The New Middle East as We Know It Transcript

Disclaimer: This transcript is an edited version of a transcript created using AI technology and may not reflect 100% accuracy.

The video can be found here.

Sarah: Good afternoon and welcome to day five of Operation Epic Fury and Rising Lion. Right before we went on, I got an alert that my daughter and her family have to go into their sealed room as they have done throughout this war. I have to say that we have never before encountered a more practiced, coordinated, disciplined, and well-choreographed war between the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Most everyone in the world recognizes the nature of pure evil that the Islamic Republic represents, and most of the free world understands that this is just like a metastasizing cancer and it must be removed from our collective body politic[?]. At this point in time, the Islamic Republic of Iran has struck out against its Sunni Arab neighbors. The regime has struck out against the infrastructure, airports, hotels, and oil facilities in the UAE, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi Air Base, Saudi Arabia, including a CIA base, Kuwait, hitting the Al-Salam Air Base and Kuwaiti airport, and Bahrain, where they attacked the Fifth Fleet headquarters, residential buildings in Manama, and the Pram Plaza Hotel, and in Qatar, where it struck the Al-Aduwaid Air Base hosting U.S. Central Command forces. Jordan appears to have been struck 73 times by falling debris from intercepted missiles and drones. Iraq has been hit multiple times by drone strikes, specifically hitting an ammunition depot and causing explosions near Abil International Airport in the Kurdistan region and a hotel housing U.S. troops, as well as a logistical support facility near Baghdad International Airport. A British base in Cyprus was attacked on March 2nd, potentially widening the conflict to most of the European Union. Turkey has been attacked, although Turkey has certainly helped the Islamic Republic launder money, with[inaudible] air defense systems destroying the oncoming Iranian missiles. So we are particularly honored to have with us today Dalia Ziada. Dalia was born in Cairo, Egypt. She’s the author of the very important book, The Curious Case of Three-Legged Wealth, Egypt, Military Islamism, and Liberal Democracy. Dalia studied international diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law at Tufts University, and she was very instrumental in the uprising that initiated the 2011 revolution against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Dalia has been named by CNN as one of the eight agents of change in the Middle East and by the Daily Beast as one of the most fearless women in the world. Because Dalia spoke out on October 7, 2023, she faced accusations of espionage for Israel and incitement of war crimes, and that led her to seek refuge in the United States, where we are delighted that she is our friend and neighbor. So Dalia, why do you think the Islamic Republic has attacked their Sunni Arab neighbors?

Dalia: So first of all, thank you, Sarah, for having me, especially at this time. And before we delve into why Iran is doing what it is doing, I just want to send a message of solidarity to everyone in the Middle East right now who are suffering from Iran’s aggression, totally unjustified aggression against its neighbors. Although I am not surprised, this is exactly what Iran has always used to do, not only against Israel but also against its Arab neighbors. So, to your question, unfortunately, for so long Iran has been treating its Arab neighbors, Arab countries, as its kind of backyard where it can implant militias, intervene into domestic politics with the purpose to create failed states so they can occupy these failed states. We saw this very clearly in the examples of Iraq and Lebanon, and also they gave themselves, over the years, the liberty even to implant militias in countries like Yemen, for example, and Syria, and also Iraq, and of course Lebanon with Hezbollah, where these militias did so much harm to the Arab people in these countries under the claim or under the flag of resisting against Israel, or killing or annihilating the small Satan[?], which is Israel from their perspective, as they used to call it, and fight against the great Satan, which is the United States, also from their perspective. So what we’re seeing today is only an extension to what Iran has always been doing. They give themselves the freedom to fire rockets, fire missiles at Arab countries, thinking that the Arab countries will tolerate that, as they have always tolerated the Iranian aggression in different forms, except that this time the region attacked, or the sub-region attacked, which is the Gulf region, the Arabian Peninsula in particular, did not accept what Iran is doing and decided to defend itself. And there are two aspects to look at here, actually. One is the fact that Arab countries, or Arab Gulf countries in particular, are standing up to Iran and saying, “No, we are not going to accept your aggression on our countries under the flag of fighting or retaliating against the United States and Israel.” And surprisingly, we are seeing not only these Arab Gulf countries coming together and acting in a collective manner against Iran, which, if you know the Arab Gulf region well, it’s a big deal that they will come together over anything, the tribal divisions and competition there is huge. So the fact that they now can come together and we can see Qatar standing shoulder to shoulder with United Arab Emirates and Saudi to respond to Iran, this is huge, in my opinion. But what’s even more huge and more impressive is that these Arab Gulf countries are taking the side of the United States and Israel against Iran. This is game changer. And I would not be exaggerating if I say that this is the birth of a new Middle East and the death of the older Middle East that we’ve always known. So we are witnessing a very critical moment right now. Iran is doing all it can to survive, but in the process, it’s actually pushing a new alignment in the region that promises a better future region.

Sarah: So do you think that this new regional realignment will endure past the war?

Dalia: Oh, it’s a very difficult question, especially we are still in the very early days of the war, and it’s still developing. Also, we don’t know what will happen in the next few hours or tomorrow or one week from now. But here is what I think is going to happen. So Iran, what they’re doing right now, or from the perspective of Iran, is that they want to widen the conflict as much as they can, widen it either geographically, like turning it from an Iran-US-Israel conflict into a Middle East conflict. So this is one thing. And the other thing is to widen the scope of the conflict globally through economic channels by targeting gas and oil facilities. So while, of course, by doing this, that’s why Iran, we saw, for example, in the past few years, were attacking specifically civilian areas in Arab Gulf countries, hoping to provoke the Arab Gulf countries strong enough to respond to them. But thank God, so far, the Arab countries are practicing very high self-discipline. They are still in the defense mode, not yet in the attack mode. So, so far, we’re good about this point, which actually means we are not going to see a regional war, as Iran wishes, anytime soon. And the other side, which is the economic pressure that Iran is trying to put on the world by attacking energy facilities, either in the region, or now actually we are seeing them attacking Turkey, which means they want also to expand the conflict to Europe, this is somehow creating a new reality where there is no trust in Iran anymore, a new reality that says that we cannot trust this regime anymore, and we can trust Israel and the United States more. The question is, as you said, which is very crucial, is, well, okay, now after the dust settles and this war ends, will the Arabs continue to be on the side of Israel and the United States? Are we really going to see a new reality in this dynamic between Israelis and Arabs? What will determine that is how strong Israel will be after this war, not how weak Iran will be or how involved the US will continue to be. Really, it’s all about how strong or stronger Israel will continue to be after this war, and stronger not only militarily but also economically and technology-wise, on all different levels. Why? Because if you understand the Arab mindset, usually Arabs like to bet on the strongest horse. And if Israel is the strongest, that’s why they were trying to appease Iran for so long, to accommodate Iran for so long, not because they love Iran. There are so many ideological divisions and even wars historically between Sunni Arabs and Shia Iran, but they had to accommodate Iran because Iran was a stronger power at that time. Now, if Israel continues to be stronger on all these levels, security level, economy level, and political level, and so on, this promises that Arab countries will really be more willing and more even eager to have stronger and more stable and more pragmatic relationship with Israel, which is good for everyone in the region.

Sarah: So, Egypt, as far as I know, has not yet been attacked by Iran. And in a very delicate, carefully calibrated message, President Fatah Abdel Sisi condemned the Iranian attacks to his brotherly Arab nations as a direct threat to regional[?] stability. And your parliamentarian in Egypt, Mohamed Farid, offered a contrasting view, arguing that complete elimination of any Iranian nuclear threat, actually a comprehensive view, and full neutralization of its ballistic missiles capabilities are urgent necessities to end its criminal aggression. But a very popular broadcaster named Ahmed Moussa, who has close ties to the Sisi government, described the campaign[inaudible]and urged Iran to direct its response toward Israel. He said, “We want a real rocket that strikes the heart of Tel Aviv.” So, do you have any idea where most Egyptians stand between these two polarities?

Dalia: So, there is a big misunderstanding about the position of Egypt, unfortunately, in Western media. And let me tell you the truth, which is not a happy one, by the way. So, all what you’re seeing, like, for example, they are saying right now that the Egyptians are opening Taba, which is on the border of Israel, for Israelis to cross into Israel because they can’t use the airspace. Okay, fine. But Egypt is not doing this in love of Israel, by the way. They are doing it under the pressure of the United States, which they know very well that if they don’t do that, the military aid will be cut if they don’t allow the Israelis to go. So, there, in this show, they are only pleasing the United States. They are not pleasing Israel. And by the way, they are not speaking against Iran. Even when President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, in this iftar he had last week, I believe, with the leaders of the Egyptian military immediately after the war happened, he said he did not say, “We condemn Iran.” He did not even mention Iran. He said there were mistakes that happened. And you can go, those who speak Arabic can go back to the speech and listen carefully. It was, of course, exaggerated in Western media in a very unfair way. He said, of course, first of all, he kept saying also vague sentences that you can understand very well that he’s referring to Israel as a threat to Egypt and saying that no one can touch Egypt, meaning Israel cannot touch Egypt the same way they did with Iran. And then he said, of course, there were some mistakes happened by firing at some Arab countries. He did not even say Iran did a mistake or we condemn Iran for doing this and that. He did not say that. Okay, so this is one thing. On another level, all the narrative you’re seeing happening on social media, okay, you have one parliamentarian, which, by the way, Mohamed Farid is not really an important parliamentarian. He’s not one of the influential ones or so. He’s just a number, just another chair in the parliament. But the influential ones like Mustafa Bakri and others who are very vocal and very influential and very close to the regime as well, they are speaking against the attack on Iran. And they went and- if you follow the Egyptian media, you will be shocked. They are singing love to Iran and blaming Israel. Iran, which has always been hostile to Egypt. They killed President Sadat, for God’s sake, how people forgot all of that. And not they killed, but they honored the killer of President Sadat. They named the street after his name in Iran. So, Iran has always been hostile to Egypt. And now the Egyptians are forgetting this. And if you go to the Egyptian media, it’s all about showing love to Iran and rejecting what Israel and the United States did. And actually, I remember actually listening at one of these media stations, someone saying that Iran’s victory is Egypt’s victory. And the logic here behind this, it’s not necessarily support of Iran. It’s mainly hate to Israel. It’s not allowing Iran because they claim that Iran is the only reason why Israel is not getting stronger and not becoming a regional player. So if we let Iran, the Iranian regime fall now, this means Israel will get more and more stronger. And unfortunately, in Egypt, until today, until this very day, they still call Israel an eternal enemy. So please don’t be deceived by any vague rhetoric that is mistranslated in Western media. And just follow the source, follow what’s really happening inside in Egypt, and you will be shocked.

Sarah: Right. I know on February 20, Iranian President Pazashkian met with Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and signed an economic agreement. So perhaps that’s part of the reason that they’re so buddy-buddy with one another. It’s really horrible.

Dalia: For about a year now, actually, Iran and Egypt has been very close. Under the influence of Qatar. Qatar has been pushing them closer together, thinking that it can create an axis in the region that is stronger than the peace axis[?]. So it’s kind of expanding the axis of evil that Iran and Qatar has been working on for so long. And also Egypt was very attractive to them because Egypt have a very strong military institution. It’s actually perhaps the strongest among all the Arab countries. So that’s why, and also the largest in number and its geographic location and all of these considerations. So it was only an attempt to expand the axis of evil. And now Egypt feels disoriented because they don’t know. Now they align themselves with this axis of evil of Qatar and Iran, thinking that it is going to win, especially after October 7. And now, actually, it’s not winning, it’s losing. And Egypt is losing its best allies in the process. So let’s see.

Sarah: So a few months ago, I was reading about the huge military buildup of Egyptian troops in the Sinai. And of course, the terrorist tunnels that ended up in Gaza were built underneath the sands of Egypt. So are these things still going on?

Dalia: The building of the tunnels? No, of course, it’s not happening anymore. Of course, after the war, and after the war in Gaza, and after all the tensions that happened between Egypt and Israel, this is not tolerated anymore. Let’s go back just 10 years ago to explain why these tunnels existed. So the habit of building tunnels between, or the tradition, actually, of building tunnels under the Rafah border between Egypt and Gaza has been the case at least since the 1990s, when Hamas started to get stronger and they were the de facto power inside Gaza. And so they started to find illegal ways to smuggle products and even- products, by the way, we’re speaking not only food products, but they were smuggling cars and other stuff, like things as big as cars. And building materials and weapons and everything. So they started creating these tunnels. Who helped them on the other side? The Egyptian tribes. And the Egyptian tribes did not- the Egyptian tribes in Sinai, the Sinai tribes and they did not help Hamas for love of Hamas, but unfortunately these tribes historically have been involved in drug smuggling and weapon smuggling because they are very much on the border. Their position, in other words, allows them to do that. So it’s only a way to profit. For them it’s a way to profit, and Hamas pays really well. And so why not? Why not do this business with them? This continued to be the case until, in 2013, after the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, Hamas smuggled through these tunnels and kind of occupied Sinai and radicalized the youth in these tribes and actually created small terrorist cells, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and so on. And then later, in 2014, these terrorist cells came together and formed what is known as ISIS-Sinai, Daesh-Sinai, Wilayat-Sinai in Sinai. And they started to attack the Egyptian military there, and they started to attack even Egyptian Muslims and Christians, killing them in very large numbers and so- And at that time, the Egyptian military had to do something to control the situation because it’s now not only hurting Israel, it’s also hurting the Egyptians. So what they did, and people can also go back and find it online, a speech by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi where he said exactly what happened in 2014. He said, “I went,” he himself went to the Israeli counterparts in the Ministry of Defense at that time and said, “We need your help to secure Sinai.”

And they made agreements to close the tunnels and get rid of Hamas and so on. The Israelis did not only say, “Yes, okay, you’re welcome to come close enough to the Rafah border to do the job,” but they said, “We are coming to do it with you.” And it was an epic cooperation between the Egyptian military and the Israeli military. Imagine, for the first time they are working together, not against each other in Sinai to fight against Hamas. It was amazing. So by the year, around the year 2015, 2016, the Egyptian military flooded the tunnels with water, the tunnels under the Rafah border with Gaza with water, pushed Hamas out, and had full control over Sinai, even controlled the terrorist cells, ISIS terrorists inside Sinai as well. So everything was under control and Egypt announced that there are no tunnels under the Rafah border anymore. And they were right about it, by the way, it was truly the case. Then around the year 2018, with the rise of the economic crisis in Egypt, there was a lot of unrest[?] in the making, including in Sinai, because these Sinai tribes are now losing one of the main sources of their income. And it’s a huge source of income. They don’t have so many businesses to do in Sinai. If you know Sinai is a vast Bedouin[?] desert. There is not much to do there. So they are now losing a huge source of income. They had been patient for a few years and the military promised to compensate them, but they can’t because the economic situation is very bad in the country. So what happened is that in the year 2018, the Egyptian intelligence made a deal with these Sinai tribes that it is okay, go back to doing business with Hamas in Gaza, open tunnels, do the trading with them on one condition. These tunnels will be only one way, from Egypt to Israel or to Gaza and not backward. And actually the Sinai tribes committed to the deal and they opened the tunnels and started trading again with Hamas. What made Hamas more powerful in a very short time is that also around this time, 2019, 2020, and after, we saw the conflicts or the civil wars in Sudan and in Libya heating up once again. And while weapons in large numbers and large volumes were sent to Sudan and Libya, unfortunately by some Arab countries as well who were involved in this and also by Turkey and others, and Russia also was involved. So there were a kind of surplus of weapons in Sudan and Libya with these militias. So what they did, they sold some of these weapons to Hamas through the tunnels under the Rafah border. And how they smuggled it, if you look at the map, Libya and Sudan, their only gate to Hamas, to Gaza, is through Egypt. So this is exactly what happened. And that’s why, in a very short period of time, Hamas was able to do the October 7 attack in 2023. Now, after October 7, yes, the tunnels were closed, of course, because Israel discovered most of them because of the war, because of everything. The tribes in Sinai are actually sitting on fire because, once again, they are losing a big source of income. They have been trying to renew this trading with Hamas through drones. Actually, if you follow also the news, there were a lot of news of drones flying from Sinai into Gaza with weapons. It’s not in support of the Gazans or anything or Hamas, it’s a trade, it’s basically a trade. The Sinai tribes are sending the weapons so Hamas can send them money. So this is what was happening and this is what’s happening now. And I believe the problem is not only the tunnels, the problem is the support that Hamas is getting in Egypt and it’s growing every day. Egypt 10 years ago in the Egyptian media was calling Hamas a terrorist organization. Now they are calling them freedom fighters. It’s crazy. So as long as Hamas remains popular in Egypt, we have a problem. It’s not only about tunnels, they will find a hundred other ways to do that. And unfortunately the Egyptian government, the Egyptian police, the Egyptian military, the Egyptian intelligence will not object to that because they don’t want trouble inside. They don’t[?] want these Sinai tribes to turn against them. So they will allow them to do whatever they want to do and it will eventually lead to big trouble.

Sarah: Right. And of course, Egypt has been the recipient of United States aid after Israel, the biggest, largest recipient of United States aid. And I think I should take you to Capitol Hill and you should explain this. We should go together. So let’s get back to Qatar. Qatar has seemingly made itself indispensable, casting the illusion to the entire world as a moderate Arab ally and negotiator. Now, Qatar has been hit on the Al-Aduaid Air Base. How do you think Qatar is feeling towards the Islamic Republic and towards this front with the United States, as well as with Israel?

Dalia: Actually, I tell you, just before we started this webinar, I read a statement issued just a few hours ago by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Qatar where they explain a phone call that happened. And it’s like a readout of a phone call that happened between the Qatari foreign minister and the Iranian foreign minister. And in the call, the Iranian foreign minister said, “We are sorry, we did not mean to attack your civilian facilities. Actually, our missiles were directed at the American bases.” So for the first time, Qatar responded, or the Qatari foreign minister responded, in a very aggressive way by rejecting all these claims and insisting that Iran stop. And he kind of threatened Iran with retaliation if this continued. This press release, this statement, when I was reading at the beginning, I thought it was a parody or something. Maybe it’s fake, but it was real, which, once again, we are seeing a shift, a very interesting and important shift in the position of Qatar. And by the way, this shift is not just happening right now as a result of the war. This shift has been happening for about one year now. Qatar, because of its relationship with the Trump administration. So what’s happening is that most people are thinking that Qatar is influencing the Trump administration. But I can’t tell you, I just can’t go through much detail. In all the meetings I had here in my capacity as a Washington, DC coordinator with Izgab, and we had very important meetings on the Muslim Brotherhood, on the region, on the Middle East region and everything and Israel and so… Actually we heard great things about how the United States administration, how the US administration is pressuring Qatar to cut off its ties with Iran and with the Muslim Brotherhood and with this Islamist axis in the region if they want a strong relationship with the United States. They are making it a condition, which is huge and very important. This shows you, and actually we saw maybe glimpses of that for those who are following closely the behavior of Qatar. For example, after the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar did not object to that or speak out against that as was expected. On the contrary, they were agreeing and accepting.

Also, we are now seeing that Qatar and the relationship between Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood members worldwide[?]which Qatar was directly sponsoring, this space between them is really widening, is really widening over the past year. One of the main bandits of the Muslim Brotherhood who was sponsored by Qatar from the UK, he came to the US and was arrested by ICE a few months ago and Qatar did not do anything about it, did not do anything to protect him or to stop the US from arresting him. And actually, this is also a great indication that Qatar is trying to distance itself from this Islamic axis or Islamist axis. How far Qatar will distance itself? Of course, we should not be very optimistic because also for Qatar, it’s an ideological thing. The regime itself is ideologically invested in this Islamist ideology, this radical Islamist ideology. There are members in the Qatari regime who are Islamists. So this, we have to understand and we have to encourage Qatar to go more and more away from this Islamist axis with caution, with understanding that we don’t need to be overly optimistic about it, but the further we can widen this space, the better.

Sarah: Okay, do you believe that after this war, Egypt will try to assert itself as the most dominant force within the Arab world?

Dalia: Oh yes, of course. After this war, I believe not only Egypt, but several powers in the region, several key players, I like to call them the big sisters, countries like Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and so- They consider themselves the big sisters in the region and they will want to assert themselves as a new leadership. For Saudi, for example, I am sure, I have no doubt, they will try to use the Sunni angle by claiming that we are now the leaders of the Sunni world and the Sunni side of the Sunni-Shia equation in the region is now on the rise as the Shia side is falling down or falling apart. Now it’s our Sunni momentum and Saudi is historically the mother or the home of Islam and Arabism. So they will try to emphasize this and play the role of the new big sister of the region. In contrast, Egypt will try to emphasize its secular socialist history as the big sister of the region. Egypt has always been the big sister in this regard and maybe emphasize also its historical importance, geographic importance, political importance or geopolitical importance, given its geographic proximity to the Mediterranean and to Israel and so on. So this is what Egypt will play.

And also we have Turkey. Turkey will try its best to emphasize its role as the new big sister of the Middle East. And we are seeing President Erdogan is doing this very actively already. He has been trying to do this for years and now it is his momentum. However, Turkey’s approach is different. Turkey wants to go back to the Ottoman Empire era where they can have troops everywhere in the region. It’s a masked[?] occupation, kind of a new occupation, we can call it neo-occupation. So this is the Turkish approach and they have already started doing it. Now they have troops in Libya, they have troops in Syria. They wanted to have troops in Gaza also under the flag of the Board of Peace and the ceasefire and so on, and the International Stability Force and all of that, but Israel rejected that. So this is what Turkey is trying to do. Turkey is mainly the muscle, the military power. Saudi wants to dominate via the religious rhetoric. Egypt wants to dominate via the historical geopolitical rhetoric. Who is going to win in the three? I believe the future of the Middle East is not in the hands of Arabs, is not in the hands of Iran or anything. Actually, the future of the Middle East is in the hands of two main powers, Turkey and Israel. And I believe this is also the understanding in policy circles here in Washington and that’s why we saw President Trump in the Board of Peace meeting earlier in February, he insisted, he brought actually the issue of the need for Turkey and Israel to work together because he knows that the future of the region is in the hands of Turkey and Israel and it would be good for everyone for these two countries to pragmatically work together for the good of the region rather than entering a new phase of clashes and conflict and wars between Turkey and Israel that will drag the whole region into a new form of conflict. So the new Middle East will just be a copy of the older Middle East. So let’s hope they will pragmatically take this route. But honestly, no, forget it. It’s not about the Arabs. It’s not about Iran, of course. And it’s mainly about Turkey and Israel.

Sarah: Yeah. Although on that note, Rasip Tayyar al-Sham has unfortunately, I mean, Hayat Tayyar al-Sham has unfortunately relied so much on Turkey in its taking over of Syria. And Erdogan has certainly not said very lovely things about the state of Israel or their prime minister. He has certainly declared a great deal of enmity towards Israel. And I think it’s very hard for Israel to navigate this as they’re trying to live with Ahmad al-Shara as the leader of Syria right now. So it’s a very delicate compromise, a delicate walk. And speaking of delicate compromises, do you think that the United States might acquiesce or compromise and allow the second-tier level of Iranians, of the Iranian theocrats, to reign, including the son of the late Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, who’s worked well with the IRGC, the Quds Force, as well as the Basij?

Dalia: Yeah, we are hearing news right now about what will happen next in Iran, things like suggesting some names of new leaders, including the son of Khamenei. And so, but the main criteria here is how the U.S. is going to respond to all of that, and whether Israel will accept to withdraw or retreat from this war right now at this very moment. I think for Israel, we know for sure it will not retreat until it annihilates the Iranian regime, because honestly, this is an opportunity that may never come again. And if we give a case[?] of life to the Iranian regime right now, it will become 100 times stronger than it was. And we don’t want this to happen. And believe me, when I say we, I don’t only speak about Israel or the United States, I also speak about the Arabs. The Arabs in the Middle East also don’t want to see Iran standing on its feet again. We want them fully collapsing, so a new Iran can be born, a new peaceful, secular Iran can be born out of it, but not dealing with the Iranian Islamic regime anymore, the revolutionary regime anymore. For this to happen, the U.S. has one of two options, maybe easier to go with the negotiations route, because at the end of the day, war cannot go forever, there has to be an end to the war. And so this is one route, or what the U.S. is discussing right now, of arming some groups on the ground, like the Kurds, like other groups inside Iran, in order to put the pressure against the regime. Because actually, maybe in the initial days of the war, President Trump, when he called upon the Iranian people to go back to the street and fight against the Iranian regime, he didn’t account for the fact that it’s very costly for them right now. If you are an 18-year-old student, an activist, and your colleagues, tens of thousands of your colleagues, have been murdered by this regime just two weeks ago, you will hesitate to go back to the street, knowing that you yourself will be killed, especially at a time when the Iranian regime has nothing to lose, and it’s really willing to practice utmost force against its own people and against even its neighbors, as we are seeing right now. So this is very risky. So the people did not go to the streets, they celebrated, they were happy, but they did not go to the street to bring down the regime.

So the other option that the U.S. is considering now is arming the Kurds or some other groups to do the job from inside. In my opinion, this will be very dangerous. I feel like it’s repeating the same scenario we’ve seen in Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan before that. It starts with arming activist groups inside, turning them from nonviolent activists into violent activists, and then this will create a power, a force inside the country that will later refuse to put down their weapons and go back to being peaceful after they tasted the power of having a weapon. And we will end up having a civil war, which is a scenario I don’t like to see in Iran, because it will be a huge risk to everyone. So I hope there will be an alternative to this. The United States will not take down this route with the Kurds, because, by the way, also once again, the Kurds are not only in Iran, they are also in Iraq, in Syria, in Turkey. And you don’t want to destabilize this region, really, the Levant[?] and southern Turkey. You don’t want to destabilize this. It will be a big mess if we do that, a really big mess. This is what will lead to a regional war. So let’s hope this will not happen. And I hope there will be another alternative. Also, I don’t agree with the negotiations. There is no way to go back to negotiating after you already have the upper hand in the war now. What to negotiate on exactly? Negotiate that they remain in power? This does not make any sense. So I believe the only option for the U.S. now is to go on with this war, the U.S. and Israel, to keep going on with this war until they are 100% sure that the leadership is annihilated. And maybe at that point, we can discuss the day after, but not now.

Sarah: So do you think there is a possibility that the United States might commit ground troops to help the protesters take over the regime?

Dalia: There are some reports now about that. But the issue is that, look, if you look, for example, at the Arab Spring[?] countries, in the examples that succeeded and did not fall in civil wars, like in Tunisia and in Egypt, one of the main factors, and I was there, I was on the ground, so I’m telling you what I know firsthand. One of the main factors, we succeeded in 2012. And then later in 2013, when the Muslim Brotherhood took over, we succeeded in bringing down the dictator, not because we were so powerful, we were so young, so naive, so nonviolent, by the way. But the issue is that the military took our side. The military had an interest at that time to side with the people so they get rid of the dictator or later get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood. So the military had an interest, and thus it put its military power, its military force, a highly organized military force behind the nonviolent protesters. And this led to the success of these revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and also prevented the collapse into or the fall into a civil war after the fall of the dictator. Compare this to the example of Iran right now. The issue is that the Iranian regime or the bond between the Iranian military forces and police force, the Basij, the Revolutionary Guard, and so the armed forces, in other words, the bond between the armed forces in Iran and the Iranian regime is not a political bond. It’s an ideological bond, which means for them, for the military personnel, it’s easier and even religiously and legally justified to kill these activists, to kill their fellow Iranians, despite being nonviolent, despite being young, despite being helpless, to protect this regime. Why? Because for them, this is not a political regime. They are the agents of God on the ground. It’s a religious belief, a very strong religious belief that Ayatollah is like a version of God on the ground.

So, of course, you will not go against this version if you are a military personnel trained to obey and serve this Ayatollah. No, you will even sacrifice your life to protect him while you will look at your fellow Iranians as mosquitoes. You can kill them with cold blood. So, keeping this in mind, it’s almost impossible to expect that at one point the military forces inside, including the Basij, which are actually kind of a militia assisting the Revolutionary Guard, it’s very hard to expect that at any moment they will take the side of the Iranian people against the Islamic regime, unfortunately. So, there are no other options left other than maybe creating militia among these young people, which once again, in my opinion, it will be very dangerous and will not lead to something good in Iran.

Sarah: So, there are 93 million people in Iran. I heard that approximately 15% are really fervently religious believers. So, how will that break down? Do you think that Iran could pull apart and break up into different ethnicities at one point? [inaudible]

Dalia: It’s difficult. No, I don’t think they will fall apart like we’ve seen in Syria, for example, in Libya, in Yemen, in such places. Why? Because although, of course, there are like three main ethnic divisions and just two other minors, they still… Okay, Iran is a very big civilization. It really has its roots deep in history. And countries with such deep culture and history, they have a sense of homogeneous fabric that goes beyond their ethnic differences. I can tell this, at least from my experience in Egypt. It’s really, no matter the religious and ethnic differences, there is a common factor that keeps these people together. Like in Egypt, it’s the same thing in Iran.

It’s very culturally rooted and a very big and important civilization. So, it’s very hard to expect that they will fall into these ethnic divisions because the core, the Persian core, that Persian history core, historical Persian core, that glues them together is still very strong and very intact. And by the way, this was the motivation behind all the need for change that was happening, including, by the way, among the religious groups or the groups who are loyal to the Islamic regime. It’s also important for them. Beside this Islamic identity or Shia Islamic identity that honors this regime, it’s also their Persian identity. And I would say arrogance also is part of this, is an important part of their identity. So, it’s not only the Islamic part. So, I don’t think we will see a tragic scenario like Syria or Libya or Yemen or so in Iran. I’m more optimistic about Iran in this regard.

Sarah: That’s wonderful. So, can you, I think you’ve left us on a very upbeat and positive note. And do you feel there’s going to be a realignment looking towards the future of the Middle East, where most of the Arab countries will look towards the United States and Israel and perhaps Turkey?

Dalia: Oh, yes, of course. Even more, actually, as Turkey also is getting stronger and stronger as a rival to Israel on setting[?] the future of- or the agenda of the future of the Middle East, we will see Arab countries leaning more and more on the side of Israel and the United States. And I’m saying also the side of Israel because just by, if you said and calculated by a pen and paper, who hurt Arabs more? It’s Turkey, actually, more than Israel. Israel has been a great neighbor to all its Arab neighbors, including at times of tensions, at times of wars. And so Israel has been a good neighbor for at least four or five decades now. So, there is no logic why they would not take the side of Israel. And even inside countries like Saudi Arabia, which, of course, we saw like a rise in the anti-Semitic rhetoric against Israel in the past few weeks and so. But when you speak to policymakers there, when you speak off the record with them, they say, “No, eventually we want to have peace with Israel, of course, but we want certain things to happen before we can do that.” Because also don’t forget that, unfortunately, there are still Islamist groups in Arab countries that are very powerful.

They are leading the mainstream in these Arab countries, and they have a say in everything and they have the power to pressure decision makers and policymakers in these countries and leaderships and so. So, they also put them into account. They want to make sure their domestic audience will be pleased with their actions. So, once again, as I said earlier, eventually Arabs will put their bet on the stronger horse. And if Israel remains a stronger horse, they will definitely take the side of Israel and try to make peace in the region as much as possible.

Sarah: So, the map is being reshaped as we speak. This is really wonderful. Dalia Ziada, you are a wonderful, courageous woman, such an intellectual powerhouse and an absolute gem. Dalia is also a fellow at the Institute for Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy. Her writings are so worth reading. She is just a treasure for all of us. Thank you so much, Dalia. And for us to continue to do our work, please, if you can, contribute to emetonline.org so that we could continue going on Capitol Hill every day and having these wonderful webinars with wonderful people such as Dalia Ziada. Thank you, Dalia.

Dalia: Thank you so much, Sarah. Thank you.
[END]