Talking Turkey: Impediment to Further Progress in the Middle East Transcript

Disclaimer: This transcript is an edited version of a transcript created using AI technology and may not reflect 100% accuracy.

The video can be found here.

Sarah: Afternoon. For at least a decade, Syrian Kurdish soldiers of the SDF have guarded the city of Hasakah and the northwest province of Syria. There they’ve managed to defeat the radical Salafi-Jihadi group, ISIS, and keep them imprisoned. However, in December of 2024, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani or Ahmed al-Shara took control over Damascus together with the forces of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and after a 12-day military campaign, vanquished President Bashar al-Assad to Moscow. Ahmed al-Shara rose up as a jihadist youth within Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq. He is now endeavored to instill Sharia law within Syria.

Beyond that, the Radical Jihadi Group, ISIS since January, has been freed from the guardianship of the Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces and allowed to leave their prisons. This has been for the first time since ISIS’s defeat, very much at the hands of the Syrian Kurds in 2019. Unfortunately, the Syrian Democratic Forces lost control of many key areas in northeastern Syria in early January of 2026. The SDF, the Syrian Kurdish force, which helped the United States to defeat ISIS, are now being integrated into the Syrian Army.

Here to discuss all these and many other things, with us is Sinan Ciddi of the Foundation of Defensive Democracies. Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at FDD and director of the Turkey program. He’s had over two decades of research experience focused on Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy with bylines in foreign policy, foreign affairs, Politico, Newsweek, The National Interest, and 19FortyFive. He frequently provides commentary on various media outlets including the BBC, CNN, DW News, France 24, the Recurrent podcast, i24 and CBS’s John Bachelor Show.

Sinan is also an associate professor of National Security Studies at the Marine Corps University, and an adjunct professor of Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and he’s the author of Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism. He obtained his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, the University of London in 2007 in the field of political science. Sinan, let’s first discuss why it is that Mohammed al-Jolani or Ahmed al-Shara has such an aversion to the Kurds. What does this reveal about his relationship with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan? Is he carrying Erdoğan’s prejudices against the Kurds into Syria?

Sinan Ciddi: First of all, thank you for having me again, Sarah. It’s a pleasure. And thank you everyone for making time to join this interesting and timely webinar today. It is a difficult question to really pry into the mind of Ahmed al-Shara at this point. He’s been in charge of Syria now, basically just over a year now. He took power and deposed Bashar al-Assad back in December 2024. And since that time, he’s been grappling and clawing at attempts to see if there is any potential for Syria to remain and be rejuvenated and reconstituted as a singular state entity.

And many doubted, I think, including myself, that he’d be able to last this long for a whole variety of reasons, but he has. And he is firmly in charge of Syria, and he’s certainly gotten accolades and recognition for that from powers such as most of the major European powers as well as the European Union and whole. Also, he’s championed and promoted by the United States government at this point, who have taken and lifted sanctions off Syria, off him personally. Just before he became president of Syria, he had a $10 million bounty on his head for rewards for justice program by the U.S. government, and now he’s been welcomed in Washington.

Now, the Kurdish angle to this is interesting simply because one of the biggest challenges that he has faced is to essentially have a state that’s unified, whole, and is represented by a singular government. He doesn’t want it to be fragmented and broken up and autonomous zones here, or federal components of it here, like its neighbor Iraq. He wants to keep a solid and strong hold of a singular entity that is the Syrian Arab Republic. The problem with that is, there are various minorities inside of Syria; the Kurds possibly being the largest and most influential, which don’t necessarily share that vision with Ahmed al-Shara and the Syrian government.

And the reason for that is relatively simple, simply because I would say from the Kurdish perspective, they just don’t trust Shara, right? The Kurdish entity that has formed an autonomous administration mainly concentrated in the northeastern parts of the state, the country, is essentially I would say accustomed and used to basically having their own way, their own lifestyle, and really a sort of an autonomous administration of self-governance that they called Rojava, which is their name for the Kurdish autonomous zone in Syria, basically for over a decade now. right?

And they don’t trust Shara because they believe that he is a jihadist, someone that the Kurds essentially fought against, which is slightly inaccurate because I would say, as much as Shara does have a jihadist past, he was not ISIS. Although he had tenuous links to ISIS formations inside of Syria, his organization, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, which is now dissolved was something that the Kurds and other Jihadists spent a lifetime fighting against, but they also fought against the Assad regime.

So, the Kurds then never trusted the Assad regime because they were heavily persecuted, but they also spent the last decent chunk of the last 10 to 15 years fighting against Jihadists, which tried to sort of exterminate Kurds inside of Syria. And many of those Jihadists that fought against the Kurds are now occupying positions of power inside of Syria. They’re Syria military commanders. They’re close to the orbit of Sharaa. And Sharaa has basically said, look, that’s fine. The past is the past, and the future has to sort of be more optimistic, and we need to come together. We need to essentially make Syria successful. And he’s implored the Kurds of Syria to say, look, lay down your weapons, so to speak. Lay down your swords and whatnot, and let’s find a compromise.

And the Kurds have been resisting up until now, simply because they were a partner of the United States under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which helped us, the west, fight against the Islamic State in northern Syria, as well as SWAT in Iraq. And they’ve been trained by the U.S. They maintain weapons by the U.S. They have material and monetary resources that were provided by the United States in addition to holding territory. So, they were negotiating with the Syrian government from the perspective of strength. They had weapons and Sharaa said, “Look, lay these down.” And the Kurdish position for the last year has been, “Well, no, why should we? We don’t trust that you will essentially allow us to continue existing as a minority or as an independent entity inside of Syria. And we don’t want to go back to the old ways. We don’t want to be persecuted by any Assad remnants, and we certainly don’t want to be persecuted by Sunni, a former Jihadists, in any going…”

And those doubts were somewhat confirmed in the last year whereby there were reprisal attacks and persecution of Syrian minorities such as the Druze and the Alawites in various parts of Syria. And the Kurds are saying, if the regime, the new government inside of Syria cannot guarantee the safety of other minorities such as the Druze and the Alawites, which don’t have military strength like us, then why should we sort of lay down our weapons and just fold ourselves in both administratively as well as militarily into the Syrian government? And as a result of that, there’s been the standoff until recently.

Sarah: So, do you think Ahmed al-Sharaa has gotten some support from President Donald Trump, who seems to regard him in high regard, and he seems to regard Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in high regard.

Sinan: Yes, and I think those are the two game changes that has basically forced the hand of the Kurds because the United States, although it was the Kurdish partner of choice and material backer of the Syrian Kurds, the SDF, that has basically disappeared at this point because in the last year the Trump administration has given a lot of credit, both political and economic credit to the Syrian government. And the Trump administration has basically said at this point, as of late December, early January of this year, okay, I understand Kurdish reticence to integrate and disband, but here’s the thing; we were very happy partnering up with you in previous times, when ISIS was a real threat, and you did us a solid. But at this point, that no longer exists and the United States is accustomed to having direct talks and direct relationships with state actors, not non-state actors. And basically, the administration here in Washington has made it clear that they will no longer essentially just work exclusively or even tangentially with the SDF, that they would prefer the SDF, its military entity, to disband, disarm, and integrate itself into the new Syrian military, and that the United States will not back any other movements that might potentially weaken the integrity of Syria.

Now, on the Turkish side, that’s another interesting aspect because this dance, this relationship between Trump and the Kurds is not a singular thing. The Turkish government and Turkey has had a huge stake and continues to have a huge stake and involvement inside of Syria’s future, simply because Turkey was the entity that groomed, backed, and raised Ahmed al-Sharaa’s movement that toppled the Assad regime. And on top of that, they do not appreciate, or the Turkish government does not appreciate, and considers SDF, the Kurdish entity that the U.S. partners with as a terrorist threat to Turkey because they are a direct offshoot of Turkey’s own domestic Kurdish separatist movement. The Syrian Kurds don’t deny that, and Turkey’s long had a problem with this sort of partnership between the United States and the SDF, but sensing that the administration is pushing for Syrian Unity under the banner of Ahmed al-Sharaa. Erdoğan, the president of Turkey has jumped on this bandwagon to pressure the SDF to essentially lay down its weapons and integrate because Ankara has issued military threats that if they refuse to integrate and disband, that the Turkish military would be essentially forced to take military action against what they consider to be a terrorist entity.

Sarah: So, what is your impression of Tom Barrack, and his influence on Trump, and his influence on the policy in Syria?

Sinan: So, Tom Barrack is an interesting character. He is Washington’s Envoy ambassador to Ankara, but he wears two hats. On top of that, he’s also the U.S. administration’s special envoy to Syria. So, he coordinates and oversees all of the U.S.’ Syria policy. And so, he’s in charge of essentially making Syria succeed as a project, as a stable and prosperous entity. And he has an interesting background. He’s Lebanese by descent, so he is a Lebanese Christian by descent. So, his family roots go back. He considers himself sometimes quite common. He says, “I have Ottoman roots.”

He is also very close and a close confidant and personal friend of President Trump. And he really does have the ear of the administration as far as the Middle East and Syria is concerned. I would say he’s probably more influential in what happens inside of Syria than the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. So, he’s highly regarded by the Trump administration, but he is also highly regarded by the Turkish government. The Turks absolutely adore him. He is perceived as the first U.S. envoy that is helping Ankara succeed in its policy goals because Barrack is on the same page with Erdoğan.

Basically, when he says, the U.S. had a working relationship with the Syrian Kurds, but now that has to go. We have to have a singular, prosperous, and stable Syria, and the only way to do that is if all components inside of Syria, all minorities come under the banner in unity and leadership of Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa. And that’s music to the ears of the Turks, right? And so, he’s highly regarded by the Turkish government.

Conversely, Barrack has a terrible reputation and perception on part of the Israelis, and some of the Arab states in the region, which basically suspect him of really towing the line for the Turkish government and Turkish interests. In fact, the Israeli government labeled Barrack as “a hostile actor”, which I think is the first time that the Israeli government has ever labeled or classified a U.S. envoy as a hostile actor because the Israelis fundamentally believe that empowering Sharaa and building up his capacity both militarily, politically, and economically could present a threat to Israel going forward, but they also suspect Turkey’s involvement inside of Syria to be highly problematic to Israeli security interests because in addition to just promoting Syrian Unity and the Sharaa government, Turkish government has a significant or huge military presence inside of Syria to the tune of about 20,000 to 30,000 troops.

And recently, the Turkish military Chief of staff, their equivalent of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs, basically said the Turkish government has no intention of ever leaving Syria; that they have military positions, that they will not leave Syria. So, Israel sees that as a threat and as a potential staging ground for Turkish hegemonic and military expansion into the Middle East. And their problem with Barrack is that Barrack is basically holding the line on this for the Turks, and that’s problematic.

Sarah: Yes, it’s very problematic. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has certainly lost no opportunity to describe Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, comparing him to Adolf Hitler. He said, “He is doing no less than what Hitler did.” He referred to Prime Minister Netanyahu as a relative of Hitler. He’s labeled Bibi as the “Butcher of Gaza”, a blood thirsty, genocidal, vampire, and “The biggest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East”. And he obviously has expressed a great deal of sympathy and support for the Muslim Brotherhood. So, I am not quite sure I really understand here; is president Trump bringing all this firepower into the region against Iran, allegedly to help the humanitarian crisis to get rid of the nuclear weapons and the drones, the missiles, and possibly to help Israel, yet he is totally sympathetic to Erdoğan and Ahmed al-Sharaa? Could you help enlighten us about this?

Sinan: I can try. It’s very convoluted and very confusing, and the daily dynamic shifts so quickly. So, sometimes I have to sit back and sort of scratch my head and say, huh. Oh, okay. Okay, what does that mean? And it’s very hard to do this on a daily basis because it’s exhausting, but here’s the thing. What we’ve been talking up to here too is very interesting in a position of, who will dominate and get to control Syria? What are Turkey’s intentions towards Syria, maybe potentially against Israel? But here’s the thing, I think we can step back and really consider what’s going on.

One of the things that Turkey has been very interested since the fall of the Assad regime is Turkey sees this as its moment to really push through and expand its influence as the premier power in the Middle East, if not further. Just, I would say a fun fact, if you look at the size of Turkey’s economy, it was just recently released. In terms of numbers, it’s got an economy, which is about $1.6 trillion, which equates to almost triple the size of the Israeli economy. It really is a domineering G20 power, even though it’s experiencing heavy inflation and heavy dire domestic economic progress at the level of the average citizen, but as a military and political power, Turkey really has elevated itself.

And that’s important because once the Assad regime collapsed, and following the 12-day war last year against Iran, between Israel and Iran, that was a definite signal that Erdoğan got suggesting that Iran’s days as the hegemonic threat and power broker in the region were essentially done. And Erdoğan has wasted no time in really pushing itself and pushing Turkey and elbowing Turkey into Syria, into the Horn of Africa, into having forward military bases in Somalia and Qatar, and bolstering its military position on existing on Cyprus, as a means to say, look, we’re not going to waste an opportunity if Iran declines even further, especially if the Trump administration takes decisive military action against Iran in the coming days or weeks, whatever.

Turkey sees this as its moment as to say, okay, if Iran’s out that’s great. We want to position Turkey as the premier power in the region that essentially dominates this space, and that I think is essentially what they’re playing for. They have certainly capitalized upon their position both politically, military and influentially inside of Syria. They’re also using all the means at their disposal to solidify ties and augment Turkey’s relationship with other major Arab powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and they also already have a very strong existing relationship with Qatar. And so, what you can see is Erdoğan is not wasting time. He never lets these sorts of crisis wither away. He sees them as opportunities. And if the Iranian regime is taken out or it is forced to collapse one way or another by the U.S. and Israeli military action, I think it’s Erdoğan’s intention essentially, to say, that’s not our preference; that he’d rather have a weakened Iran regime stay in power. But if it’s gone, he’s going to use that as an opportunity to really sort of push Turkey further in and become essentially not waste the opportunity, both in terms of influence and military prowess to step into Iran’s shoes.

Sarah: So, do you think Turkey is trying to take Qatar’s place as a major mediator, influencer, and hegemonic region?

Sinan: It is trying. Turkey has been influential to the extent that we’ve seen Turkish diplomatic actions escalate over the last two months or so. Mainly in relation to trying to get the U.S. to back off any military action against Iran, Turkey almost hosted these direct talks that failed between Iran and the United States, they were subsequently moved to Oman, but didn’t really go anywhere. It is interesting that Trump does seem to listen to Erdoğan. He constantly praises Erdoğan, saying he’s a big guy. He is a successful guy; that he should be respected.

And certainly, Turkey’s voice, in trying to delay or get the Trump administration to back off any military action, have had some success. There’s no doubt about that. Whether it will ultimately succeed in doing so, that’s another matter, but Erdoğan has also been very successful in getting Turkey to be positioned or take increased sort of positions inside of, for example, Gaza. Turkey is a member now of the Board of Peace. Turkey would like to essentially position Turkish military troops inside of Gaza as part as the stabilization force. Although Trump would like that, so far, he’s resisted saying yes to that because of strong Israeli objections. The Israelis fear that a Turkey military presence inside of Gaza would essentially position a NATO military, because Turkey’s a member of NATO, don’t forget. It would position a NATO armed military inside of Gaza potentially and possibly helping Hamas regroup, re-arm, and reconstitute itself.

And so, Turkey has been successful on a number of these levels. And as you also correctly pointed out, there’s an excellent analysis, I think from my Israeli colleagues at the INSS that recently just got published online that suggests that Turkey has been very successful at de-legitimizing and undermining Israel’s public and international reputation on multiple fronts across diplomatic channels in the world. And they’ve actually been pretty successful at that. And so, the Israelis are trying to sort of figure out what to do with Turkey. They don’t want to call them an enemy. They don’t consider them to be an ally or partner, [inaudible]. The word they’ve chosen to go with right now is to call them a rival, but they also don’t know the endpoint at which Turkey can continue to escalate, and push and elbow its way into undermining Israeli interest and Israeli reputation.

But it’s not just about Israel. There are Arab powers there that also have question marks as to what is Turkey’s end goal in this? Fine, it wants to become more politically influential and the dominant power, it certainly has the economy to actually do it and capacity to do it, but the question that they don’t have an answer to is: What is the end goal? And I don’t have that either. I can point to people on a map saying, here’s where the Turks have military forces. Here’s where they have private military contractors. Here’s all Turkey’s positions inside of Syria in terms of bases. Here’s all their PMC sites. Here’s all the training and assistance missions that they have in Sub-Saharan Africa, right? If you ask me though, that’s great. What are they doing with that? The answer is, I don’t know at this point.

This is one of the things that we’re trying to essentially figure out, but some Israeli colleagues and analysts will say, let’s not beat this about the bush, right? What is going on here is essentially, Turkey is the new Iran or will become the new Iran minus the nuclear threshold right now. Although, having said that, Turkey is very interested in the thought of acquiring nuclear weapons at this point.

Sarah: That’s right. They’ve said if Iran can get them, why can’t we? Which is another huge threat for Israel. And Turkey’s a member of NATO. This is something that I’ve… They’ve bought the S-500 missile system from Russia, yet they’re still a member of NATO. I know we are trying not to sell them the F-35s. I think they’re trying to return the S-500 missile system, but how can they have such a cozy relationship with Russia, which is the reason why we have NATO, and still maintain their membership in NATO?

Sinan: This is an interesting problem. Yes, Turkey is a NATO country. It’s been a member since 1952. It has the second largest military in NATO. It has NATO bases, its Ground Forces Command in NATO. I should also say that Turkey has more active army divisions in terms of manpower than all of the European Union combined. And one of the things that Erdoğan is essentially angling at is to suggest that without Turkey’s participation, European security going forward against Russia cannot exist; it cannot become a reality. And most big states inside of the European Union have bought into this, fearing that the U.S. will not honor its obligations to Europe, especially under NATO. They’re getting ever closer and establishing even stronger ties with Erdoğan’s Turkey saying, this is the worst time in history to alienate Turkey, and we need to essentially engage with them.

But you’re right, this is despite Turkey essentially having very advanced collaborative ties with Russia. And the reason why Turkey does that is because Erdoğan just thinks, I can have my cake and eat it. I can have a foot in both camps. He doesn’t have a strategic relationship with the Russian Federation. I think they’re able to compartmentalize a significant number of policy goal differences. They’re not allies. They’re not partners, but Turkey does have good ties with Moscow, and one of those is in the line of defense. Like you said, by going back to 2019, Turkey acquired sophisticated Russian air defense system, which resulted in Washington, at that time, the Trump administration sanctioning Turkey and literally kicking it out of the F-35 program when Turkey was due to receive a significant number of F-35 vices. And it was also part of the manufacturing consortium of the F-35 platform. The F-35 is the first U.S. war plane that is internationally procured and produced, right? There are multiple consortium country members that make the F-35, and Turkey was an integral part of that until it got kicked out.

The Turks also have a nuclear civilian energy program with Russia. Russians are just about finished building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. And there may be two others on the horizon, but that power plant is 100% owned, fueled and maintained by Russia going forward. And some speculate as to whether that relationship will lead to the advancement of a nuclear weapons program with Russia. I don’t think that’s going to happen. That’s not something Russians do. But the Turks have threatened, not threatened, I should say, but they have explored the opportunity of advancing their relationship with Pakistan, because Pakistan is a nuclear power, and a Muslim nuclear power, and the Turks are certainly interested in this.

So from the perspective of NATO, Erdoğan says, “I have a defense relationship with Russia, I have a nuclear power relationship with Russia.” Turkey also has significant trade ties to Russia. One of the biggest export markets for Turkey is Russia. And also, Turkey is a major importer of Russian natural gas, and to a lesser extent, oil. Russia sort of accounts for somewhere close to 50% of Turkey’s natural fossil fuel needs. And that’s not a relationship Erdoğan can give up very easily. I mean, Turkey is energy poor, or resource poor on that level; it doesn’t have any oil or gas to speak of. And so he’s sort of saying, well, you know, I don’t. And Europe and the United States have kind of tolerated this sort of foot in both camps approach simply because they don’t want to alienate Turkey on things that account.

One of the things that Turkey comes through for them on is, for example, you know, in the Ukraine war, Turkey has done the bare minimum of living up to its responsibilities of a NATO member to constrain Russia’s war effort. That’s one thing. And it’s also sold sort of armed drones to Ukraine during this war, it has contained Russian warships to the Black Sea, it won’t let them out of its choke point in Istanbul, and allowing the Russian Navy to sort of have warm water ports in the Mediterranean.

And so he’s quite content in having both foot in both camps. So a foot in both camps simply because, look, Washington and Europe is not going to alienate him because they fear that if they alienate Turkey, that could be a bridge too far to burn. I mean, there are more real things that keeps Washington on side. For example, Turkey is home to major intelligence gathering radar and tracking stations to the United States in multiple airbases that are NATO or US-controlled. Those outposts control the most significant intelligence gathering nets that we have in the Middle East. And Washington is not going to essentially walk away from that.

I should also add that Turkey has a sizable, not just a sizable, but Turkey’s shipbuilding industry in the military space far exceeds the capacity of the United States, and even Europe, right? Right now, the Turks are constructing somewhere in the realm of just over 30 warships in their shipyards. That’s more than all of the European Union combined, right? And so these are the reasons why Washington or Europe is not willing to alienate Turkey or throw it out, knowing full well that they can’t entirely trust Erdoğan.

Sarah: So Turkey has just provided three mosques in Gaza, and one of them is named after Abdullah Azzam, someone who was Osama bin Laden’s mentor. What are they trying to state here?

Sinan: Yeah, I mean, that was just mind-boggling to me. I mean, fine. You know, Turkey is a Muslim country, and they said, basically, their messaging is, look, our aid organizations are interested in rebuilding mosques for Palestinians in Gaza, because they should have houses of worship, especially now it’s the month of Ramadan, but fine. Why help build a mosque and allow them to name it after the mentor of Osama bin Laden? I just have zero answers to this. I mean, it’s beyond callous. I’m just stupefied. Maybe they don’t care. Maybe that’s the optics they want. Maybe they thought no one would notice or care. I have zero explanation to this. Maybe this is just the Erdoğan regime showing its teeth. I certainly don’t think that’s the majority will that the Turkish people want represented across the world, that Turkey is a sponsor of mosques bearing the name of homicidal jihadists. But there is no good explanation as to why this took place. I’m actually stumped at this. I just took another step back.

But it’s also like, you know, the other day, the Turkish foreign ministry… The Turkish foreign ministry puts out tweets if it’s a particularly important national holiday for ally countries of Turkey. It put out a congratulatory message for Iran’s national day saying congratulations to our neighbor Iran. Iran is not an ally of Turkey, but… And I took a step back and said, okay, well, look, again, you don’t need to do this. I mean, Iran’s national day is not celebrated necessarily by the majority of Iranian citizens. In fact, it’s a creation of the regime itself in Tehran and they’re not very happy about this. Turkey could have just not said that, right? But on the other hand, Erdoğan congratulated his Iranian counterpart, Pezeshkian, a few weeks ago, saying, “Well done on handling the protests.” I mean…

Sarah: So, yeah, and they’re trying to make themselves into the mediator between the United States and Iran. Why do you think that is? Do they want Iran to succeed, basically, because of all their proxy terror networks that are attacking Israel?

Sinan: Yeah, that’s a good question. I think Turkey has two options here. It’s aiming for both outcomes in what happens to Iran. I think their first choice of things, if they could have their wish come true, is for the Iranian regime to survive. Not because they particularly like it, not because they’re allies with it, not because they’re going to essentially deepen any sort of meaningful ties with Iran. Turkey and Iran have been, or this regime in Iran, have been quite ambivalent towards one another going back decades. But one of the things that Erdoğan likes is having a weakened Iranian regime stay in office, because that weakened Iranian regime is an opportunity for Turkey to extend its political, economic, and military potential into the Middle East, right? It will also ensure that Iran’s proxy networks remain intact, which will be a source of grievance and annoyance, if not an overt threat to Israel’s national security, because Israel will be focused on trying to essentially continue the sort of struggle against these entities into an endless point in future. And that’s something that Erdoğan can kind of live with in a weakened Iranian regime. But it also ensures that Iran’s not a power vacuum, that it’s not just this sort of…

There’s no guarantee that if the regime falls in Tehran, that there will be any sensible government that takes its place that will ensure its unity, its survival, even if that new government will have close ties to the West and the United States, whatever. There’s no guarantee of that. So Erdoğan’s like, well, I’d rather just have the devil on earth. I think that’s their first choice. So Turkey’s intermediary efforts have been to sort of try and pressure the Trump administration not to go to war with Iran, and in fact, the government again reiterated its firm opposition to the United States and the Western Hemisphere today, saying, look, we’re totally against any military action.

Now, on the other hand if the United States and or Israel does take military action against the Islamic regime, then Erdoğan will try and make hay out of that too, right? Whereby, well, okay, it’s defeated. And so let’s make the best of this, what we can. So there are a couple of things that I think worry Erdoğan, and what they will try to do is, one of them is, there is a potential that Turkey might position its military into a newly created buffer zone inside of Iran, between Turkish and Iranian border, but inside of Iran. Because one of the things that Turkey is worried about in a post-Islamic regime scenario is something that we saw in Syria, which is an independent or autonomous Kurdish statehood or stateline[?], because Iran is home to a significant number of Kurds, Iranian Kurds, who have been treated horribly by the regime for decades.

And one of the things they’re interested in is potentially having what the Syrian Kurds have, which is an autonomous and independent zone, and that Kurdish entity inside of Iran is also an offshoot of Turkey’s separatist Kurdish movement, and so Turkey may essentially, we’ve heard rumors suggesting that Turkey may establish a military buffer zone to ensure or enforce that such an autonomous Kurdish zone does not materialize inside of Iran. But in this case, that’s problematic because it could lead to armed conflict between Turkey and whatever is left, whatever the new Iranian sort of government or entity that governs that space becomes. But also if the regime is collapsed, then Erdoğan will use that as an opportunity to really capitalize upon, essentially trying to expand its influence and military presence inside of the Middle East. But it also does worry that a fallen Islamic regime will ensure the existence of an Israeli and American-led security order in the region. And they don’t really like that. But they will try and make hay out of a fallen Islamic regime.

Sarah: This is a fallen Shiite Islamic regime and he wants to be the head of the Sunni empire, it sounds like. So what is Ankara trying to do around the Horn of Africa and the Muslim-majority populations there?

Sinan: Yeah, that’s a great question, and this is kind of one of the areas which I’m focused on now in our work here at FDD in terms of trying to understand what Turkey’s game inside of Horn Africa is. So if we picture this, Turkey is now taking its geopolitical struggle against Israel, and in some ways, you can say that the struggles of the Middle East now are playing out in the Horn of Africa. Turkey has very advanced ties, a significant sort of relationship with Somalia itself. It has done for a long time now.

Turkey was one of the first countries to establish a relationship with Somalia after it reconstituted itself as a viable state. Turkey has a vast military base in Somalia. It has secured natural gas and fossil fuel exploration rights off the coast of Somalia. So it set drilling ships there. It’s like military is providing assistance and training to the Somali military. In fact, they’ve just given them tanks in the last week, and they’re training the Somali military to use those tanks.

Turkey has education and commercial ties. There are over 200 companies operating inside of Somalia. But Turkish activities in Africa are not limited to Somalia. I could pull up a map that shows you where Turkey has a defense attaché in the majority of African states. It also has training assistance missions to train local police forces and local militaries in half a dozen African states that are Muslim-majority populated, and that is also quite interesting and somewhat dangerous, probably. I don’t know.

And again, you can ask the question, well, what does Turkey seek to do with all this presence? And the answer is, I don’t know. I mean, if it’s just about commercial ties, that’s fine. If it’s providing training assistance such that half a dozen African states can have some semblance of a trained and equipped military, that’s great. But what does Turkey get out of that? One argument is, well, Turkey is trying to establish good relationships with these countries it is involved with because Turkey seeks natural resources such as rare earth minerals. In Somalia, it has a sort of base to launch satellites up into space. That’s great. But that doesn’t answer the question of, well, in that case, why does Turkey have such a big problem with Israel’s recognition of Somaliland?

I mean, if it’s all about economics and commercial ties and safety, fine. Go on about your business. But Erdoğan’s taken quite heavily to condemning Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. But also, I think he’s on record. Just yesterday, when Erdoğan was in Ethiopia for the first time, for a long time and called upon the Ethiopian government not to recognize Somaliland, and that’s a problem. One answer that I’m trying to work up is this notion that, beyond commercial ties, rare earth minerals, trade ties, that’s very valid for Ankara. They like that. It helps them. It’s commercial prowess. But on the influence and power projection side and growing sort of Turkey’s soft power influence of the African continent, one of the things that’s probably worth paying attention to is in the vast majority of these Muslim African states where Turkey has begun or has substantive ties, it’s worth noting that a lot of these countries don’t have a strong history of antisemitism or bad ties or bad image towards Israel.

But Erdoğan is using this as an opportunity to groom these states in terms of having a negative disposition and building up popular sentiment against Israel as it seeks to expand its influence and range and power in the Middle East, and so he’s achieving several things at the same time or at least angling to achieve several things at the same time, which I think it’s important to bear in mind.

Sarah: So it sounds very much like Erdoğan is trying to resurrect the Ottoman Empire and be just a major player in the world. Is that [crosstalk]?

Sinan: Yeah, I mean, that’s one way of looking at it. I would say he’s not necessarily pushing for territorial acquisition. Although some people have said that, and I might be wrong at that, because just enforcing new territorial or maritime boundaries that’s difficult for Turkey. But certainly, if by what you mean is really sort of positioning itself as a major power, then yes, absolutely. I mean, that’s why I sort of quoted the size of the Turkish economy’s GDP. It is a sizable economy, and Erdoğan thinks this is our moment.

Erdoğan does consider Turkey to be a great power player, and he wants that recognition to come, and he kind of gets that sort of recognition in Trump’s classification of him, the Europeans’ classification of him. Turkey is very active diplomatically and militarily across the world. So yeah, I would say some notion of the creation of Turkish greatness in the region and beyond, and he’s certainly angling towards that, no doubt.

Sarah: Yeah. So, of course, you and I both know many secular Turks. Is there any chance that there could be a Pro-Ataturk political power rising up in Turkey?

Sinan: Yeah. I mean, are Erdoğan’s days numbered? Who knows? But what we do know is this. We put out a major study. FDD published a report on succession in Turkey. We just published it a week ago, two weeks ago. It’s just called, “Who Controls Turkey After Erdoğan?” It’s a really long report. It’s about 10,000 words. Anyone can download it from our website and read it, and I didn’t do this just because it was a fun study, but we did this because Erdoğan has already started this process of trying to pass on power from himself, I think, we think to his son. Because if anybody watches him online or in his public engagements internationally or domestically, he does look increasingly frail. I think he’s tired. Or he may be hiding in some sort of illness that people don’t want to know, but he does look challenged and fatigued, and that is a problem for him, and he started this sort of process of succession in about mid-2025, and so we thought, well, that’s interesting. Who’d take over his as… Who does he intend to have him succeed or succeed him?

And right now, the plan seems to be he wants his son, Bilal Erdoğan, to take the reins of power. We don’t know when that is. Turkey would essentially have to hold elections no later than May 2028. But I think given the conditions that he can shape, Erdoğan may essentially try to do this as early as the end of this year in an election, or sometime definitely, possibly more likely in 2027, and the way he’s looking at this is, okay, he’s focusing on his son as opposed to any other sort of political professional because he doesn’t trust anybody else other than family to take over reins of power. He fears that if he gives power to somebody else, even if it’s his own sort of acolyte, he doesn’t think that that’s going to protect him and his families from prosecution, abuse of power type of trials after he steps down. He wants his son in there because his son, he thinks he can guarantee continuity of protection as well as continuity of his sort of geopolitical vision and ideological vision for the country. So that’s the intention, we think.

Our study also does focus on saying, well, he’s not the only contender. There are many other likely contenders. Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan could be one. Erdoğan’s son-in-law, the drone builder, Selçuk Bayraktar, could be another significant player that would vie for power. But against that narrative, Turkey has no history of dynastic succession, right? I mean, say all you want about Turkey, Turkey has a rich history and experience of electing their leaders, and Turks really want this now more than ever. I mean, believe it or not, if there was an election tomorrow, Erdoğan would lose heavily. Everyone’s fed up, right? Turkey’s domestic population is really hurting economically. Turkey has an inflation rate of about 60% annually. It’s terrible. Conditions are horrible inside of the country. The country may be $1.6 trillion GDP, but household incomes are really dire. Erdoğan has driven the economy into the ground. So there are these other popular candidates or contenders for power on the opposition side who would be looking to take over from Erdoğan.

And even though he wants his son there, or maybe his son-in-law, or maybe a foreign minister who might try and… the problem is, at some point, my guess is that there has to be elections, and the people, there is one influential person in prison who does have significant popular support. Erdoğan jailed him last year, this time last year, the mayor of Istanbul, simply because the mayor of Istanbul nominated him. He became nominated by his party through a primary election to become the presidential candidate to fight against Erdoğan, and as soon as Erdoğan saw his numbers and his potential, he put him in jail. So he is worried.

Now, given that if he has existential fears and what he wants to achieve with the country, my worry is, even though Turkey has no dynastic succession history and all this sort of stuff, will free and fair elections in Turkey be permitted at the most sort of pivotal moment for Erdoğan when he seeks to sort of possibly step down from power, maybe for health reasons, whatever, that he’s just going to allow or permit, I should say, a free electoral process that has an undetermined outcome? I’m a little skeptical of that. I think there is a proven history now, at least going back since the 2023 presidential elections, where Erdoğan is willing to put his thumb on the scales in any sort of outcome. And I think at this final juncture, if he is intending to step out of power, he will actually do everything that he can to ensure that his son takes over.

Sarah: There is such a wonderful secular population within Turkey. Is there any possibility that the people could take note of what happened in Iran? Could they rise up if they see that these elections…

Sinan: There’s always hope. There’s always hope, and I think there’s an emerging sort of understanding on the side of the Turkish population. I think there’s a sense that people have derived in the last few years that without popular uprising or popular sort of pressure, at the very least, that transfer of power in Turkey is not going to occur peacefully at this point. I mean, we have seen the extent to which Erdoğan is willing to go to beat down dissent and protest. It’s not the same as Iran yet. They haven’t fired on crowds or mobilized military against them. But we have seen every time there is a challenge to him, a popular challenge to him, that he’s been very, very heavy-handed. I always think there is hope, but I think the understanding has to be that the regime in Ankara, whether it’s Erdoğan or anyone else that’s left after him, is not just willing, I think, to allow power to transit out of their hands. And so the people may have to step up.

On the opposing side, my worry is a lot of Turks have essentially remained pretty insular. They look at their home from within, and I worry that there is this naïve sense that, and I don’t mean that in a mean way, but there’s this naïve sense that, look, Erdoğan’s not going to be around forever. Of course, we’ll have elections. Of course, the people will essentially be able to determine who their next leader is, and we should do away with all this talk that the government or any of its security apparatus will essentially try to override the will of the people.

I find that at this juncture of Turkey’s sort of governance, to be somewhat naïve. I think they grossed at that sentiment, and some of that sentiment is promoted by influential media personalities in Turkey and opposition figures. I worry that they have sort of lulling the population into a false sense of security, just saying, well, let’s just ride this out until we have to. Completely underestimating the potential that Erdoğan and the regime in Turkey has to essentially just batten down the hatches.

But let’s say he’s thrown out and his son doesn’t get it, and we have a brand new president who’s secular, who is westward-looking, good, interesting, reinstituting the rule of law, et cetera, et cetera. Okay, that’s great. But the big problem there is Erdoğan’s been in power for 23 years. An entire generation has cropped up that thinks like him. The discourse, the education system, the bureaucracy, the bureaucrats, civil servants. The country is filled with these people in positions of power. How do you get rid of the mindsets even if you get rid of the figurehead? I’m just loathful of betting on quick fixes to major ideological shifts inside of Ankara in terms of its military priorities, its military posturing, its Anti-Westernism. I think that will take some time for it to materialize. I just worry that there’ll be a quick fix to this.

Sarah: Right. One final question and then I’m going to let you go. Similar to Iran, does Turkey have anything like the IRGC or the Basij, or militia surrounding Erdoğan and his henchmen?

Sinan: In a word, no. He has law enforcement, he has the military. The one thing that he does have is this private military contractor called SADAT, S-A-D-A-T, and SADAT is notorious. It’s like the Wagner Group, both in terms of resources, reach. They operate as mercenaries as well as training. They basically shipped a lot of fighters to the Libyan civil war, mercenaries, which were mostly Syrian fighters. They’re now training insistent missions in half a dozen African states, including Somalia, and that PMC is also thought to be a coup-proofing entity that surrounds Erdoğan.

The reason why we know this is when the coup attempt against Erdoğan happened in 2016, SADAT mercenaries were deployed onto the streets, not by Erdoğan, but they deployed at the behest of their owner, who was a pro-Erdoğan acolyte, a former Turkish general who was dismissed from the Turkish military for being an Islamist, but established SADAT as a PMC. But his mercenaries were on the streets to essentially ensure Erdoğan’s safety, and from that point onwards in 2016, SADAT was given a very prominent role inside the state. Its leadership was called into cabinet meetings, and so Turkey doesn’t have anything close to what the IRGC or the Ayatollah sort of other security apparatus like the Basij. But it doesn’t mean that we should count out these PMC and other actors from essentially coming to Erdoğan’s rallying cry.

But I think those entities, the Basij and the IRGC, were created as entities close to augmenting Iran’s ideological message. I would argue that Erdoğan doesn’t have an ideological framework that’s close to Iran. Erdoğan is an expansionist, authoritarian sort of hegemon. That is what he is. He’s a power man. You can say he resembles more Putin than anything relating to Khamenei in Iran. Erdoğan is not peddling an ideology. I don’t think he has one. I think he’s using the rhetoric of Islam when he wants. But his essential poison is power projection and expanding Turkey’s military, economic, and political footprint across the world, and therefore, he doesn’t need a Basij to internally police. There’s no ideology to police in Turkey. I mean, Turkey is still as diverse internally in terms of how people dress, eat, and do whatever they want, and so he doesn’t have that. But he does, I think, have institutional entities that will help protect him if necessary.

Sarah: Sinan Ciddi, it has been a real pleasure to talk to you. I could talk to you for hours and hours. You are a wealth of information. Sinan Ciddi, who is the head of the Turkish program at the wonderful Foundation for Defense of Democracy. Please support FDD if you want to hear more brilliant experts like Sinan, and also, please support The Met at themetonline.org. We’re on the Hill practically every day. In fact, we’re on the Hill today, part of us are, and trying to promote Western values and Western democracy. Thank you so much, Sinan.

Sinan: Thank you for having me. It was a pleasure.

Sarah: Pleasure. Thank you. Bye-bye.

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