Should Israel Cross Russia‘s Rubicon?

(August 12, The National Interest)

After Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, most of the Western world united in its support for Ukraine against the Russian assault. The United States and its allies across Europe, Northeast Asia, and Australasia imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Russia, reduced diplomatic ties with Moscow, and began providing Kyiv with enormous quantities of economic, humanitarian, and military aid. Nevertheless, Israel did not go nearly as far as most other Western democracies in its support for Kyiv.

As we wrote in a previous article, Jerusalem has limited its assistance to rhetorical volleys, humanitarian aid, and some provision of intelligence, refraining from providing Kyiv with weapons and declining to participate in the international sanctions regime against Russia. Given Israel’s alignment with the American-led Western bloc in the new cold war against the Sino-Russian-Iranian Eurasian bloc, such a posture might seem surprising. However, Israel’s calculus becomes clearer when we consider Jerusalem’s need for freedom of action in striking Iranian targets in Syria and its desire to blunt the consolidation of Russia’s alliance with Iran, Israel’s archenemy.

The origins of the modern Russo-Iranian alliance date back to the two countries’ cooperation in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Shortly after the Syrian conflict began in 2011, Iran—with its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah began dispatching assets to Syria to prop up the Assad regime. Over time, Iran created a foothold in the country, viewing Syria as a second front—along with Lebanon—from which to threaten Israel. Tehran began shuttling troops and advanced weapons from Iran into Syria to fortify its new Levantine stronghold. Israel, concerned about this new Iranian footprint, started conducting airstrikes against Iranian and Iranian proxy targets in Syria in 2013.

After the Assad regime used chemical weapons to murder Syrian civilians in 2013, Russia offered a diplomatic solution to the crisis that prevented potential American strikes against Syria. Two years later, in 2015, as Assad’s regime neared collapse, Russia mounted a military intervention to both rescue Assad and maintain its existing foothold in Syria. Together with Iran, Russia saved Assad’s government from defeat. Russia and Iran developed a close military partnership, as Iranian proxies fought Syrian rebels on the ground while Russian planes bombed them from the sky.

Saving the Assad regime led to an expanded Russian military presence in Syria. Russia not only modernized and enlarged the base it had held in Tartus since 1967 but also acquired a new air base at Khmeimim. It deployed ground units and military police throughout Syria, and its planes began dominating the western and central Syrian skies. Most importantly, it deployed the sophisticated S-300 and S-400 air defense systems to Syria.

In this environment, Israel and Russia established a deconfliction channel to ensure that Israeli and Russian assets in and over Syria would not clash. Under this arrangement, Russia stood by as Israel repeatedly struck Iranian and Iranian proxy assets. Moscow and Jerusalem reached a mutually beneficial modus vivendi, whereby the former maintained its dominant position in Syria while the latter degraded Iran’s capabilities. Despite Russia and Iran being on the same side in the Syrian war, Russia accepted that Israel would attack and eliminate Iranian targets.

The eruption of the Russo-Ukrainian war challenged this Russo-Israeli arrangement in Syria. As Russia took massive losses in Ukraine, it began withdrawing units previously stationed in Syria to shore up its force posture in Europe, including at least one S-300 system. Israeli officials began fretting that a diminution of Russia’s position in Syria would lead to the enhancement of that of Iran. Nonetheless, Israel maintained its communication channel with Russia to ensure that their forces would not clash. Israel also muted its criticism of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for fear that Moscow would punish it in the Syrian theater.

The Russo-Israeli modus vivendi in Syria, which had become tenuous after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, collapsed with the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. Outraged by Russian support for Hamas, Israel now no longer always notifies Russia ahead of its strikes against Iranian targets in Syria. The new policy means that, although Israel does not attack Russian assets in Syria, it does not consistently allow Russia to prepare for Israeli sorties. Israel and Russia now eye each other with deep suspicion across the Israeli-Syrian border. For Israel, the situation in Syria looks increasingly bleak.

Meanwhile, the Russo-Iranian partnership that began in Syria has now expanded to Ukraine and beyond. During the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, despite harboring similar grievances about the contours of the Western-dominated international system, Iran and Russia had adopted different approaches to redressing them: Iran, disruption, and Russia, accommodation. However, as Russia became increasingly isolated following its 2014 occupation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas, Moscow shifted to a more confrontational approach, bringing it into greater alignment with Iran’s grand strategy. Russia and Iran now find themselves united in a full-fledged challenge to the global order.

This partnership is manifest in a myriad of ways. In Ukraine, Tehran has emerged as one of Russia’s chief weapons suppliers, providing Moscow with drones, missiles, and ammunition and sending advisors to Russian-occupied Crimea. In August 2022, Russia launched an Iranian satellite into space. Russia and Iran have also made significant progress on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), an international transportation network stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf meant to bypass the Western-dominated Mediterranean. Iran has also become the chief buyer of Russian wheat and has approved a strategic partnership between its national oil company and Russian hydrocarbons conglomerate Gazprom. To lessen its dependence on the Western-dominated SWIFT financial payments platform and counter the hegemony of the U.S. dollar, Russia connected its payments system with that of Iran. Now, as the possibility of a further escalation of the Middle Eastern war looms, Russia has reportedly been delivering sophisticated air defense and radar systems to Tehran.

Jerusalem now looks on with trepidation as the relationship between Moscow and Tehran has evolved into a strategic partnership with military, diplomatic, economic, and technological dimensions. Iran keeps inching closer to developing nuclear weapons while also continuing to wage war against Israel through Hamas, Hezbollah, and other proxies. Meanwhile, a Russia that is increasingly aligned with Iran and Hamas peers across the border from Syria. Although Israel had sought to appease Russia after it initially invaded Ukraine, this relatively passive approach has resulted in Israel’s standing idly by as Russia and Iran have consolidated a wide-ranging alliance, and Russia has sided with Iran against Israel in the ongoing Middle Eastern conflict.

Given this geopolitical architecture, Israel should consider at least wading into, if not outright crossing, the Rubicon and begin more actively supporting Ukraine against Russia in the medium term. Clearly, with the Middle East on edge at the moment, Israel has other, far more urgent priorities. However, if and when regional tensions begin to recede, it is time for a course correction in Israel’s strategy toward the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Jerusalem should gradually and quietly expand its support for Kyiv, focusing on increasing intelligence support for Ukraine and, to the extent it will be able to spare them, sending Kyiv a handful of defensive systems and munitions.

Doing so would provide several significant benefits. First, it would increase the chances of Ukrainian success on the battlefield and dent Russian power. Second, further Israeli support for Kyiv could tie the Israeli cause closer to that of Ukraine in the Western imagination. At a time when Western support for Israel is faltering, associating Israel with Ukraine, whose struggle has captured the hearts and minds of many in the West, might yield considerable benefits. Overall, it would signal that Israel recognizes its role in the broader clash between the Western and Eurasian blocs and indicate to its allies and adversaries alike that it is a capable actor ready to help its partners and cripple its foes. It would put both Russia and Iran on notice that Jerusalem will respond to their anti-Israel alignment not only in the deserts of the Middle East but also on the plains of Eastern Europe.

Anthony De Luca-Baratta is an intern at the Center for the National Interest, where his research centers on technology and defense policy. He is a Public Service Fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). When he is back home in Montreal, he is a proud member of JC’s morning hockey league.

William Erich Ellison is a rising second-year PhD student at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His research interests include the U.S.-Israel relationship, the transatlantic relationship, and Israel’s relationships with major powers in a multipolar world. You can follow him on X at @Will51796.

Joseph Schneider Malamud is a rising second-year MAIR student at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Research Intern at the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET). His research interests include European and Israeli domestic politics and their interaction with their geopolitics and national security concerns. Follow him on LinkedIn.