The Saudi Shift

In recent years, the relationship among the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia has undergone a profound transformation. New regional alliances, escalating security threats, and shifting leadership priorities have reshaped the diplomatic and strategic landscape, producing a significant realignment among these three nations.

A pivotal moment came just weeks before October 7, 2023, when Washington and Jerusalem believed Riyadh was on the verge of joining the Abraham Accords. The outbreak of war in Gaza, however, coupled with shifting public sentiment inside Saudi Arabia, dramatically reduced the likelihood of such an agreement materializing in the near term.

One of the central fault lines has emerged in Yemen. Under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has continued to back Yemen’s internationally recognized government, now operating under the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which is fighting the Iranian-backed Houthi movement and remains committed to preserving Yemeni unity.

For years, it appeared—at least on the surface—that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were aligned in confronting Iranian expansionism, counterterrorism threats, and broader regional diplomacy. Yet in early 2026, the UAE shifted its support to the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist faction founded in 2017 that seeks control of southern Yemen and its strategic ports along the coastline.

Although the STC also opposes the Houthis, its primary objective is southern secession—directly contradicting Saudi Arabia’s commitment to a unified Yemeni state. This divergence marked a decisive break between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

The UAE, led by President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), is a federation of seven emirates, with Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum serving as Vice President and ruler of Dubai. By early 2026, the once-close partnership between MBZ and Mohammad bin Salman had visibly frayed. Both nations aspire to economic primacy in the Gulf, and long-simmering rivalries have resurfaced. Disputes over OPEC cohesion and the region’s economic trajectory have only intensified these tensions.

Saudi Arabia increasingly views the UAE’s expanding footprint in the Horn of Africa and along the Red Sea as a challenge to its own regional dominance. At the same time, Riyadh’s ambitious Vision 2030 initiative has not generated the transformative momentum originally anticipated, fostering growing resentment toward Emirati ascendancy.

The rivalry has extended beyond Yemen. When fighting erupted in Khartoum in April 2023, Saudi Arabia—alongside Turkey and Egypt—backed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The UAE, by contrast, supported the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), formerly known as the Janjaweed militia, supplying them with weaponry.

Both factions have been implicated in atrocities against ethnic minorities and in widespread violence under the cover of war. The conflict has evolved into one of the world’s gravest humanitarian crises, displacing approximately 14 million people and resulting in catastrophic loss of life.

Perhaps most concerning has been the marked increase in antisemitic rhetoric emanating from Saudi Arabia. Riyadh appears to be moving closer to the Islamist bloc—particularly Turkey and Qatar—and strengthening ties with Pakistan, signaling a recalibration of its foreign policy orientation.

Saudi state media and educational materials have intensified attacks on Jews and Israel. “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” continues to circulate widely and is cited in some circles as factual. Textbooks and news outlets frequently feature hostile portrayals of Jews and the Jewish state. Israelis—and individuals whose passports bear Israeli entry stamps—have long been barred from entering the Kingdom.

On January 23, 2026, the Anti-Defamation League warned of the “increasing frequency and volume of prominent Saudi voices—analysts, journalists, and preachers—using openly antisemitic dog whistles and aggressively pushing anti-Abraham Accords rhetoric, often while peddling conspiracy theories about ‘Zionist plots.’”

Just weeks later, on February 11, 2026, the UAE reportedly lobbied the American Jewish Committee, which maintains a satellite office in Dubai, to issue a statement addressing the surge in antisemitic rhetoric from Saudi Arabia. The AJC declined to take sides in the growing Gulf rift.

The UAE, as a signatory to the Abraham Accords, has prioritized a security-first approach, emphasizing the exclusion of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Islamist actors from political legitimacy. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, appears to be aligning more closely with Turkey and Qatar—actors that have shown little willingness to engage diplomatically with Israel.

A decade ago, a Saudi tilt toward Ankara or Doha would have seemed extraordinary. Today, however, such a shift reflects a notable recalibration in Riyadh’s strategic posture. The war in Gaza has only deepened these divides.

As President Trump increases American military deployments to the region, frustration in Washington has become more pronounced. At the Munich Security Conference, Senator Lindsey Graham expressed that frustration bluntly:

“Knock it off, Saudi Arabia; knock it off. I am tired of this. MBZ is not a Zionist, and you are emboldening Iran by having this conflict.”

The emerging Saudi shift carries significant implications—not only for Gulf politics, but for the broader architecture of U.S.–Israeli–Arab relations. Whether this represents a temporary tactical repositioning or a durable strategic realignment remains to be seen.

Sarah N. Stern is Founder and President of the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET), a Middle East policy institute and think tank in Washington, DC.