oil imports from Iran.

The last time the Trump administration was in power, they pulled the U.S. out of the 2015 nuclear deal and imposed severe sanctions on Iran. The objective was to deter Iran’s activities in the region and to contain their nuclear ambitions. These sanctions placed India in a challenging position. Initially, India was granted a waiver, allowing us to bypass the sanctions. However, after the waiver expired around May 9, 2019, India had to comply with U.S. sanctions. India did face a similar situation in 2022 which it navigated quite well. In that situation, the US dissuaded countries from purchasing Russian oil.

I think the new Trump administration might pressure India to stop purchasing Iranian oil. However, while the US is a critical strategic partner for India, India is also a necessary partner for the U.S. I think there will be diplomatic conversations conducted behind closed doors to discuss this issue and to determine the projects in Iran that should be looked at. India also has significant investments in Iran. Of course it will look to save those investments. At the end of the day, international relations is about protecting one’s national interest.

Interviewer: Thank you. I am now going to address the questions from our audience. Historically speaking, India was strongly supportive of the Palestinian cause. This was more pronounced during Soviet times. This position seems to have changed under President Modi. Can you shed some light on the evolution of India’s stance on the Palestinians and where India stands today?

Ratnadeep: Before Prime Minister Modi was elected in 2014, India favored the Palestinian cause. Prime Minister Nehru, for example, voiced support for Palestinian statehood at the United Nations. In 1974, India was one of the first non-Arab countries to recognize the PLO. In 1988, India officially recognized the state of Palestine. It continues to provide aid to Palestine for development projects, reflecting a commitment to supporting the Palestinian cause on humanitarian grounds. Since the war started, India has provided two batches of humanitarian assistance to Palestine.

Since Prime Minister Modi came to power in 2014, we have witnessed a significant emphasis on India’s policy of de-hyphenating its relationship with Israel and the Palestinians. As I mentioned, the de-hyphenation policy is now India’s official stance on the current Palestinian conflict.

As I discussed, Modi’s visit to Ramallah was separate from his visit to Tel Aviv. As mentioned, India values Israel as a strategic partner and has expanded cooperation on counterterrorism. That said, it has also supported a two-state solution and has assisted or rendered support to the Palestinian people. India continues to fund UNRWA because it believes it as a legitimate human organization which works with Palestinian refugees.

Interviewer: Thank you. We have a question from the audience about the recent BRICS conference. India attended the BRICS conference along with the other members. At that conference, there was talk about creating a common currency and of bringing the BRICS countries closer together. How do you think this would affect the India-Israel relationship, if at all?

Ratnadeep: One of the things that the block is looking at is de-dollarization. Israel has a good relationship with China. China has invested in a lot of projects in Israel. Unlike the U.S., Israel does not have a harsh Chinese policy. So, I do not think BRICS will have a major impact on the India-Israel relationship.

Interviewer: India gets quite a bit of energy from Russia. Russia has an interest in the Middle East. Is India cooperating with Russia in the region? Might Russian interests influence India with respect to geopolitical moves?

Ratnadeep: Yes. Russia has actually been an important partner. Mostly, it has to do with counterterrorism and security. In addition to BRICS, both India and Russia are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Members of this organization have collaborated on a lot of counterterrorism and security related measures. Russia aligns with the Middle East and oil exporters through OPEC to regulate oil supplies and stabilize prices. India is a major oil importer which benefits from stable energy prices. So, it is in India’s interest to cooperate with Russia to a huge extent in this regard.

Interviewer: Another question from the audience. There has been conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India. How much does this affect the Israeli-Indian relationship? Does India view Israel as a partner in combating Islamism?

Ratnadeep: Yes. That is a good question and addresses a topic I did not cover in the presentation. Shia Muslims comprise a significant minority of India’s Muslim population. When Hassan Nasrallah was eliminated, Shia groups protested on Indian streets. This is one of the reasons why India cannot take a very tough stand on Iran or its proxies. This is especially true about Hezbollah because it is a Shia Islamist group. So, India’s Muslim population supports Hezbollah and views Israel negatively. That said, I understand that the majority of Indians share a significant commonality with Israel because of their comparable experiences. Similar to Israel, India has faced violence and acts of terrorism from Islamic extremism.

The majority of terror attacks in India’s history were committed by Pakistani-backed Islamist groups. This is especially true in the Kashmir region. Many Indians admire Israel for dealing with Islamic extremism because they have experienced it in their own country. That said, there is a delicate balance that India has to maintain in this regard. This is because of the significant domestic divide in the population on this issue. Part of India’s population supports the way Israel is dealing with its’ issues while a significant part of the Muslim population supports the Palestinian cause.

Interviewer: Are there any other domestic pressures impacting India’s relations with Israel?

Ratnadeep: I would say that prime minister Modi’s BJP-led government has maintained good relations with Israel since coming into power. One of the first foreign ministers to visit Israel was also from the BJP. That said, the opposition parties have to make sure they cater to their Muslim vote bank. They have to make sure they maintain the delicate balance between supporting Israel and catering to their vote bank and they are very cautious in that regard. The opposition has been careful about putting out statements since October 7^th.

Interviewer: We have a question from the audience about the relationship between the people in each of the two countries. How do most Indians view Israel and Israelis, outside of geopolitical interests?

Ratnadeep: As I mentioned, many young Israeli backpackers visit India once they complete their army-service. There is a town called Dharamkot in Himachal Pradesh. It is known as Mini Israel. If you go there, you will find signs written in Hebrew. Many people there, such as hotel receptionists, speak Hebrew. So, a lot of Israelis visit India but I would not say it is reciprocal. Few Indians visit Israel. As I mentioned, there are a few operational flights between the two countries although this may change in the future. Generally, Indians are not interested in visiting Israel as tourists. Those who do travel to Israel do so for business or for academic purposes. Israel will need to be developed as an attractive tourist destination for Indian tourists.

Interviewer: Thank you. Would you say people’s opinions on Israel depend on the region of India in which they live? You mentioned warm relations between Indians and Israelis in areas which Israelis visit. Are people’s perspective on Israel different in places that Israelis do not visit, like smaller cities or rural regions?

Ratnadeep: Well, I am not aware of what people think in every place in India. However, I can say for a certainty that India was one of the only countries where the Jewish people have never experienced any kind of anti-Semitism. Throughout history, Jewish people have been persecuted in counties across the world. Indian Jews never had experience. You will hear positive stories about India from Jewish people who moved to Israel even after 1948.

Currently, I think there is a level of hostility amongst Indians toward Israel. However, the hostility is different from that which manifested in the Amsterdam pogrom a few days back. In India, we are not witnessing the rise of an anti-Semitism like what we see on US campuses. Jews visit India every now and then. They visit small towns as well. I have friends who come and visit cities in India. They tour every corner of the cities and feel safe. Until now, I do not think there has been a single case of Jews who have been targeted for being Jewish but I cannot say that for sure.

Interviewer: Historically, it appears India has supported different ideologies. During the Cold War, Indian leaders tended to adhere to a more leftist worldview. Modi has a more conservative worldview. What do you think is going to be the ideology of the future? Which ideology do you think most Indian citizens adhere to?

Ratnadeep: There was an Indian prime minister who visited the United States and was asked the same question. She was asked if India aligned with the right or the left. She answered that India stands tall. I am referring to Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the former prime minister and I agree with what she said.

Ideologies come and go. Tomorrow, a government that leans right may be replaced by one that leans left. Irrespective, I think international relations is about pursuing one’s own national interest and that determines one’s objectives. I do not think there is a right-wing foreign policy or a left-wing foreign policy when it comes to India. What we have seen is that India pursues an Indian foreign policy, not a BJP foreign policy or a communist foreign policy. Of course, we have witnessed differences in how we have approached issues. However, almost all our administrations throughout history have made sure to prioritize Indian interests.

Interviewer: Thank you. Following October 7^th, there was a sudden need for Israel to not rely as much on workers coming from Gaza or from Judea and Samaria. There was some talk about Israel finding workers in either India or Sri Lanka. Has this panned out? And if so, how is it affecting relations between Israel and India?

Ratnadeep: Indian workers came to work in Israel even before October 7^th. Many caregivers came from India to work in Israel. Indian workers continued to work in Israel even after the war began. Around 10,000 people were supposed to have been recruited for the purpose you mentioned. I have met a lot of people who have interviewed, some of them are now in Israel and the recruitment process continues.

The problem right now is the connectivity issue I referred to previously. It is difficult to obtain flights from India to Israel. Also, the region is unstable and transporting people from one part of the country to another may present challenges. That said, India is committed to providing the support that Israel needs, especially as it relates to the manpower they’re looking for.

Interviewer: Thank you so much. At this point, I need to end the webinar. But before I do, I would like to thank our guest, Ratnadeep Chakraborty. This has been an enlightening webinar, and I think this topic is only going to become more and more relevant.

Ratnadeep: Thank you so much.

Interviewer: Bye

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