Perspectives from within: Iranian intellectuals on potential strikes against Israel

Disclaimer: This transcript is an edited version version of a transcript created using AI technology and may not reflect 100% accuracy.

Joseph Epstein: Hello. I would like to welcome you all to today’s Endowment for the Middle East Truth (EMET) webinar. I’m Joseph Epstein, EMET’s Director of Legislative Affairs. Today’s webinar features Hussain Ehsani, an independent researcher focusing on Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East.

Since Israel allegedly assassinated Hamas Chief Ismail Haniyeh, the world has been waiting for Iran to retaliate. Iranian officials have threatened to take action but have not yet done so. The United States and foreign mediators are pressuring Iran to avoid starting a regional war. Foreign mediators include Iranian allies like Russia. Iran seems to be stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it cannot allow Israel’s assassination of Haniyeh go unpunished without sacrificing its deterrence. On the other, a regional war is not in Iran’s interest. Outlets like the Telegraph and Iran International have reported that there is dissent among Iranian leaders as to how best to respond. Today, Hussain will focus on how Iran’s elite are weighing their response options.

Hussain Ehsani is an independent researcher based in Ottawa, Canada. He holds a master’s degree in Middle East studies from the University of Tehran. His concentration was the independence of Kurdistan and regional security of the Middle East. Hussain previously worked in Iraq, researching terrorist groups, specifically ISIS and Al-Qaeda. While living in his native country of Afghanistan, Hussain focused on the Islamic state of the Khorasan Province for the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. He co-authored a book with Sean Withington called ‘Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan – Phony Caliphate or Bona Fide Province?’ After the US withdrew from Afghanistan, Hussain fled to Canada, where he now covers the war in Gaza. Hussain is fluent in Farsi, Arabic, Kurdish, and Pashto.

Before we start, I would like to mention that EMET’s work is only possible with your support. If you find what we do informative and helpful, please consider sponsoring a future webinar or contributing to EMET at https://emetonline.org/. It is your support that allows us to continue with our important work on Capitol Hill. Our objectives are to promote a prosperous and peaceful Israel in the Middle East, fight the influence of the Iranian regime, increase US national security, and improve the welfare of Jewish Americans. Today’s webinar will be recorded for future viewing. I encourage those of you who find the webinar informative to share the link once it has been sent out. If you have any questions for our speaker, please feel free to write them in the Q&A function at the bottom of your screen. Without further ado, I would like to introduce Hussain Ehsani.

Hussain: Thank you so much, Joseph. It is a great pleasure to be here. Thank you for providing the opportunity for me to talk about recent developments amongst Iranian intellectuals. I would like to share my screen and show you some slides. These illustrate the perspective of Iranian intellectuals on the potential strike on Israel. English is my fourth language. So, if I do not articulate my points well, please forgive me.

Following the demise of Ismail Haniyeh inside Tehran, there has been dissent amongst Iranians as to whether they think Iran should strike Israel again. Since October 7^th, I have been studying Iranian intellectual perspectives toward the war inside Iran and the war inside Gaza.

I will start with the first slide which depicts a new Iranian or Farsi proverb. It states that if Israel knows Ismail Haniyeh’s bedroom, they know about the time and the details of the IRGC’s retaliatory strike against them. This proverb is becoming more famous and popular amongst Iranians and it reflects public opinion. In this presentation, I want to focus on the Iranian intellectual perspective as regards striking Gaza.

On the second slide, I will introduce the Iranian intellectuals I have been studying since October 7^th. I will focus on their reactions to the death of Ismail Haniyeh. Haniyeh was assassinated in the north of Tehran, in the guesthouse of the IRGC. He was killed right after the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian, the new president of Iran.

I Iranian intellectuals I have focused on are mainly those inside Iran. These intellectuals do not have any affiliation with the opposition groups outside of Iran. They have close ties with Iranian intelligence entities, with the IRGC, or with Iranian officials. In an effort to create a comprehensive picture of who they are, I collected information from Iranian moderates, conservatives, hardliners, and progressives. I gathered and analyzed their opinions about striking Israel following the death of Haniyeh.

As I show in the next slide, many Iranian intellectuals regard the death of Ismail Haniyeh as a massive failure of all the official entities in Iran. They are well aware that Haniyeh was killed in a very sensitive place, the guest house of the IRGC in Tehran. They know the timing of his assassination was also very sensitive, just a few hours after the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian. They are considering five important factors regarding the massive failure that was the assassination of Haniyeh.

The first is that the counter intelligence failure exacerbated internal conflicts between the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence. The IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence have traditionally engaged in conflicts or power struggles. In the past, the Ministry of Intelligence has asked to be able to do something to counter threats of assassination against Iranian officials. The IRGC and their protection organization refused to allow the Ministry of Intelligence to investigate threats from within the IRGC. These conflicts have now resurfaced and the Ministry of Intelligence and IRGC are embroiled in struggles and arguments over Haniyeh’s assassination.

The second factor causing concern is that Iranian intelligence entities hire people based on their appearance and background. Those with beards in Iran are generally part of Hezbollah or are conservatives or hardliners. They are close to the conservative parties like Paydari, or the other parties close to the Ayatollah Khamenei. Iranian intellectuals are critical about people in Iran being recruited and hired based on these criteria. They believe Iranian Intelligence entities should avoid assessing people based on their appearance and background and that this is one of the main weaknesses of Iranian intelligence entities.

The third factor being taken into account among Iranian intellectuals is that most people in Iran admit that Israel has the upper hand in foreign intelligence. Iranian officials fear that if Israel can successfully assassinate Ismail Haniyeh, they need to be apprehensive about their own destiny.

The fourth factor under consideration by Iranian intellectuals is very important. The vulnerabilities in Iranian intelligence are raising concerns about the extensive IRGC presence across the Middle East, particularly, in Lebanon, in Syria. Iranian intellectuals are worried about the potential outcomes of investing so many of their resources for use outside of Iran. These include funds invested in the missile industry or on the militarization of IRGC. Most of them are critical of Iran for not enhancing their intelligence and counterintelligence programs inside their own country. They believe this leaves Iran vulnerable to possible Israeli operations inside Iran.

Haniyeh’s assassination raised a fifth concern amongst Iranian intellectuals. Israel was able to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh inside Tehran. Iran’s April 13^th or Operation True Promise strike on Israel was an attempt to restore Iran’s deterrence following the killing of the IRGC’s top commanders in Damascus. Haniyeh’s assassination illustrated that their attempt at deterrence was clearly not successful.

Based on these factors, Iran is going to propose some kind of categories for Iranian entities or Iranian officials. The first category is national level, the second category is regional level, and the last one is global level.

In the next slide, Iranian intellectuals articulate their views on the optimal next step for Iran at the national level. For many of them, the main question that must be addressed is not whether or not Iran should retaliate. Rather, the main question is whether Iran should retaliate or whether it should enter into a full-scale war against Israel. In both cases, the Iranian response should have some requisite features.

It must be well-calculated and well-designed. Iranian intellectuals are warning government and other official entities to be cognizant of the potential backlash if the retaliation is not well-calculated. They are also advising that any retaliation against Israel must have the capacity to restore and stabilize Iranian deterrence across the Middle East, particularly as regards Israel

The IRCG revealed in a statement that a short-range missile killed Haniyeh. Their analysis showed he did not die from an F35 fired from outside of Iran. Based on that, Iranian intellectuals believe Iran needs to retaliate in an equivalent manner from both a security and military perspective. Additionally, Iran should perform some special operations or target killings inside Israel. The scale and target of the operation is less important than performing a targeted killing inside Israel to retaliate against Ismail Haniyeh’s demise inside Tehran.

Fans of Iranian retaliation believe Iran should continue its campaign of psychological warfare against Israelis. They assert Iran must continue its psychological operation on social media to help deterrence. From the Iranian perspective, the fear of death is worse than the death itself. Iranians can deter Israeli citizens by injecting fear through social media.

The Iranian intellectuals rejecting the idea of retaliation are aware of the price of a full-scale war for all actors. They know about the geopolitical vulnerability of both actors. They know Israel has some vulnerability inside the region but they are also cognizant of Iran’s economic and security weaknesses. This group of people believe that preventing escalation is the best option for all of the Iranian entities and therefore they will not condone a retaliation against Israel. Instead of retaliation using military and security measures, they believe Iran should do something in the foreign policy arena. Either that, or they should use international law to hold Israel accountable for Haniyeh’s assassination.

The next slide explains how Iranians have been thinking on a regional level since the demise of Ismail Haniyeh.

First of all, Iranians say that Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination was a trap set by Benjamin Netanyahu. They believe it was a way for him to escape from the deadlock around the ceasefire in Gaza. They maintain that Benjamin Netanyahu wanted to strike Iranian intelligence services or entities to show Israel has the upper hand everywhere and can do anything it wants using its intelligence capabilities. Benjamin Netanyahu wanted to send a strong message to Iran after the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian is an IRGC-affiliated official who became president of Iran and who is considered to be a moderate. Benjamin Netanyahu wanted to send a message to Iranian leaders that he can reach them anywhere irrespective of whether they are moderates, conservatives, or hardliners who are close to the Ayatollah Khamenei.

Most Iranian intellectuals believe Iran should retaliate at the regional level with the assistance of its proxies such as the Houthis, Hezbollah or the Iraqi militias. Given the casualties incurred by the Houthis, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, these Iranian proxies should be involved in the retaliation with Iran. They suggest, for example, that Iran should support the Houthis in targeting Haifa’s port and in making it inoperable. They believe the Houthis have the proven capability to succeed in such an attack. They also think Hezbollah should be involved in coordinating with Iran to retaliate against Israel. This is because Israel killed many of Hezbollah’s top and middle level commanders. They believe the location of a strike should come from outside of Iran and it should come from one of the resistance bases in the countries housing the Iranian proxies.

At the global level, Iranians believe they can use the current state of US-Israel relations to ensure Israel is held accountable for assassinating Haniyeh. They are aware of the big differences between Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu. They are eager to exploit and expand these differences. As I said before, most Iranians are not fans of retaliation. They think that Iran’s foreign policy at the global and regional levels, should be very strong and active and should be able to hold Benjamin Netanyahu accountable. Iran could establish a lobby group to halt Bibi using US pressure, particularly since the United States is preparing for the presidential election from November to January.

The next slide shows my conclusions. Most Iranian intellectuals think Haniyeh’s assassination was a significant failure for Iranian entities They believe it has resulted in a backlash or a negative impact on Iran’s security spheres. This is not just the view of Iranian intellectuals. Iranian citizens and average people tend to agree as well. Most Iranian intellectuals think this has resulted from investing so much money in the missile industry and on the axis of evil across the Middle East. These investments have not resulted in any significant positive impact for Iranians.

I can understand the differences in Iranian perspectives regarding the options for the retaliation against Israel. If Iran retaliates with 100% force at the regional level, I am sure they will use their proxies across the Middle East, particularly the Houthis or Hezbollah in Lebanon. At the global level, I think Iranians will exploit the gap between Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu.

Thank you so much for listening. It is a great pleasure again to be here. If you have any questions, I’m very happy to address them. Thank you, Joseph.

Joseph: Of course. Thank you, Hussain, that was a really fascinating assessment. Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Northern Tehran. For our viewers, Northern Tehran is the affluent part of Tehran. Many senior Iranian officials live there. The assassination occurred in a secured complex. Since Israel was allegedly able to assassinate Haniyeh there, they can potentially reach many of the regime’s elite. In theory, Israel could even get them in their homes. Hussain, how has that affected the discourse? Do you think some of the elites are more scared about taking steps against Israel, given that they are now aware of its capabilities?

Hussain: Yes, exactly. They believe Israel can successfully target every person willing to make a decision in favor of retaliation. They believe that if they advocate for retaliation, they could be Israel’s next target even though they are inside the most secure places in Tehran. I want to mention that Ismail Haniyeh was targeted in one of the most secure compounds in Tehran. It was not just a building. That was a compound run by the IRGC and the Intelligence Protection Organization. Given that, Tehran’s elite believe Israel can destroy every person or entity advocating for any kind of retaliation against them.

Joseph: Thank you. There are reports about dissent amongst the Iranian elite. They do not all agree as to how best to respond to the alleged Israeli assassination. Do they agree with Iran’s foreign policy? In particular, do they agree with the funding of proxies and Iran’s aggressive policy in the Middle East?

Hussain: Iranian society is not very monolithic and so the answer to your question is not a simple one. Iranian society is fragmented with regard to ethnicity, language and ideology. Their ideology varies based on the extent to which they are close to the velāyat-e faqīh ideology of the Ayatollah Khamenei, versus the extent to which they are moderate or progressive.

Most Iranians in the lower levels of Iranian society are against the regime. They likely welcomed the death of Ismail Haniyeh. We saw footage of many people cheering, celebrating and rejoicing over his death. In some cases, they were distributing sweets to celebrate his assassination.

Basically, it is very hard to provide one key message or one key response from the Iranians regarding Haniyeh’s assassination. Most of the people in the lower hierarchy of society are very happy about it. These people receive no respite from their dire economic situation while the government spends money and oil revenues on Hezbollah, the Houthis or Iraqi militias.

Joseph: That makes sense. The elite ruling class in Iran is currently allied with the regime because they are in power. Do you think they share the same ideological goals as the regime or is their allegiance just a way to maintain their privileged status in society?

Hussain: Many Iranian elites or intellectuals do not care who is in power. They do not care who is controlling the country. As I just mentioned, Masoud Pezeshkian is now in power and the moderate class is now helping the government and the regime. When it comes to Israel and their operation inside Iran, it does not matter whether the elites are moderates, conservatives, hardliners or even progressives. This is about foreign interference. It is about a foreign incursion or invasion inside their soil and this might unite them. In this case, they will likely share the same ideology. I do not think there will be differences amongst them regarding their ideology or school of thought toward Israel. Most of these intellectuals believe that Israel is an occupier and Iran should help Palestinian or Hamas organizations to fulfill the objective of the Palestinian cause.

Joseph: Thank you. Around 10 days ago, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent out warnings to off-duty soldiers in countries surrounding Iran. These warnings related to countries around Iran that Israel has relations with, most particularly Georgia and Azerbaijan. The warnings stated that the Iranians may strike at Israeli targets outside of Israel. What have you been hearing about that?

Hussain: Yes, exactly. Iranian conservatives and hardliners, in particular, think if they cannot target Israel directly, they can retaliate by targeting Israelis. They are suggesting striking locations like Erbil in Kurdistan, the north of Iraq, and Azerbaijan. Many hardliners and conservatives believe that Azerbaijan is complicit with Israel. Azerbaijan has great ties with Israel, and they share logistical, economic and security information and intelligence. The Iranians believe Azerbaijan is not just a country but an asset of Israel and that Israel helps Azerbaijanis come to Iran for operations. The Iranians can easily enter Azerbaijan because they share a common language and background. Many conservatives or hardliners believe that if Iran cannot target Israel directly, they should target Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Before Haniyeh’s assassination, Iran was targeting Erbil in Kurdistan, in the north of Iraq. They were targeting the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) because they think there is the presence of some intelligence or security belonging to Israel there.

Joseph: There are people from the areas surrounding Iran, with the same ethnicity as minorities within Iran. What do you think their role is in helping Israel with intelligence and with these alleged assassinations?

Hussain: The Islamic Republic of Iran often accuses these minorities of belonging to intelligence entities like Mossad or CIA. Basically, I am not surprised that Iran has called them intelligence assets for Mossad or for the CIA. We should also consider the public opinion of both the Azerbaijani and Kurdish people toward Iran. I saw a video in which Azerbaijani people were asked what their stance would be in a war between Israel and Iran. Most of them believed they should support and stand with Israel because Israel has helped them a lot. At the same time, they noted that Iranian entities or the Islamic Republic has always interfered in their domestic and internal issues. They know the true nature of Islamic Republic of Iran. The minority people inside Iran know the nature of the Iranian regime toward their rights. These minorities include the Azeris and Turks in north and northwest of Iran, the Kurds in the west of Iran, and the Baluchis.

Joseph: Thank you, Hussein. I would like to move on to some questions from the audience. One of our audience members is asking if Iranian intellectuals are discussing the potential for an Israeli preemptive strike against Iran? If they are talking about it, how are they saying Iran should respond in that scenario?

Hussain: A pre-emptive strike by the Israelis, is a major concern for the Iranians. I can see they are concerned based on what they are saying on social media, in think tanks or in panel discussions. They believe the security breach allowed Israel to do anything that they wanted to. This security breach had a direct consequence on Iranian security. It implies that no Iranian official is safe. Israel can perform a preemptive attack inside Iran and destroy any ideas of retaliation. As I mentioned, they have a new proverb basically stating that if Israel knows the bedroom of Ismail Haniyeh, they know the details of the IRGC’s strike.

Joseph: On that note, we have another question from the audience asking about the vulnerability of the IRGC. Can they be penetrated by intelligence agencies, including and especially the Mossad? What would be the impact of that?

Hussain: I think the Tehran series provides some good insights to help answer this question. The Tehran series is based on the reality on the ground. It illustrates the weaknesses within the IRGC. It shows how groups who want to penetrate the IRGC can use financial and sexual incentives to achieve their objectives. I think the Iranians are well aware of the weaknesses within the IRGC. One of the first and foremost vulnerabilities of the IRGC, is the threat of being penetrated by intelligence entities in the region or across the globe.

Joseph: Recently, Ayatollah Khamenei gave a speech in Farsi. During this speech, he said that tactical retreat is okay in Islam, but retreat for other reasons is not. Do you think he is justifying a potential non-strike from Iran or potentially delaying it even further?

Hussain: The team around Ayatollah Khamenei is reviewing every potential option for striking back at Israel. I think they are well aware that any kind of strike would result in a great backlash for Iran because Israeli officials have emphasized this would be the case. Israel is very well-prepared for a strike from Iran, and they are preparing their response. I think that the majority of Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei’s advisors are aware of this. That is why they are trying to convince Ayatollah Khamenei not to strike.

Joseph: When we think of Iran delaying their retaliation, it is hard not to consider the potential impact of the upcoming US election. Global leaders seem to be waiting to see who the incoming president will be before determining their policy. We have seen this playing out all across the world, from places like Russia and Ukraine, to others like Azerbaijan, Armenia and China. Of course, this is also true for Iran and the rest of the Middle East. Do you think it is possible that the Iranians will postpone their strike until after the US election? What are Iranian sources saying is the potential impact on policy in the case of a Trump versus Harris administration?

Hussain: Iranians are waiting to see what will happen in the US presidential election. The result of the election will determine whether they will strike Israel directly, or will do something else against Israel. Many Iranian elites believe it does not matter who becomes president. Kamala Harris has a good relationship with Israel. This would be an obstacle for an Iranian response to Israel. Trump is a pro-Israel, and he knows how to deal with Iran. I think they are not going to wait for the result of the election. Mostly, I think they are advising the Iranian officials that Iran should widen the gap between Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu. They should exploit the ceasefire issue or make sure Benjamin Netanyahu is held accountable in the United States or some other organization like the ICJ.

Joseph: Thanks. For more than a year now, we have seen reports that Iran is incredibly close to acquiring nuclear weapons. Of course, they have managed to complete a very advanced enrichment of their nuclear stockpile. It seems like they keep adding more and more to it. Do you think that part of their response could include a nuclear breakout?

Hussain: Yes, exactly. That was my hypothesis or assumption as well. I think a nuclear breakout is one of Iran’s options for retaliating against Israel in response to the death of Ismail Haniyeh. This may be something they are planning while keeping silent and not performing any kind of retaliatory strike against Israel. This is another option that I was thinking about. I have not seen any argument or discussion on this, on the public sphere, open sources, think tanks or panel discussions in Farsi language. However, I think this is going to be another option for Iranian entities or officials.

Joseph: Interesting. Thank you, Hussein. So, if you were in the place of the Islamic Republic right now, what would you do? You don’t want to start a regional war, but at the same time, you just can’t let Israel get away with an assassination in the middle of your capital.

Hussain: I might not be the best person to answer this question since I am not sure that I can give one exact answer.

Joseph: We have seen speculation that Iran could respond to Israel in a non-kinetic manner. This response could include cyber-attacks or something else along those lines. What do you think about that possibility? Have you seen a lot of chatter amongst Iranian intellectuals on that?

Hussain: Yes, exactly. Iranian officials or Islamic Republic entities, often try to make up for their military failures by taking action in the cyber security sphere. I am not saying that they are very sophisticated in this regard. However, I am always thinking about the extent to which they can use cyber security attacks or cyber security activities against Israel, the United States or other rivals. One of the aspects of a cyber security attack is the idea of psychological warfare. They can plant some PSYOPs or psychological operations in social media. We have lots of news supporting the idea that Iran wants to interfere in and disrupt the United States election. I am 100% sure that every time Iran has a failure in the military or physical arena, it attempts to make up for it using psychological warfare, cyber security or virtual spaces.

Joseph: What would this actually look like? You mentioned Iran many use psychological warfare, using tools like social media. What does that mean from a concrete perspective?

Hussain: Let me provide an example. There is a protest occurring based on the One Iran international report by Negar Mojtahedi. I can see how Iran can work to impact this protest. Iran is behind the protests in encampments at Canadian universities. Iran is using psychological warfare to motivate and stimulate the protesters for its own sake. I cannot see how these protests serve the Palestinian cause or are supported by the Palestinian cause. Mostly, they are motivated by Iranian officials. Another example would be that in the case of the United States, Iran is willing to actively interfere in the US election and to manipulate ideas and talking points. They are willing to discourage or encourage people to perform every kind of action during the election.

Iran has injected the idea that Israel’s internal issues and conflicts will cause the country to split in the near future. This has directly influenced public opinion in countries and groups in the Middle East. There are protests in Israel in front of government buildings and entities. These protests call for bringing the hostages back. Iran translates those protests into Arabic, for the people in the Middle East, and into Farsi for its own people. They convey the impression that the protests confirm Ayatollah Khamenei’s words on the first day of the revolution. The protests confirm Khamenei’s belief that Israel can and must be eliminated from the region.

So, I think that the mixture of these tactics, is going to target every aspect of countries like Israel and the United States. The Iranians want to manipulate people’s understanding and beliefs about the situation on the ground.

Joseph: Thanks. I mentioned in the introduction that you lived in Tehran and you received your master’s at Tehran University. In the West, we hear a lot about how dissenting voices are shut down in Tehran. Of course, any opposition to the regime is not allowed. Can you tell us a little bit about the intellectual environment inside of Tehran?

Hussain: The majority of people in Tehran boycotted the last presidential election. This illustrates the intellectual environment inside Tehran. They believe it would make no difference if they turn out and vote for Pezeshkian versus Jalili, as an example. Most of them do not believe in the election or political process inside Iran. They believe that most political processes favor the Supreme Leader.

We know about the internal conflict between moderate and conservative groups. Moderates want to curtail the power of conservatives in the government. Conservatives accuse the moderates of being pro-western, of supporting the idea of negotiation with western countries and of solving problems with western countries. The JCPOA, signed during Rouhani’s presidency, is an example of this.

Pezeshkian’s cabinet is full of IRGC affiliated or semi-IRGC affiliated candidates. Most of the conservative intellectuals who were up against Pezeshkian are now pro-Pezeshkian. They are supporting Pezeshkian because the cabinet includes mostly IRGC affiliated candidates. The moderates are upset at the moment. People like Javad Zarif, are upset by the composition of the cabinet.

With regard to internal issues, Iranian intellectuals are very fragmented. They are always infighting and they have lots of struggle and conflict between them. However, when it comes to the foreign issues like Israel or the United States, history shows that Iranian society is very unified in their views. This includes both Iranian intellectuals and society as a whole. If someone invades Iran, they will stand together to defeat those enemies or rivals. They will overcome their internal differences.

Joseph: Thank you so much, Hussein. It looks like our time is up. I would like to thank you, Hussein Hassani, for being here with us and for sharing your expertise. We hope to see you again in a future webinar as well. I would like to thank our viewers, of course, as well, for staying with us.

Hussain: Thanks for having me. Thank you.

Joseph: Bye.

[END]

The video can be found here.