When ‘Lebanonization’ is a good thing

In the summer of 2024, I attended several meetings on Capitol Hill with Lt. Col. (res.) Sarit Zehavi of the Israel Defense Forces, president of the Alma Center, an Israel-based think tank focused on developments in Israel’s northern front—Lebanon and Syria.

At the time, tensions with Hezbollah, still led by its senior leader, Hassan Nasrallah, were bubbling. It would be about two months later that Israel would initiate a widespread offensive against the terrorist organization, beginning with the pager and walkie-talkie operation, and peaking with the elimination of Nasrallah himself. In Syria, it was about five months later that President Bashar Assad would be ousted, giving way to the rise of a new regime.

Our meetings on Capitol Hill, with members of Congress and their staffers, were heavily focused on these two arenas. However, at times the conversation would also naturally shift to Gaza, as Capitol Hill dwellers were interested in our assessment of developments in the southern enclave. On several occasions, Sarit took that opportunity to make a comment that really stuck with me, saying that “Israel does not wish to see a ‘Lebanonization’ of Gaza.”

Her reference in that comment was to Israel’s experience during the first Lebanon War in 1982. At the time, the end of intense warfare came with the expulsion of PLO figures from Beirut, away from Israel’s border and to the faraway land of Tunisia. Conditions on the ground, however, remained unstable and compelled the IDF to maintain a presence in Southern Lebanon for the next 18 years. During that time, IDF soldiers were considered “sitting ducks,” easy targets for Amal (later, Hezbollah) operatives. While the IDF maintained mostly defensive positions, Hezbollah did what it could to grow stronger, with considerable success.

In the year 2000, with the IDF’s unilateral withdrawal from the country, Hezbollah was able to quickly take over. Just five months after the withdrawal, three IDF soldiers were killed, and their bodies were taken while patrolling the Israeli-Lebanese border. In 2006, the killing and abduction of two more soldiers ignited the Second Lebanon War. It was these developments, after Israel had finished its cross-border presence in Lebanon, which marked the 18-year endeavor as a failure. The sacrifice of tremendous military assets, including the lives of approximately 400 soldiers over 18 years, had been in vain.

In this context, “Lebanonization” is certainly not a desired outcome of the war in Gaza. Military action places an incredible toll on the country pursuing it. This is especially true when said country’s army is a people’s army, relying mostly on reservists. Therefore, it must have an end, and to be justified requires an understanding that non-military means cannot currently achieve that end. Bogging down the IDF indefinitely in the streets, roadways and camps of the Gaza Strip, only for a withdrawal many years later with reality on the ground mostly unchanged, sounds nightmarish.

That said, the irony is not lost on me that following the escalation and subsequent ceasefire with Hezbollah in the months following those meetings on Capitol Hill, the term “Lebanonization” has taken on an entirely new meaning. The circumstances surrounding Israel’s security policy vis-à-vis its neighbor to the north are certainly not those of the year 2000, much less 2006. The ceasefire reached in November of last year has ushered in a new reality, marking Israel’s last foray into the Lebanese mud, finally, as a successful one.

Today, there is a wide international consensus, including in the Middle East, that Hezbollah must disarm in the entirety of Lebanon, and that its reluctance to do so poses a legitimate threat to Israel’s sovereignty. Hezbollah’s threat to Lebanon’s security—and the obstacle it poses to Lebanese stabilization and progress—is also recognized.

Given this, Israel enjoys wide operational freedom to enforce the ceasefire as it sees fit. It is no longer expected to rely on the likes of UNIFIL, whose complete incompetence was acknowledged with the recent decision to end its mandate at the end of 2026. With the freedom and international backing to strike Hezbollah-related targets, and with political pressure ramping up on Hezbollah, not on Israel, this new “Lebanonization” seems like a pretty darn good one.

What we’re now seeing in Gaza is an Israeli attempt to duplicate the same dynamic that exists on its northern front. Whether this attempt is a successful one will be determined by Israel’s actions against the very first infractions of the ceasefire by Hamas. Israel’s insistence on responding by force to every crossing of the yellow line and every assault against IDF soldiers by Hamas terrorists regardless of the excuses Hamas might try to make is welcome. Immediately following the Hamas attack on Oct. 28, which killed one soldier, Israel launched a series of strikes spanning roughly 24 hours, eliminating some 100 Hamas terrorists. All the while, Israel maintains its commitment to continue upholding the ceasefire at large, and to progress on Trump’s Mideast peace plan.

In Lebanon and Gaza, Israel remains adamant on enforcing the current ceasefires on its own in the way it sees fit. It maintains military leverages on the ground while keeping the door open to progress towards peaceful resolutions. In doing so, it enjoys the freedom to act as necessary, while upholding international legitimacy for its actions. Pressure is on Hamas to follow through on its commitments, just as it is on Hezbollah to disarm and on the Lebanese state to disarm it.

This new “Lebanonization” might just be what Israel needs in Gaza now.

Elad Israeli is the director of legislative affairs at the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET).