The Palestinian cause will not end Saudi-Israeli normalization

No matter how much they are disproven, some old notions refuse to die.

Take the notion that Israel will never be able to establish normal ties with Arab states before solving the Palestinian conflict. This idea had been enshrined in American foreign policy until the signing of the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords in September 2020, when four Arab states agreed to normalize relations with Israel.

Until then, the prospect of warm Arab-Israeli relations as opposed to cold peace with Egypt and Jordan without a two-state solution was unthinkable for many. In 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry famously remarked there would be “no separate peace between Israel and the Arab world” without peace with the Palestinians. The Abraham Accords upended that notion.

Yet as a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal is closer than ever, despite the lack of a path toward Palestinian statehood, the same claims have emerged. As recently as last year, the Saudi Foreign Ministry stated that a two-state solution was a prerequisite to normalization. Yet, most Middle East observers understand that official statements are often not aligned with actual policy.

Before the Oct. 7 massacre, Senate Democrats had pushed the Biden administration to pressure Israel harder than the Saudis for concessions to Palestinian statehood. As Axios reported at the time, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman claimed he needed a Palestinian component to get support for any deal at home and in the Arab world. What he sought were not real concessions to the Palestinians, but the appearance of real concessions.

The war in Gaza has not changed this equation. In September, bin Salman reportedly told then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken that he would need six months to a year of quiet in the Gaza Strip as part of a normalization deal. He also reportedly told Blinken that he personally “doesn’t care” about the Palestinian cause.

For moderate Arab autocracies, such as the Gulf states, the Palestinian issue is a headache. It has been the most effective radicalizing and mobilizing cause throughout the Arab world. It also has been at the center of left-wing nationalist and Islamist revolutionary movements in the region. Failed wars, the assassinations of heads of state, insurgencies in Jordan and Lebanon, and Houthi strikes on international shipping lanes have all been carried out in the name of the Palestinian cause.

To Riyadh, security guarantees and nuclear-program assistance are much more valuable than concessions for the Palestinians.

Since becoming the de facto ruler in 2017, MBS has pursued a “Saudi-first” agenda focusing on turning his country into a technological and investment hub. He aims to reduce dependence on oil sales and promote nationalism separate from religion in a program known as the Saudi Vision 2030 project. In Saudi politics, Vision 2030 is the priority and to accomplish it, the country needs stability.

Thus, the center of Saudi Arabia’s demands will be seeking help in deterring Iran, which, for decades, has directly threatened the kingdom through proxy attacks, drug trafficking and exploiting sectarian feuds within the Shia community in Saudi’s eastern province.

Traditionally, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has centered around a simple exchange—the Saudis provide oil and sell that oil in dollars, and Washington provides security guarantees. This understanding, however, changed after Barack Obama became president in 2008. Obama’s Middle East policy centered around extracting the United States from the region, leaving Saudi Arabia and Iran to “learn how to share the neighborhood.”

President Joe Biden continued Obama’s foreign policy. He also angered the kingdom before becoming president by promising to “make a pariah” of MBS for the 2018 assassination of dissident Jamal Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist. While President Donald Trump has a much better relationship with the Saudis, concerns that a successive administration may revert to Obama-era policies have continued.

In future talks, Riyadh will likely seek serious U.S. security guarantees. Past talks have centered around a defense pact with formal U.S. promises to defend the kingdom, as well as access to more advanced U.S. weaponry. The Saudis will need to be assured that successive American presidents won’t be able to cancel any defense agreement.

Saudi Arabia has insisted, in past negotiations, on U.S. support for a civilian nuclear program. While Riyadh alleges such a program would not be used for military purposes, MBS has said that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would “follow suit as soon as possible.”

While MBS may not care about the Palestinian cause himself, he recognizes its ability to galvanize the masses. Thus, the appearance of true concessions on behalf of Palestinians is important. MBS is popular and does not want to lose the trust of citizens. The majority of the Saudi population is young—with a median age of 29—and many were introduced to the Palestinian cause through the current conflict and have sympathy for the suffering of civilians. To win them over, MBS needs to show that he has helped the Palestinian people.

However, he recognizes the Palestinian cause for what it is: a self-destructive, revolutionary ideology chasing the dream of destroying Israel. He has seen how much it has harmed the Palestinian people, keeping them destitute with a bleak future. Unlike the Palestinian leadership, when considering peace with Israel, the Saudi leader will place his people’s future above Arab nationalist fantasies.