Why Lebanon Won’t Make Peace With Israel

On Friday, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun declared, “Lebanon does not intend to pursue normalization with Israel,” though he left open the idea of “peace” as merely an absence of war. This ambiguous stance reflects Lebanon’s long-standing refusal to acknowledge Israel as a legitimate regional partner, despite shifting regional dynamics and significant recent Israeli military successes.

Since Israel’s founding in 1948, its relationship with Lebanon has been marred by conflict, including major wars in 1978, 1982, and 2006. While Israeli actions on Lebanese soil left scars, the far greater long-term damage has come from the unchecked presence of Hezbollah—an Iranian proxy embedded within Lebanon’s military, government, and civil society. The group has fired over 10,000 rockets into Israel, most recently following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, massacre, and has provoked widespread devastation on both sides of the border.

Despite these provocations, Israel has acted with increasing precision. In July 2024, the IDF eliminated Fuad Shukr, the mastermind behind the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing that killed 241 U.S. servicemen. In September, “Operation Grim Reaper” wiped out 42 high-ranking Hezbollah commanders through the coordinated detonation of beepers and walkie-talkies. Days later, Hezbollah’s elusive leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was eliminated in a targeted Israeli strike, while asleep in his underground bunker in Beirut.

One might think such setbacks would lead Lebanon to reconsider its hostile posture toward Israel. Hezbollah’s dominance has been severely neutered by the IDF. Yet internal paralysis, ancient resentments, deeply entrenched feelings of national and ethnic identity and a political system rooted in sectarianism render peace almost unthinkable.

Lebanon’s government is divided among 18 officially recognized religious sects. This confessionalist structure makes consensus rare and foreign policy decisions nearly impossible. Hezbollah, with its allegiance to Iran, unfortunately still holds disproportionate power within Lebanon’s government, effectively vetoing any move toward normalization. Its raison d’être is Israel’s destruction, not peaceful coexistence.

Moreover, Lebanon continues to frame its national identity through the lens of anti-Israel “resistance,” clinging to unresolved issues like the Shebaa Farms dispute and the Palestinian refugee presence. While other Arab states—such as the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco—have embraced normalization, Lebanon remains stuck in an outdated and self-defeating alignment.

Many Lebanese fear political or even violent repercussions if they openly advocate for peace with Israel. Lebanon’s internal political scene is inextricably linked to these larger historical wounds. Political parties and leaders often exploit external threats, especially those posed by Israel, to consolidate their own power and legitimacy. Although a much-weakened Hezbollah continues to position itself not only as a military force but also as a protector of Lebanese sovereignty, making any move toward conciliation with Israel politically fraught.

Yet the reality on the ground remains grim. Ordinary Lebanese citizens bear the brunt of this geopolitical deadlock, enduring economic hardship, sporadic violence, and a perpetual sense of instability. Many harbor private hopes for a future free from perpetual conflict, but fear, intimidation, and a fractured political reality keep aspirations for peace suppressed. The shadow cast by Hezbollah stifles both dissent and dialogue, ensuring that the status quo—however damaging—persists.

While younger generations increasingly look outward, inspired by the progress of neighboring nations and frustrated by their own stalled prospects, they find themselves caught between memory and possibility. The wounds of past wars, propaganda, and the ever-present threat of retribution for dissent have bred a culture of caution, if not resignation.

International mediation, though often attempted, has struggled to gain meaningful traction so long as Lebanon’s internal divisions and external allegiances remain unresolved.

In such an environment, the specter of normalization can easily be weaponized against rivals, with accusations of collaboration or weakness quickly surfacing in public discourse.

Even moderate voices are wary of being branded traitors. This is not diplomacy; it is extortion by terror.

The international community, particularly the United States, has an opportunity to push for change. But pressure must be applied strategically. As long as Hezbollah remains entrenched and a weakened Iran continues to fund terror, peace will remain elusive. Real progress will come only when Lebanon liberates itself from the grip of foreign-backed militancy and embraces the path of normalization—one that serves not only Israel’s security but Lebanon’s own chance at prosperity.

Unfortunately, winning wars does not necessarily undo long-held grievances.  Any discussion of peace with Israel inevitably stirs up ancient anxieties and reignites regnant debates over national and ethnic identity and the ultimate price for compromise. Peace within Lebanon is viewed through the jaundiced prism of decades of cynicism and weighed down by generations of public disillusionment and distrust.

Until then, Israel must continue defending its citizens with strength, precision, and resolve, while extending an open hand to any future Lebanese leadership courageous enough to choose peace over paralysis.

Sarah N. Stern is Founder and President of EMET, a think tank and policy institute specializing in the Middle East.