Who Are the Winners and Losers in the Fall of Syria’s Assad?

(December 9, 2024 / Newsweek)

In 2016, I broke a Ramadan fast with a group of Syrian ex-rebels fighters in the Turkish town of Kilis, three miles from the Syrian border. We shared dates, erksous—a bittersweet drink made of licorice root—copious amounts of food and hookahs, while they told me their war stories and described the brutality of the regime. They were outraged by the government’s atrocities, including makeshift barrel bombs dropped on their hometowns, sarin gas deployed against civilians, and the horrible torture techniques employed by the Mukhabarat, Bashar Al-Assad‘s feared intelligence agency.

A fighter nicknamed “the Cat,” because had—so far—survived being shot eight times, told me he’d lost all hope of victory. Indeed, with ISIS flags waving just across the border, rebel forces in shambles and the Bashar al-Assad regime bolstered by Iran and Russia, Syria’s future seemed bleak.

Yet over the weekend, suddenly, and to much of the world’s surprise, the despotic regime of the al-Assad family fell and Assad himself, with his wife and children, escaped to Moscow, where he was granted political asylum.

There is no country active in the region that won’t be affected by the regime’s collapse. But those with the largest stakes are Turkey, Iran, Russia, Israel, and the United States.

Assad gave up his country’s autonomy for Russian and Iranian help. Without them, the regime would have collapsed years ago. The fact that neither could stop the latest rebel offensive shows how bogged down both Moscow and Tehran have become in their military conflicts with Ukraine and Israel, respectively.

Indeed, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has helped lead to its abrupt decline in influence in Central Asia, the South Caucasus and now the Middle East.

And now, the fall of the regime is a major blow to Moscow. Russia had no better friend than Assad. Putin doesn’t much appreciate strong allies, preferring subordinates. Assad was a weak leader happy to give up control for his own survival. He let Russia use his territory however it wanted in exchange for patronage.

Now, Russia will have to negotiate with the new government—whose leaders are yet to be determined—over the future of its military bases and advanced S-400 missile defense system still in the country. Rebels have reportedly captured intact crucial components of the system, meaning it could potentially be reverse engineered.

But the ultimate loser from the fall of the Assad regime is Iran.

In the past, Tehran has used Hezbollah to support Assad against rebel forces. Its own military is incapable of doing so—Iran specializes in irregular warfare and its conventional forces are weak and largely ineffective. Its air force still uses Soviet-era MiG-29 fighter jets. With Hezbollah greatly weakened by Israel, there was nothing Tehran could do. In fact, the weakening of Hezbollah created the necessary conditions for the rebel takeover. All the same, the failure to prevent the inevitable has reportedly caused serious discontent within the Iranian security services.

The loss of Syria is particularly damaging to Iran as any government formed by rebels will be hostile to Tehran and its proxies. This means the collapse of the so-called “Shia corridor”—or Iran’s land route from its borders to the Mediterranean Sea through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Without this supply corridor, rearming Hezbollah becomes extremely complicated if not impossible.

Where Iran is a loser, Israel is a winner. Just before the regime fell, high-ranking Israeli officials told the Hebrew-language tabloid Israel Hayom they prefer the rebels over Assad. For Israel, the top priority is weakening the Iranian “axis of resistance.”

Indeed, with Hamas largely destroyed and Hezbollah a shell of its former self, the loss of Assad is a major blow to the axis. Even if the new rulers in Damascus are hostile to Israel, they will not cooperate with Iran. Tehran’s only hope is to form a proxy in the rubble of the regime among the Alawites (an offshoot of Shiism of which Assad was a part) or other Shia minorities. To prevent such a possibility, these groups must be incorporated into the new ruling government. Otherwise, Iran will use sectarian strife to its advantage as it has done in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Israel is taking efforts to ensure conflict does not spill over its borders. The Israel Defense Forces recently declared the Syrian border a “closed military zone” and temporarily captured strategic military border posts abandoned by the Syrian army. Jerusalem also carried out airstrikes on a regime chemical weapons factories and rocket stockpiles to prevent them from falling into rebel hands.

Israel’s goal seems to be to stay out of Syria as much as possible. With the war in Gaza and fragile peace in Lebanon, Jerusalem does not want a new front. It will likely get its way. The chances that even a hostile, Islamist government in Syria would pose a serious threat is minimal.

The biggest winner so far is Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has backed the rebels since 2011 and has thus expanded his nation’s foothold in the region. Erdogan will likely seek to play a large part in state building. He could potentially pressure Islamist elements of the rebel forces to step back.

Turkey’s main concern in Syria is creating a Kurd-free buffer zone on its border and having operational freedom against the U.S.-backed People’s Defense Units (YPG)—the largest Kurdish militia active in Syria and affiliate of the Kurdistan Worker’s (PKK), which is branded a terrorist organization by Turkey. Unless the United States steps in, Erdogan will use the opportunity to carry out offensives against the Kurds. Already, Turkish-backed rebels have taken the northern city of Manbij and surrounding area from Kurdish forces.

However, Washington may be able to broker an agreement between the sides as there is precedence to Turkish-Kurdish peace. The ruling Barzani family of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government has long had good relations with Turkey while maintaining Kurdish autonomy.

With U.S. ally Turkey muscling out Russia and Iran, the United States is a winner as well. Although Turkey is often a problematic partner, Erdogan is preferable to Washington over Putin or Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

For the Syrians, the only way forward that will lead to peace is a government void of sectarian strife. The new Syria must be for all its citizens, no matter their religion or ethnicity. Turkey and the U.S. should help implement such a vision. The risks are high, Syria could follow in the footsteps of Lebanon, Yemen, or Iraq, meaning more bloodshed and anguish.

While examining the geopolitical ramifications of the fall of the regime, I can’t help but think back to that night in Kilis. The anise smell of shisha-tobacco, the reviving tea after a large meal, the warm summer breeze. While the future of Syria is a daunting question mark, the fall of the Assad dynasty, which has brutalized the Syrian people for more than 50 years, offers respite to its many, many victims and their families. And for my rebel friends, the return of hope they had lost for a brighter future.

Joseph Epstein is the director for legislative affairs at the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET), a fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.