The Internal Kurdish Resistance against the Regime Transcript

Disclaimer: This transcript is an edited version of a transcript created using AI technology and may not reflect 100% accuracy.

The video can be found here.

Sarah: Good afternoon and welcome to yet another very topical and very timely EMET webinar. There are approximately 30 to 45 million Kurds in the world. They live in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and about 1,600 in Armenia. Iranian Kurdish armed groups have thousands of forces operating along the Iran-Iraq border. President Trump on March 5th said he welcomed the Kurds’ assistance in helping to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran. He also offered, “extensive U.S. air cover.” Yet it seems that President Trump might have changed his mind. On Sunday, he spoke to reporters saying, “The conflict is getting complicated enough without the Kurds getting involved.” Here to shed some sunlight on all of this is our good friend Diliman Abdulkader. Diliman is the founder and president of American Friends of Kurdistan, an organization created to help strengthen, protect, and promote American Kurdish relations and support policies that promote the national security interests of the United States. I’m also proud to say that Diliman was a former employee of EMET. First of all, Diliman, can you explain to our audience the various Kurdish factions and whether or not they’re uniting together?

Diliman: Well, thank you for having me, Sarah, and thank you to the EMET team as well for hosting this timely panel and conversation. The Kurds in Iran have long fought the Islamic regime. This conflict just well over 10 days old. Conflict is nothing new to the Kurds. Since the first day of the Islamic regime, since 1979, the Kurds have fought directly against the Khomeini, Khamenei afterwards, and now looks like Mojtaba Khamenei’s son. With this recent war, the Kurds have a united force. This is very important. The Kurds are the most armed and are the most organized, battle-hardened ethnic minority inside Iran, compared to even the Farsi-speaking population inside Iran. The Kurds created an alliance called the Kurdish Alliance for Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, which is composed of 6 Kurdish factions. All have directly engaged against the IRGC for decades. So they are experienced, they know the mountains, and they mainly focus on what the Kurds call Rojava, which is East Kurdistan or northwest Iraq. Many of these Kurdish factions and forces are based in Iraqi Kurdistan. Their bases where they operate their HQs, where they train. They’re based in Iraqi Kurdistan because that’s where they found a safe haven, because when there is no war, the IRGC tends to continue to attack them, with the exception of one of the groups with it, which is PJAK, affiliated with the PKK, who has a base in Iranian Kurdistan. Now, the Kurds, you asked me if the Kurds are united. The Kurds are very well united to face directly against the IRGC. They know the enemy, they know their adversary on the ground. But the Kurds are also waiting and hesitant, but also studying the situation because we witnessed what just happened. And we had this discussion, Sarah, a couple months back. They saw the situation in Syria, and they don’t want that same mistake of betrayal to happen to them. So they have a whole list within their coalition, within their alliance. They’re asking for the United States, before we do go in, before we do fight the IRGC directly, we have a list of demands, which includes a no-fly zone, which includes air cover by United States and Israel, which includes advanced weapons, but also which includes international recognition and autonomy. So I think these are important points for the Kurds to kind of check off before they go in, and they want to make sure that these guarantees and assurances are met before they risk thousands of their lives like they did in Syria, only to be betrayed at the end.

Sarah: Yeah. Can you discuss the history of betrayal by the United States under various administrations?

Diliman: The Kurds have a complicated relationship with the United States. They are pro-American. They are pro-Western. They share the same values. But for a long time, the United States has used the Kurds as boots on the ground, or has called on the Kurdish, even the Kurdish civilian population, to rise up against certain regimes. For example, Saddam Hussein, right? During the First Gulf War, the Kurds rose up against Saddam’s Ba’athist regime, only for the Kurds to be betrayed when the United States decided to withdraw. So what happened? Saddam ended up going to the north and attacking the Kurds. This has happened on multiple occasions throughout history with Kissinger, with the first Bush administration, but also just most recently in Syria, as we witnessed, the Kurds shared a 10-year alliance with the Syrian Democratic Forces, which was led by the Kurds in northeast Syria who fought ISIS along American servicemembers. And unfortunately, just last month, in January and February, we decided, the United States decided to legitimize and recognize Zelenskyy, who now is the so-called president of Syria. That became, the betrayal of the Kurds, and the Kurds were forced to withdraw. The United States CENTCOM was told to stand down and not defend the Kurds when the jihadist-backed Damascus so-called government and Turkish-backed government led an incursion against the Kurdish areas. So I think this is a continuation of that. And that’s why the Kurds in Iran are very wary and are laying out the groundwork as far as their demands, their political allegiances, and they don’t want to put all their eggs in one basket. They’re saying, we will not sacrifice our lives and go across Iran. We’re not going to march to Tehran to topple the regime only for us to be betrayed. And I think that’s a legitimate position to take. But also, it’s an opportunity for the United States to see the Kurds as real, strong, reliable long-term allies rather than simply, oh, the strong fighters on the ground, they’re always ready to fight. That’s not the case. The Kurds do not want to fight. The Kurds do not enjoy fighting. The Kurds want a peaceful, stable region, and they only want to live in their part of the land, which is called Kurdistan. They’re not there to topple every regime in the region only to be betrayed.

Sarah: Ideally, you would like to foresee a stable Kurdistan. Would that include parts of Iraq and parts of Iran, like eastern Iraq and western Iran?

Diliman: Yeah, that’s a legitimate question. Of course, every Kurd, if you ask a Kurd, and myself as a Kurdish American, of course, we would like to see an independent Kurdish state, just like everybody else has in the region, everybody else has in the world. The Kurds are the largest the largest ethnic population in the world without a state of their own. That’s always the goal. So that’s not a secret. They have a right to self-determination. With that being said, the Kurds are also rational actors on the ground. They understand the regional dynamics. They understand the stronger powers around the world, from the United States to Israel to Russia, China having an influence in that region. And the Kurds will want a certain degree of autonomy in northwest Iran. So if they don’t get that total they’re not calling for separation, for example. They’re not calling for carving out Iran. So I think that’s a fearmongering tactic that we’ve heard in Washington for the past few weeks. That’s not the case. The Kurds want a democratic Iran that the people can decide on their own. It’s up to the people. It’s not up to a mullah and it’s not up to a monarch. I think that’s important to emphasize. The Kurds are not going to bow down to a king. The Kurds don’t have a strong and positive relationship with the former Shah either. The former Shah executed Kurds publicly, treated the Kurds the same way as the mullahs do today. In their eyes, they don’t see a difference. What the Kurds do want is a free democratic Iran for the people to decide themselves, for the people to vote, for their identities to be recognized. And the Kurds will not carve out, it doesn’t make sense to do that. It’s not rational. And the Kurds are not irrational. So they want to create an autonomous region within Iran that allows them to govern themselves, that allows them to create a stable future and security for themselves. I mean, keep in mind, the Kurds are armed. They are engaged with the IRGC already. We shouldn’t sideline the Kurds and we shouldn’t make the Kurds enemies or label the Kurds as separatists when the Kurds are going to be key to toppling this regime if that time comes.

Sarah: So is there a possibility that either the CIA or the Mossad would support an Iranian Kurdish bloc?

Diliman: I think there’s a huge possibility because it makes sense. The Kurds are battle-hardened. The Kurds have experience on the ground, and the geography of the Kurds allows for any other, for example, if they were to play that role, and that’s a big if, but if they were to allow, for example, US Special Forces to gain access to Iran, it would be through the Kurdish region. Because the Kurdish region of Iran shares a border with the Kurdistan region, the autonomous Kurdistan region in Iraq and neighboring Iraq, where we have US bases, US service members, the largest US consulate in the world. So the Kurdish geography plays a pivotal role. Of course, there were news that the Kurds will be CIA-backed and that they’re going to receive arms from the United States. Then President Trump kind of walked that back. A lot of that has to do with a phone call from Turkey as well. Keep in mind the Turks are playing a huge role. They fear the Kurds are going to carve out their own regions, separate, a similar situation to northeast Syria. Keep in mind, the Kurds are 15 million in northwest Iran, in Iran, 15 million. We’re not talking about 3.5 million like in Syria. We’re talking about 15 million Kurds with major forces who have that experience to kind of engage with the IRGC. So Erdoğan, of course, and Turkey fears that domino effect, that Turkey is next. But again, the Kurds will not be mercenaries. The Kurds studied that situation in Iraq. The Kurds studied the situation in Syria. With the referendum and the lack of American backing, with the incursion by Shiite militias into Kirkuk. So there’s a lot of history behind this. So it’s not easy for the Kurds to say, yes, we’ll do it for the sake of freeing, toppling the regime. No, I think the rest of the country also has to play a role in toppling this regime, not just only the Kurds.

Sarah: First of all, can you go into a little bit of the history why Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has so much animosity towards the Kurds?

Diliman: In short, the Kurds don’t identify as Turks, and that is the biggest thorn in the Turkish government when they view the Kurds, is that the Kurds say, we’re not Turks, we are Kurds, we don’t speak Turkish, we speak Kurdish, we have our own language, we have our own history, we’ve been here longer than you have. The Kurds have been in this region since the Median Empire, and they are descendants of the Medes. They’ve been long before here, before the Ottoman Empire. And the Kurds, even since the establishment of the state of Turkey in 1923, the Kurds stood against the Turkish state. So I think it’s a historical thing for the Kurds is that they just want to be left alone. They don’t want anybody’s land. They want to be able to identify as their own but the Turkish state refuses to accept that. Even to this day, the Turkish state refuses to accept that. If you say you’re a Kurd, the Turkish state will put you in prison. There are thousands of Kurdish political prisoners inside Turkish jails today. And Erdoğan may be the leader today, but Erdoğan is just part of the bigger problem that the Turkish government, the systematic grievance have against the Kurds historically, whether it’s economic oppression of the Kurds, language oppression of the Kurds, identity oppression of the Kurds, you name it. And Erdoğan is just kind of taking this oppression of the Kurds to a next level. And he’s not limiting himself. The thing with Erdoğan is that he’s not limiting himself to the boundaries within the Turkish state. So he’s not focusing on oppressing the Kurds inside Turkey alone. He’s going above and beyond and oppressing the Kurds in Syria, oppressing the Kurds in Iraq, and now looks like oppressing the Kurds in Iran as well. And there also, it’s important to note for the audience is that the Turkish intelligence and the Turkish government is coordinating very much closely with the IRGC and the Iranian intelligence in preventing any crossover between the Kurds in Iraq and the Kurds in Iran, or the Kurds from Iran that are based in Iraqi Kurdistan to go into Iran against the regime.

Sarah: So are you worried, first of all, that Iran could break up and there might be some sectarian violence if people, the Azeris, the Balochis, the Persians say, rebel against the IRGC and the Kurds and the Basij?

Diliman: Yeah, I mean, Iran is not just Persian, right? It’s not just Farsi[?]. They are actually less than 50% of the population. There are Azeris in the north, there are the Kurds in the northwest, there’s the Ahwazi Arabs bordering the Iraqi border, the Balochis in the south, and other minorities within those ethnic and religious minorities in the country. And none of these minorities really have a positive relationship with the IRGC. They have all been oppressed to one degree or another. But with the Kurdish component is what’s unique is that they’re also not Shiite Muslim, they’re Sunni Muslim. So majority of the Kurds are Sunni Muslim on top of being Kurdish. So they have a kind of a double negative going against the regime. But yeah, I mean, if it were to come to a certain point where the regime may break, it’s war, so there’s a possibility of a larger civil war that may break out. There’s a possibility of the different ethnic minorities trying to separate and carve their own regions. There’s a possibility of outside influencers, for example, the Turkish government influencing the Azeri population because they see them, the Azeri population, as an extension of Turkey. Or Azerbaijan, for example, playing a role into the Azeri population. And same thing with the Arabs, right, with the Arab population. So I think there’s a potential to spark more of a devastating outcome for the region inside the country. With that being said, the IRGC is no better. So I think that we have to realize that fear, there’s always that fear of potential… And I think that people don’t really have animosity with one another. It’s not to that certain degree where the ethnic minorities are going to go all out fighting one another and start killing each other. I don’t think it’s that sort of thing. But I do think the ethnic minorities will try to kind of carve out their own regions. The Balochis in the south, they number in the millions, they also want their own autonomy, for example. They’ve also been historically oppressed by the IRGC. So I think there’s a potential for that. But again, that shouldn’t be a barrier to toppling the regime. And I think the president has shown interest in, and that’s one of the biggest fears of the United States, is that we don’t want to create a 2003 Iraq-like scenario where we basically dismantle the entire IRGC, the Iranian military, and we kind of de-Ba’athified Iraq. Where everybody now is just in the hands of militias and terrorists and jihadis. Everybody’s killing each other and we can’t get it under control. That’s why I think the United States aimed for a Venezuela-like scenario where we kind of took Maduro out of the picture to try to engage with a more practical government. And that’s the same attempt that’s happening now, is to weaken them militarily so that they lose their leverage in the region so that they stop threatening Israel, stop threatening other allies, stop throwing stop striking missiles into the region, stop funding proxies. That would end also a weaker head of the government. That way we can engage them and they can be more practical. And of course, the whole goal is so they don’t have a nuclear weapon.

Sarah: So do you think it’s possible without the United States committing ground troops to the region either.. You said there are about 15 million Kurds in Iran and what, 8.5 in Iraq, is that a strong enough force to be able to take on the regime?

Diliman: Well, I think strikes alone won’t topple the regime. I think that’s just something to put out there. Strikes alone won’t topple the regime. That’s a decision that the U.S. has to make, whether to put ground troops in. I believe, if I’m not mistaken, we have about 50,000 troops prepared for this Operation Epic Fury in the region currently as we speak. So that’s the largest number of U.S. military service members in the region since the Iraq and Afghanistan war, since we ended those operations and those wars. The 15 million Kurds doesn’t equate to 15 million Kurdish fighters. The Kurdish fighters, some groups have 5,000, some have 10, some have 1,500. But the civilian population is also prepared and united with the Kurdish factions. So when they get the green light, when they feel that it’s safe, they can also pick up arms and go against the regime. But again, I think strikes alone won’t do that. That’s why the Kurds have their demands. That’s why the Kurds are saying, if you want us to liberate, at least we’re not going to march to Tehran. We’re not going to go march across Iran and liberate everybody, and we’re going to lose 20,000 lives here too, and then only for you to recognize somebody else in Tehran tomorrow, like you did Jolani in Damascus. But we will create a buffer zone, if you will, in northwest Iran, what the Kurds call East Kurdistan, an autonomous region that allows it to be a buffer zone, a US-friendly region, part of Iran, that is a likely scenario. But if you want the regime to fall outside of just strikes, the people have to rise themselves. I think there’s been multiple warnings by the United States for the people to stay in for now because of the airstrikes. The IRGC is using civilian areas as operating bases to go against. And also the IRGC has warned the people that if you come out into the street, that we will see you as an enemy because now it just looks like you’re taking orders from Israel and the United States. And they’re not armed, so they’re not like the Kurdish population where they’re armed, they’re civilian populations. The Kurds are also civilian, but the Kurds, because of the history, they really never put their weapons down. So I think, yeah, so it’s up to the people on the ground. The strikes are having a huge impact on the ground, but still, as of now, still looks like the regime has a strong control over the country. And if the president decides to wind down the operation or give it maybe 7 to 10 more days or 2 more weeks, whatever it may be, there’s a window that is closing and the people have to take advantage. And there’s not going to be another opportunity like this for a while where Israel is playing its role, but the United States kind of investing a large portion of its military into the region, as we’ve seen. So I think there’s an opportunity for the people to take advantage of, but it’s dangerous because they’re not armed and we don’t want civilians to continue to lose their lives.

Sarah: So the Kurds have been very well trained and prepared for this for years and years. What would happen to the Kurds in Iraq or Iran if, God forbid, they do not succeed?

Diliman: The Kurds know the risks, but they know that if the regime doesn’t fall, and we’ve seen evidence of this from past previous protests, for example, the immediate revenge mindset of the regime is to go after the Kurds. The most airstrikes that we’ve seen from the United States and Israel has been actually focused on northwest Iran where the Kurds reside. On the military bases, on intelligence buildings, infrastructure, and on missile defense vehicles on the ground, whatever the IRGC may use as an attack, not only against its own people, but against as it sees its adversaries, to strike U.S. consulate, to strike U.S. bases in the region, to strike Israel. They focus a lot of that in the northwest region of Iran. With that being said, if the regime doesn’t fall, the Kurds will get a lot of this, of the revenge by the regime. They’ll get punished, they’ll get even more suppressed, they’ll be thrown in prison, they’ll be publicly executed even more. The largest execution population percentage of Iran are Kurds. The prisoners, majority of them are Kurds. So I think because they see the Kurds as always the separatist movement, it’s not just they’re against the regime, it’s not just that they’re Kurds, it’s not just that they’re Sunni, but also now they want to separate. The Kurds here do have that number on their side, that 15 million, but the regime doesn’t fall. I think that’s why the people are not on the streets. That’s why the people haven’t risen up. Because they’re like, okay, if President Trump decides to wind down the operation tomorrow, what do we do this for? And now we’re going to get punished. There’s no more airstrikes. Nobody else is here to save us. So I think even the civilian population have calculated that. Let’s not rise up yet. Let’s not do anything dramatic. Let the airstrikes continue. We’ll see how long it lasts. If that happens to weaken the regime, great. Our forces will come across the border from Iraqi Kurdistan. Our people will come on the streets, and that way we can unite and push out the IRGC. But that has to be a long-term commitment by the US and Israel, of course.

Sarah: And of course, the people, I mean, the Kurds have been trained for years and years, but the average protester, they don’t have guns. And the most powerful voice comes out of the barrel of a gun.

Diliman: Exactly. I mean, civilians, they’re going to be a target, unfortunately. And IRGC themselves have come out and openly said that, that you will be a target if you… I mean, even there was a report I read that a young man, I think it was a 27-year-old man who just honked his horn in support in Tehran, honked his horn in support of the protesters, he was publicly executed. He was literally sniped. When I mean publicly executed, I don’t mean like there was a whole thing. No, he was sniped on the spot in his car just for honking his horn. So I mean, there’s countless reports like this, innocent Iranians, innocent people on the ground inside the country who are just being targeted by the IRGC. They don’t have arms. And the same thing with the Kurdish civilian population. They’re not armed. And that’s why the Kurdish forces that are armed have to make the right calculations and to not put the civilian population in harm’s way either. Because yes, you can defend yourself, you have an AK, but what is that young man going to do on the ground if he’s just going to work or if he’s just going home or trying to stay out of the sight of the IRGC. So it’s a very sensitive situation. It’s not easy to topple this regime. And also Iran’s geography is huge. It’s not easy. It’s not the size of Syria, obviously. It’s not a small country. It’s the size of many Western European countries put together. And it’s a mountainous region. So the strikes are having a strong impact in weakening the regime, but to date, the regime still controls majority of the power.

Sarah: So the Iraqi Kurds were instrumental in fighting ISIS, and many of them were locked up in prisons. Could you just explain a little bit about what’s happened to these ISIS prisoners and how the Iraqi Kurds actually sacrificed their own blood for this?

Diliman: Yeah, the Iraqi Kurds fought alongside the United States in weakening ISIS and defeating ISIS’s territorial occupation of the region. They fought alongside the United States in pushing out ISIS and eliminating ISIS in Mosul, their stronghold. They fought alongside the United States in liberating Yazidi women and girls who were kidnapped by ISIS. There’s a lot of ISIS prisoners continue to be in prisons in Iraqi Kurdistan. And this is the same story with the Kurds in Syria, right? The Iraqi Kurds are also in a sensitive situation because they don’t want to damage the stability that they have established. They don’t want to damage that. It’s not 100% stable because our neighbors are Turkey, are Iran, the Iraqi Shiite militias in the south and you have Jolani now who’s next door. So we’re surrounded by not so friendly pro-Kurdish, pro-American, pro-Western forces on the ground. So the degree of stability that they have established within this autonomous region, the Iraqi Kurds, the position that they’ve taken is neutrality, that we’re neutral, we’re not sending our forces across Iran, we’re not giving a green light to whoever wants to send forces, we’re simply neutral. Despite that neutrality, that position that the Kurds in Iraq have taken, The IRGC and the Islamic regime continues to fire missile strikes, over 100. By now it’s way above that in major cities in Iraqi Kurdistan, in Erbil, the capital, in Sulaymaniyah, the next major city, in Duhok. So all those major civilian population areas as well, hotels, parks, apartment buildings, international airports, on top of the US bases and assets on the ground. So they’re targeting civilians, and the Kurds don’t have an air defense system. They don’t have the Iron Dome. They don’t have Patriot missiles, unfortunately. So they don’t have an air force to fight these missiles. So they’re kind of also left on their own. So the Kurds in Iraq are also calculating, we know the history, we know what’s going on, nobody’s going to have our backs, maybe this is not a long-term commitment. They probably know that this is not a long-term commitment by the United States and this administration. Why should we put our necks out? And also now when this is all over, the regime still survives. We have to live with the regime. They’re our neighbors. We share a 400, 500-mile-plus border with Iran, with the IRGC. We have to continue that conversation. And the regime now views us as Mossad spies, agents, CIA agents. And that’s not a long-term strategy, rational strategy for the Kurds in Iran. So I think their position of neutrality is very wise. It’s very smart. They should continue that. But that doesn’t equate to the position of the Kurds in Iran. They still want to topple the regime, but they want assurances from the United States.

Sarah: So what kind of assurances at all do the Kurds living in Syria under Jolani?

Diliman: It’s the agreement that they were strong-armed to sign. That’s the only assurance that was backed supposedly by the United States, of course, but also by the French and some of the European countries. They were strong-armed. They did not want to sign this. They were forced to kind of integrate. That was the word they kept using, integrate into the Syrian army, one army and all that. But the Kurds at the end of the day kept their weapons because they didn’t trust it. They have their own security forces. They are defending and providing security for their own cities, the Kurdish majority cities. And I think they drew a red line, even with the United States saying that “We’re not going to lay down our weapons. We’re not going to just dissolve. We’re not going to disappear.” You forced us to withdraw up past the Euphrates into this corner of Syria, but we will not give up these, the Kurdish-majority cities. And now part of the agreements that they made is that the Kurds in Syria, part of the negotiations is that the Kurds will go back, for example, into Afrin. And we’ve seen signs of that, which is positive. Afrin, the city that was occupied in 2018 by Turkey with the invasion in northwest Syria. So I think there is some sort of agreement and acknowledgement of the Kurdish areas. These are part of the negotiation, but it’s very sensitive. Everything’s held on by a thread. Anything can change the ground. The scenarios on the ground can change in a heartbeat, and the Kurds are ready for that. And that’s why the Kurds in Syria still did not, despite this agreement, you can call it an assurance, but despite this agreement, they did not lay down their weapons. They still have their weapons. I think the Kurds in Iran and Iraq are doing the same thing.

Sarah: So, how are the Kurds that are in Turkey faring under all of this pressure?

Diliman: Yeah, I mean, the Kurds in Turkey are oppressed. The Kurds in Turkey, the government is not giving them basic rights. They punish the Kurds, and the Turkish government punishes the Kurds in Turkey if the Kurds in Syria do something totally not aligned with the Turk, and it’s the same thing with the Kurds in Iran. So they get punished as well. There are supposedly peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish government, but all we know, that’s also fragile, that could unravel at any moment. That’s based on the Turkish, the way Turkey behaves towards the Kurds in Syria. That’s based on the way Turkey behaves towards Kurds across the region. So I think it’s the Kurds and the Kurdish situation inside Turkey numbering at 25 million-plus Kurds there continues to be no different than the Kurds face in Iran. Lack of basic rights, lack of political freedom, lack of cultural rights, just you name it. They can’t raise their colors, their identity, they can’t dance and sing. Nobody wants to live with a government that oppresses them. We know the history of the region. Christians have been persecuted, the Jews have been pushed out of these countries, and the Kurds just happen to continue to survive and exist largely because they’ve held on to their weapons and have spoken out and fought against these oppressive regimes. But the situation in Turkey, honestly, is no better than anywhere else.

Sarah: So do we have any evidence that Erdoğan is working together with the Iranian mullahs?

Diliman: Yeah, absolutely. They met back in November, I believe it was November or early December that the Turkish government’s foreign minister visited Iran. So they were kind of hinting they kind of knew that something was going to happen. Fast forward to March. So yeah, so they’ve pre-coordinated, they are sharing intelligence. They’re also coordinating alongside the border, the border they share between Iran and Turkey. They’re preventing Iranian, for example, they’re preventing Iranian civilians from crossing the border into Turkey. If they look like, for example, if they look like they’re fleeing, so they’re preventing refugees and migrants from fleeing across their country. But we know Turkey’s intention, right? Turkey’s intention is to coordinate, share intelligence, all for the sake of preventing the Kurds in Iran from gaining any degree of autonomy. That’s the number one goal. Everything else is secondary. So it’s secondary to weaken Israel’s influence in a potential new Iran. It’s secondary to mitigate and kind of control US influence in a new Iran. Turkey wants a stake in that. So I think Turkey is trying to play it long-term. They don’t see the regime as falling, therefore we’re going to continue sharing intelligence. And they’ve kind of spoken out against this operation by the United States and Israel. They see it as fueling the fire. They see it as the United States and Israel kind of pushing regime change and trying to give the Kurds a portion of the country. And we have seen some kind of missed strikes from the IRGC into Turkey. I’m not buying into that scenario altogether as of yet. We don’t know the evidence on the ground, the intentions, the targets. Some say it may have been targets towards Cyprus, to the military bases there. But it landed in Turkey. We’ll see. We know for a fact that the Turkish government is coordinating with the IRGC and the mullahs, and they’d rather have the mullahs survive than the people on the ground inside Iran have a new government and have a chance at freedom.

Sarah: And the irony of ironies is that Turkey is a NATO ally.

Diliman: Absolutely. That’s why they get away with it all.

Sarah: They’re getting away with this. I mean, and I really wish that there were a way to expunge Turkey from NATO because they’re coordinating basically with the enemy of the United States and Israel and the Kurds. So your best-case scenario would be ideally?

Diliman: Best-case scenario, I mean, it has to continue for longer than 7 to 10 days. It has to continue longer than 2 weeks. I know the president is not interested in long-term incursion. I know the president is not interested, and also Americans aren’t just in general, boots on the ground. It’s an opportunity for the Kurds to kind of go in and weaken the regime in northwest Syria, excuse me, northwest Iran. I think that’s a kind of best-case scenario for at least we weaken the regime. They don’t have the same strength military capacity and power that they had before Operation Epic Fury. We’ve eliminated their military infrastructure and assets in northwest Iran. We created a buffer zone. Now those Kurds share a border with the Iraqi Kurds. The borders are open, so there’s freedom of navigation through those areas and they can move back and forth and also provides a kind of a buffer for pro-Western governments, not only in the Middle East but also in Europe and of course, the United States, to weaken the regime even more. That’s kind of the best-case scenario that I see coming out of this. Of course, the goal and hope is that the regime topples quickly. These military strikes that happen within the next 2 weeks really damage the regime entirely. That way the people can find a window of opportunity to kind of move out of their homes and weaken the regime and topple the regime. That’s the ultimate best-case scenario. But again, as we discussed, they don’t have arms, they don’t have weapons, they need a total destruction of the regime. And these individual soldiers have to put their weapons down so they don’t target the regime. So, I mean, there’s different scenarios, but the Kurds are hoping to at least kind of get the green light, get the assurances from the United States for their guarantees, that long-term commitments and protection and air cover and no-fly zones, that they can go in and liberate at least those areas in northwest Iran.

Sarah: Do you think there’s any possibility that the Iranian military might put down their guns and support the people, the protesters?

Diliman: No, I mean, these guys are hardliners. They’re loyal. It’s not just the military we’re talking about, theocratic military. They have an allegiance to the Ayatollah. And even the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, his son, who I believe was injured, he survived the recent attacks. He’s very close with the IRGC. So you had an ayatollah, I guess they describe him as patient, which I don’t believe. I mean, he was targeting every opportunity he could. He was using proxies every opportunity he could. But Mojtaba is known to be closer, even more close with the IRGC. He’s known to be more of a hardliner. He’s known to have oppressed the people even more, and even I believe he fought with the Iran-Iraq War so he has that identity that he’s amongst the fighters themselves, the soldiers inside the country themselves. So I don’t see that happening. The only scenario that could happen is if the United States kind of goes all in and does complete destruction. Right now they’re being very strategic about what they destroy, what they don’t destroy. They’re kind of still allowing, to a certain degree, allowing the regime to renegotiate and reengage with the United States. I think there’s that element to it. So I don’t think, of course, hopefully all these strikes topple the regime, but I think the United States is looking at it from a practical point where saying we’re going to pound them so hard, hopefully they can reengage and kind of surrender and say, fine, we won’t have nuclear weapons. That’s also considered a win for the United States.

Sarah: Yeah, I mean, we are concerned there’s this pickaxe mountain that’s very deep underground, like 500 meters underground. And scientific knowledge doesn’t just eviscerate these Iranian mullahs. I’m sure, can export or import their scientific knowledge, and they can reengage their nuclear and their ballistic missiles. It is a toxic, malignant theocracy. And of course, if we had a cancer growing within our body, we would want that cancer to be excised from our body. And it’s a very hard regime to have to live with, especially for the dissidents that have been slaughtered. So, Diliman, I can’t thank you enough for all your wisdom and all of your knowledge. Diliman is the founder and the president of American Friends of Kurdistan. If people want to support you, how could they send their their checks to you?

Diliman: Yeah, no, thank you. Just visit AmericanFriendsOfKurdistan.org. There’s a donate, continue to support us. And we’re doing the hard work on the ground on Capitol Hill, engaging with the administration as far as fighting for the rights of the Kurds, but also strengthening U.S.-Kurdish relationships and our other allies in the region. So whatever you can do to help us.

Sarah: Right. And please also remember to support us. We don’t only have these webinars every week, but we’re on Capitol Hill several times every week trying to promote the EMET, the truth of what is right and what is moral for the United States and also for our Kurdish allies that we really want to support very much. So if you want to support EMET, please go to emetonline.org. Thank you so much, gentlemen.

Diliman: Thank you, Sarah.

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