Is there an Inevitability of War with Lebanon Transcript

Disclaimer: This transcript is an edited version version of a transcript created using AI technology and may not reflect 100% Accuracy.

Sarah: Good afternoon, and welcome to another topical, timely and critically important EMET webinar. Today is day 300 of the Iranian-backed war against the state of Israel. Yesterday, we woke up to the dramatic news that Israel had eliminated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran. Haniyeh was in Tehran as a guest at the inauguration of the President Masoud Pezeshkian. On July 13^th, the IDF killed Mohamed Deif in an airstrike over Khan Younis, Gaza. The leadership of Hamas is dwindling. This should leave Sinwar shivering in a tunnel somewhere beneath Gaza, or perhaps somewhere in Egypt.

Shortly before the assassination of Haniyeh, Israel eliminated Hamas strong-man Fuad Shukr. Shukr was the individual responsible for the attack on the town of Majdal Shams. This attack killed 12 Druze children and teenagers near Israel’s northern border with Syria. Shukr was also responsible for the murder of 241 US servicemen in October 1983. The US had a $5 million bounty on his head.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is irate about these assassinations. They are especially incensed that Haniyeh was killed in an IRGC safe house in Tehran. On Wednesday morning, Iran’s supreme leader, Khomeini, gave the order to attack Israel at a meeting of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The Supreme leader tweeted that it is Iran’s duty to exact revenge for the elimination of Haniyeh in the Islamic Republic.

David Shanker is here to discuss these dramatic developments. From 2019 to 2021, David served as Under Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in the Trump Administration. In that capacity, he was the principal Middle East advisor to the Secretary of State. He was the senior official responsible for overseeing US policy and diplomacy in a region stretching from Morocco to Iran to Yemen. He supervised more than 9,000 staff and administered an annual budget in excess of $7 billion.

David advanced American interests abroad and strengthened US partnerships and alliances across the region. David worked to promote human rights, deter terrorism, fight corruption, and push back against regional adversaries. In addition to developing and implementing U.S. strategy on China, he took action to heal the Gulf rift between Qatar and neighboring states, resolve intractable conflicts in Libya and Yemen, consolidate the Abraham Accords, and counter malign Iranian influence in the Middle East. Prior to joining the State Department, David worked as the Aufzien Fellow and director of the Beth and David Geduld Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute.

David, it appears that the White House is attempting to prevent a regional war. Is it too late for that?

David: No. I do not think it is too late. As you mentioned, we recently witnessed the Fuad Shukr assassination in Beirut and that of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Of course, it was an enormous embarrassment for the Iranian theocracy not to be able to protect their guest. We have seen the red flags flying in Tehran. They represent the promise of revenge and retaliation. I think it is all but certain there will be a significant retaliation. If this retaliation does not come directly from Iran, it will most certainly come from Hezbollah. Hezbollah has lost their top military commander. However, I think the fundamental dynamic remains. Neither Israel, Hezbollah, nor Iran actually wants a full-scale war.

The real purpose of Hezbollah is not to liberate Lebanese territory, it is to defend Tehran. It is to defend the Iranian regime against Israeli strikes and to protect their nuclear program. The Iranian regime does not want to squander this resource on the Palestinians. Hezbollah is not like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq or like the Houthis in Yemen. Hezbollah is something entirely different. It is a strategic asset that the Islamic Republic wants to preserve for when it is needed.

In 2006, after the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah, much of the organization’s capability was degraded. This was in spite of the fact they continued firing around 100 missiles into Israel daily. It took around six years for the organization to reconstitute, re-arm and to develop their capabilities to where they are today. Even though I believe neither side is seeking a full-scale war, a significant retaliation from Hezbollah could result in a spiraling escalation, leading to full-scale war.

From the beginning, Hamas’ objective was to broaden the conflict. From October 7^th, Sinwar and other Hamas leaders expressed sadness and disappointment at the limited involvement from Hezbollah. They wanted a full-scale war against Israel, including all of Iran’s regional proxies. If the conflict broadens as a result of the recent assassinations, I think Hamas may ultimately get what it wanted. However, there is still room for diplomacy, and we can talk more about it later in the discussion.

Sarah: What are the prospects for the return of the 115 or so remaining hostages? The return of the hostages was one of the goals of this war laid out by Prime Minister Netanyahu. How does the assassination of Haniyeh influence these prospects?

David: Several leading newspapers have described Ismail Haniyeh as the Hamas moderate and pragmatist. He was the face of the hostage negotiations. We now have a temporary or acting external head of Hamas, but I still think Sinwar is the decider in Gaza. The assassinations may complicate communications with Hamas, or make them even more reluctant to engage in discussions about a ceasefire. That is one possible outcome. I think recent events may set back negotiations for the remaining 115 to 120 hostages. Unfortunately, I think the number of living hostages is a fraction of that. Irrespective, I think recent events on the ground may delay negotiations.

I think the assassination of Haniyeh demonstrated tremendous tactical intelligence and operational prowess. It also showed that Israel is serious about its pledge to assassinate senior Hamas leadership. Hamas’ forces have been degraded. We read about internal pressures from Hamas cadres wanting to move forward with an agreement so they can get some relief or survive. I think their discontent has the potential to cause a civil war within Hamas.

Sarah: How does the assassination of Haniyeh impact Israel’s relationship with Qatar? Qatar harbored Ismail Haniyeh and he amassed a fortune of $14 billion while living there. How has Qatar responded to recent events on the ground?

David: I have not seen much written about Qatar’s reaction to Haniyeh’s assassination. I saw a report earlier today suggesting Qatar had some degree of intelligence about the planned assassination. Of course, everyone knew the Israelis had committed to killing Haniyeh. People knew Haniyeh, Sinwar and others were not destined for long lives so the report is not really discussing anything new or unexpected.

Israel has a longstanding relationship with Qatar even though Qatar is obviously not a signatory to the Abraham Accords. Since Oslo, Israel has maintained relations and dealings with the Qatar trade office. They maintained connections and communications with the Qataris. Up to three months before October 7^th, the prime Minister of Israel continued to ask the Qataris to fund Hamas and to essentially underwrite their expenses in Gaza.

Since October 7^th, relations between Israel and Qatar have obviously deteriorated. This is certainly true at the public level. I think it was a convenient arrangement for both sides to have Hamas leaders reside in Qatar and I think it also insulated the Hamas leadership from assassination. Once Hamas leaders travelled abroad to places like Iran, or elsewhere in the region, they were no longer immune from the long arm of Israel. I think that we will probably see some statements from Qatar about the assassinations, but they will likely be muted.

Sarah: David, under the Trump administration, you worked very hard to negotiate the Abraham Accords. Have you heard any responses to the assassinations from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, or Morocco?

David: I suspect Israel’s capabilities and its willingness to use them, are reassuring to many leaders in the Abraham Accord countries. I have been traveling in recent days. I have spoken to people in Lebanon and in Israel. I imagine people at senior levels in the Emirates will express an appreciation for Israel’s operational capabilities.

In recent years, we have seen how Israel responded to provocations from its neighbors. Israel’s responses have been so proportional, calculated and measured, they have clearly signaled Israel’s extreme reluctance to escalate the conflict. I think Israel’s very limited responses contributed to a real erosion of deterrence and ultimately resulted in a very poor outcome. They led Israel’s adversaries to believe she was either not operationally prepared, or was unwilling to respond in a significant way. As such, Israel’s restricted responses invited adventurism and what turned out to be a horrific event on October 7^th.

Since October 7^th, I think Israel has changed the way it operates in Lebanon and throughout the region. I think this suggests that October 7th was transformative with respect to Israel’s approach there. Both friend and foe are aware of this.

Sarah: Right. How do you think this affects the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel? We have heard that Saudi Arabia’s close to committing to stronger diplomatic relations with the state of Israel.

David: Well, we will see. There is a deal on the table, as we all know. The deal includes several elements. The key element is a defense pact of some sort with the United States. It is an agreement for enrichment, whether at a US facility, on Saudi soil, or at a Saudi facility. The deal also includes something to do with the Palestinians, such as a roadmap for Palestinian statehood. Whatever it is, I think it will include more concessions for the Palestinians than the normalization agreement with the Emiratis. The Saudis have not moved forward with the agreement. Understandably, the Israelis have not given up anything on the Palestinian front. Still this deal remains on the table. It is my understanding both administration and congressional figures have suggested to the Saudis that now would be the time to get this agreement signed.

From a political perspective, it is a little difficult for the Saudis to move forward at this time. Saudi Arabia has little use for Hamas, but the images of humanitarian suffering in Gaza, make it very difficult for them to move forward. October 7^th probably also created a perception of Israeli weakness and this likely also set the possibility of an agreement back a little. We will see whether Israel’s recent operations against Hezbollah, Hamas and others have changed that perception. I think the coming days will be critical. I will be a little surprised if a deal happens before the US election, but it is a possibility.

Sarah: Right. As you know Hezbollah has an arsenal of 150,000 to 200,000 rockets, missiles and drones. Since October 8^th, they have used them to attack Israel and have succeeded in accomplishing a steady erosion of Israeli deterrence in the North. People from Israel’s North are not able to return to their homes. Do you think Hezbollah will launch a major attack on Israel? Do you think Israel will strike Lebanon?

David: The key issue here is the unprecedented buffer zone between Hezbollah and Israel. The buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel is now located in northern Israel and 70,000 Israelis have had to leave their homes. As I said, this evacuation is unprecedented. Nasrallah talks about it constantly. He refers to it as a great achievement of the onslaught Hezbollah initiated on October 8^th. Sadly, he is correct. Evacuating the border areas in the North is something Israel had never done before, even in the worst circumstances.

Today, Nasrallah said that we have entered a new phase of the conflict. According to him, Israel has crossed a red line and the war will move to one of a higher intensity. Hezbollah basically has an unlimited supply of unused rockets and missiles. They have upgraded, precision-guided munitions that are either GPS-guided or electro-optical. Hezbollah may up the ante by using these types of weapons in the aftermath of the Shukr assassination. They may also target Israeli cities like Haifa or Tel Aviv. That would be a dramatic escalation and I think it would lead us down a very dangerous path. Israel can target these weapons on the ground, but if Hezbollah opens the front, I would imagine tens of thousands of them will rain down on Israel.

The Iron Dome discerns the trajectories of incoming rockets and missiles. It does not expend a counter-missile battery on missiles or rockets that are going to fall on areas without civilians or strategic assets. Once Hezbollah starts using smart weapons, Iron Dome will undoubtedly be overwhelmed and Israelis will be in bomb shelters for extensive periods of time. Ben Gurion airport will be closed. Hezbollah also has land-to-sea missiles. In 2006, one of them almost succeeded in sinking Israel’s top missile cruiser and killed 12 Israeli sailors.

Israel can go after Hezbollah’s assets but it will not be able to suppress the entire attack. I hope Israel will be discerning in its own operations. The Shiite are Hezbollah’s constituents and they comprise around 38% of Lebanon’s population. The majority of Lebanese people have no use for Hezbollah but it is difficult to oppose them. They murder their enemies and their critics. One of my best friends in Lebanon was murdered by Hezbollah three weeks after I left the previous administration. It is important for Israel to hit strategic assets and to go after Hezbollah and its constituents. Israel should do its best to avoid inadvertently hitting people who are opposed to Hezbollah. It is going to be difficult to do.

One final word on this. The United States gives about $200 million a year to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Joseph Allen is the chief of staff of the LAF. During his last visit to Washington, he said that it is a possibility LAF would join the conflict in the event of a fully-fledged war between Israel and Lebanon. I would not advise it. This would end what has been a very productive US relationship in previous conflicts involving Israel and Lebanon. I recommend they maintain that relationship.

Sarah: Okay. We are 300 days into the war. Israel has relied heavily on its defensive shield. Do you think that Israel has enough of a defensive shield against what could be a massive response from Hezbollah with their 150,000 to 200,000 rockets and missiles? Will they be able to protect their population from Hezbollah?

David: Sadly, I think the answer is no. I think if there is a full-on war, there will be Israeli civilian casualties. I think people will be in bunkers and in bomb shelters and safe rooms for lengthy periods of time. I think there is the potential that the Iron Dome and other defensive weapons will be overwhelmed. The levels to which Israel’s defensive weapons could be overwhelmed, depend on who is party to this conflict. Around a week ago, the Houthis fired a drone that hit a building in Tel Aviv. The drone was probably aimed at either the US Embassy or the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The Houthis may well become involved in this conflict. Then there are the Iran backed Iraqi militias. The US hit them a few days ago as they were planning to target US forces in Iraq. They too will be involved.

So, no, I do not think Israel has a sufficient number of defensive weapons. I think this is part of the reason Israel has been interested in a US-brokered diplomatic agreement with Hezbollah. I think Israel is under no illusion that any agreement would be long lasting. However, some sort of agreement would move Hezbollah’s special force, the Radwan force, away from the border. It would create a buffer zone in Lebanon, even if Israel has to curtail its flights over Lebanon for a period of time. This temporary agreement would also allow Israel to give its soldiers a respite. Over 180,000 troops have been at war now for nine months and they need to recoup their energy. Israel needs time to replenish its stocks of offensive and defensive weapons. The Israelis can never have enough weapons for what may be coming from the North.

Sarah: Right. Our audience member, Minty Stein, asked how a diplomatic solution with Hezbollah could even be a consideration. Hezbollah’s entire reason for being, is the destruction of the state of Israel and the Jewish people. How are Amos Hochstein goals different from UN Security Council resolution 1701?

David: That is a great question. Let me start with what Hochstein has been working on. He is trying to negotiate a deal to move the 10,000 Radwan forces off Israel’s border. They are effectively off the border right now. Israel has been bombing these forces and their assets since October 8^th. The concern is that if there was a de-escalation of sorts, they would move right back. We know Hezbollah’s war plan is the same as the one Hamas implemented on October 7^th. That is why Israel moved 70,000 people out of the North as early as it did. Hochstein’s plan is to have the Radwan forces move back seven to ten kilometers. He is attempting to achieve an agreement via indirect negotiations with Hezbollah. His plan is to bring around 6,000 troops from the LAF troops to the area to augment the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL has been interim since 1978.

Under Security Council Resolution 1701, the number of UNIFIL troops increased from about 1,800 to around 15,000. The increase in troops was to ensure Hezbollah did not re-arm after 2006. At that time, there were more peacekeepers per kilometer, than anywhere on the face of the earth. They failed to keep the peace. To be fair to them, they were targeted by Hezbollah. Many of them were killed, harassed, beaten up or blown up by roadside bombs. Since 2006, UNIFIL has not found a single Hezbollah weapon in Lebanon. It is remarkable. Under any new agreement, they should not simply augment the number of UNIFIL troops in the area. Rather, they should augment UNIFIL with troops who are actually willing to actually call balls and strikes, like the Germans. The French make up UNIFIL right now. They are reluctant to call out Hezbollah and the Israelis have very little confidence in them.

The LAF, or Hezbollah, currently prevent UNIFIL troops from accessing certain areas. They must be able to inspect all suspicious places, including the so-called Green without Borders buildings or environmental NGO bases in South Lebanon. In exchange for this, there would be a delineation of the blue line, or actual border. The border would be delineated by around 11 border points, probably in Lebanon’s favor. As an example, the village of Ghajar, currently divided between Lebanon and Israel, would be unified in Lebanon. Israel would agree, at least temporarily, to curtail its over-flights of Lebanon intelligence gathering and its military missions with manned aircraft.

Israelis have been at war for nine months now. They need a break. They need to replenish their arsenal and prepare for a war more challenging than what they have ever seen before. There are risks to entering into a temporary agreement with Hezbollah. One risk is that the Israeli public may not agree to return to war to deal with the threat posed by Hezbollah. There is a real reticence to enter into a new war at this point. Public opinion may not change a year from now and this could be a problem.

Prior to October 7^th, Israel was a startup nation. It was booming economically. Tourism was flourishing and regional integration was growing. Israel did not pay attention to the threat they were facing and they kicked the can down the road. I do not think Israel can afford to do this again. I do not want to say that war with Hezbollah is inevitable, but I think strategists agree that a war with Lebanon is more a matter of when and not if.

Sarah: Right. It is clear that UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has been completely ineffective and UNIFIL has been a failure. What makes anyone believe that an agreement with Hezbollah would be enforced? As I said before, Hezbollah was created for the sole purpose of eliminating the state of Israel.

David: Correct and they actually do not become any less threatening even if they are pulled back seven kilometers. Their missile arsenal can reach everywhere in Israel. UNIFIL has been a failure. I worked in the Pentagon during the Bush administration but I was no longer in the government when Security Council Resolution 1701 came into being. 1701 increased the UNIFIL force from 2,000 to a cap of 15,000 troops but they have not done their job. The UNIFIL mandate does not fall under Chapter Seven. It cannot be enforced militarily without cooperation from the LAF.

During the Trump administration, I pursued an initiative with Secretary Pompeo to try and insist that UNIFIL fulfills its mandate. We tried to get them to insist on entering areas requiring inspection, to call balls and strikes for real, and to assume some accountability for their actions. I think we almost achieved our objective. We were close to vetoing the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate until the Beirut airport blew up and disrupted our timing. This happened four weeks before the mandate renewal. The idea was that if UNIFIL troops were not going to do their jobs, then we were going to downsize them. We were going to reduce their numbers to the 1,800 they had prior to 2007.

There are some things about UNIFIL that Israel likes very much. One of them is the trilateral mechanism that includes routine meetings between Israeli Army Generals and the LAF Generals on the border. Prior to October 7^th, they worked together to determine points of conflict prior and they deescalated small skirmishes. The Israelis also liked UNIFIL’s role assisting patrols in the Mediterranean. However, UNIFIL is not a successful organization. Like all UN organizations, it is self-perpetuating and costs more money every year. We pay for one-quarter of the entire UN peacekeeping budget. We pay about $25 million a year for this.

Sarah: How distinct is Hezbollah from the LAF? We have seen pictures of LAF soldiers giving their uniforms to Hezbollah. We know that there’s a huge Shiite presence in Southern Lebanon and there are Hezbollah weapons there. Recently, I was on the Hill with Sarita Zehavi, from the Alma Research and Education Center. Sarita highlighted how much the people in Northern Israel have suffered as a result of Hezbollah’s war of attrition. We do not know how culpable the LAF is. We do know that Hezbollah is the bully in the playground.

David: Yeah. Let me make it clear from the outset, the LAF will never oppose Hezbollah. The LAF is made up of the 17 religious ethnic groups in Lebanon with the main ones being the Sunnis and the Christians. Back in the seventies, the army basically split along sectarian lines. Since then, the army has been rehabilitated, but it does not handle sensitive missions. Nobody believes that it would maintain its integrity in the event of an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah. The military has collaborated with Hezbollah and continues to do so. The military provided artillery support for Hezbollah on the ground using American-provided artillery shells. This is incredibly problematic. The LAF does fight Sunni extremists. It fought against ISIS. It just does not fight Shiite terrorists. This is the nature of the beast.

On the other hand, I have not seen recent reports of the LAF providing equipment or uniforms to Hezbollah. US weapons are not disappearing and going to Hezbollah. Hezbollah has its own highly advanced arsenal and does not need US-made equipment from the LAF.

Overall, I think we should have limited expectations about the support we can anticipate getting from the LAF, but they are not Hezbollah. They are not the same as Hezbollah. Smart people out there, like Tony Badran and others, argue they are a disaster and we should not be giving them any money. I would argue that the 200 million or so that we provide to the LAF is a useful investment. It is a decimal point in terms of what we give overall. The LAF is not a threat to the IDF. They are a domestic security organization and a Sunni counter-terrorism organization. The money we provide gives us visibility into their organization. We can weigh in on issues within the LAF but they are not an organization infiltrated by China and Russia. As such, there is some utility to our provision of funding for this organization, even if it is far from perfect.

Sarah: Do you have any idea when the Iron Beam will be deployed? Would it be a game-changer?

David: Not soon enough. It has been in development for decades. The Israelis had a joint research program with the United States called the Mobile Tactical High-energy Laser System. We worked with the Israelis to develop it, but it was never completed successfully. My understanding is the Israelis are coming closer to deploying such a system. This is obviously something that is long overdue. It would help thwart the enemy’s ability to continue fighting this ongoing war of economic attrition against Israel. Right now, a $5,000 drone costs around $50,000 to shoot down. The Houthis’ $15,000 or $20,000 scuds, require million-dollar arrow missiles to shoot them down. The costs for the Israelis of supporting an ongoing conflict are enormous. The economics of this do not make sense. A laser system is a great idea and it could be very beneficial, but it does have limitations. The laser beam can be obstructed by rain or clouds and it is not a panacea. It would be helpful but it is not a solution. Israel needs to exact a cost from its adversaries, most particularly from Iran. Iran will fight to the last Arab against Israel. I think they have to pay for what they are doing or they will not stop doing it. So, the Iron Beam would be useful but it would only address part of the overall problem.

Sarah: Right. Iran is the head of the octopus. You spoke about the need to deal with the head of the octopus as opposed to just dealing with its tentacles. The Mullahs and Khomeini do not have the courage to deploy their own fighters. I was in Israel the night of April 13^th when we were attacked by Iran with over 300 missiles and drones. If Iran decides to attack again, how likely do you think a coalition of the United States, Jordan and others, will unite to protect Israel again?

David: I think April 13^th was a very successful test case for regional missile defense systems. The coordinated response to Iran’s attack, served to protect Israel in April. Similar responses may well also serve to counter future Iranian threats against other countries. I do not think most people in the capitals of those counties are mourning Ismael Haniyeh even though it may not be politically expedient for them to admit it.

I do think we have to point out that what happened last time was in many ways a public relations performative effort by Iran. They gave us five-days’ notice before they attacked. It would be harder to put all requisite defenses in place if Iran does not provide due warning this time. Gathering all necessary assets requires a great deal of coordination. I hope we are working on coordinating an international response to a potential Iranian attack right now. I think a cohesive response is politically a little bit more difficult now since Israel assassinated Haniyeh. I think Haniyeh may be more popular with the guy on the street than the halls of power in the capitals of these countries.

Sarah: How likely do you think it is that Iran will attack Israel now?

David: The previous Iranian attack on Israel followed the attack on what Iran described as the Iranian consulate in Damascus. It killed a senior IRGC Commander. In the aftermath of this, Iran launched an all-out attack on Israel. They made a statement at the time saying that any attacks on Iranian personnel or its interests would be met with a direct response. That was the statement given by the Iranian regime at the time. We should remember that Israel eliminated Fuad Shukr from Hezbollah, in Lebanon and Ismail Haniyeh, from Hamas, in Tehran. They achieved the trifecta. They already killed Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who was a senior IRGC official in Damascus. Let’s not forget this. I think the assassinations of Shukr and Haniyeh fit the parameters of Iranian interest senior personnel. The successful killing of Haniyeh in the most protected area of Iran, was incredibly embarrassing for his Iranian hosts. As such, I would anticipate some sort of direct Iranian response. It may come from Iranian soil or from other Iranian assets in the region, but I think it will come from Iran and not from its proxies.

Sarah: With what is going on in the White House right now, do you think the United States will protect Israel?

David: We heard from Lloyd Austin that the United States would stand with Israel if Hezbollah retaliates. I know there are many critics of the Biden administration in the pro-Israel community. I do think that for the vast majority of this very difficult time, the administration has been excellent in terms of its support for Israel. This is especially true in terms of missile defenses and what they did to protect Israel on April 13^th and 14^th. So, the administration does what is appropriate and what is necessary.

Sarah: Right. I should say we just heard from Kamala Harris yesterday saying Israel has every right to defend itself against Hezbollah. That is something positive. Let’s hope. Okay. In the last couple of days, a Shia Mullah in Lebanon, stated publicly that Nasrallah will be responsible for the destruction of Lebanon if there is a war. Jacob Frank asks if there is a major segment of the Shia population in Lebanon that might restrain Nasrallah? Also, Veri Werner asked a related question. If Israel goes to war with Hezbollah, will the Druze, Christians or other minorities in Lebanon attack Hezbollah from the rear?

David: First, I will address the question about the Shiites who are against war and against Hezbollah. I believe the statement you referenced was made by Ali Al-Amin who I have met. He is a very impressive anti-Hezbollah cleric who advocates against the melding of religious and political life. Unfortunately, he represents a very small segment of the Shiite community in Lebanon. He has been very outspoken. He, together with several dozen other Shiites, have advocated publicly against war. They are similar to people in other Lebanese communities who resent the fact that Lebanon is not a sovereign country. These include Christians, Sunnis and others. Unfortunately, decisions about war and peace do not lie in the hands of the Lebanese Prime Minister, but rather in the hands of Hezbollah. In fact, Prime Minister Najib Azmi Mikati himself said this. He said that he is not the sovereign decision maker or decision maker in Lebanon.

I think around 50 or 60% of Lebanese people do not want a war. For better or worse however, there is community solidarity. This is in part because Lebanon has been in the midst of a financial crisis for the past four or five years. Their currency devalued by 99%, and around 80% of Lebanese people live below the poverty line. They are dependent on their community. When things get tough, people go back to their primordial roots. So, Hezbollah has been able to clamp down on diverse opinions within the Shia community. There are times when they have accepted more diversity of opinion from the population but they are not trucking with it very much anymore.

As for the Lebanese people, I would say most love the Palestinian cause, but hate the Palestinians. The Palestinians drove them to civil war in the 1970s. They would like to expel the 180,000 Palestinians from their country and they view them as the source of tremendous problems in Lebanon. Even though many Lebanese may support Gazan Palestinians, or the Palestinian cause as a whole, they are bristling about this move toward war. Lebanese forces have engaged periodically in skirmishes with Hezbollah. One such example occurred about a year ago with the Lebanese forces led by Samir Geagea. That said, I do not think we are going to see a rearguard action against Hezbollah like we did in 2006.

I do not think that the people will rally around Hezbollah either. People are upset. The country is already in ruins and they do not want to see it completely destroyed like it was in 2006. We should also remember that events in the region have changed since 2006. The Syrian Civil War began in 2011 and continues until today. Hezbollah was a participant in that war and helped the Assad regime and Iran kill nearly half a million Syrians, mostly Sunni Muslims. As such, there is not a whole lot of support in many segments of the community for Hezbollah these days.

Sarah: Right. Okay. We have just about reached our time limit. I really want to thank David Shanker of Washington Institute for Near East Policy for his generous time. We at EMET really do welcome the support of our audience. We meet with members of Congress almost every day. We emphasize that the state of Israel is the frontline defensing Western civilization against Islamic Jihadism. We also produce webinars like the one you heard today on a weekly basis. Please join us next Wednesday at 12 noon for another informative EMET webinar. Thank you so much, David, for your generous time and support. Your insights are illuminating.

David: Thanks, Sarah.

Sarah: You too. Bye-bye.

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